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ABSTRACT
Science In Politics: Eugenics, Sterilization, and
Genetic Screening

September 1988
Douglas C. Telling, B.A., Beloit College
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Glen Gordon

This work examined applications of genetic knowledge for

political purposes.

A debate exists over whether technology operates

according to deterministic imperatives or is subject to human control.
The central concern of this work, therefore, was the capability of the

political system to ensure that technological applications served ends

consonant with the democratic and moral values of the American political
system.
The first topic examined was the eugenic legacy.

Beginning in

the first third of this century as a nativistic enterprise, it was

transformed after the 1930's into the application of genetic knowledge
for the purposes of breeding a genetically perfected race.

contemporary sterilization practices followed.
of revived eugenics,

A review of

Despite the appearances

the lure of the technical fix proved to be a better

explanation for most sterilization uses studied.

The final case study

examined carrier, prenatal, and neonatal screening.

Particular

attention was paid to the legal status of the techniques, the politics
of their establishment and accessibility, and their potential future

applications.

All of the techniques examined extended society's ability

vi

to address the issues motivating their introduction, but they also

created new opportunities which extended their influence into new areas,

challenging existing values (e.g., reproduction, marriage, individual
autonomy, sanctity of life).

The final discussion examined the

political institutions' response to these techniques and their extended
influence.

Generally, the political system responded by addressing the

techniques narrowly, paying minimal attention to the social values

affected by the cumulative impact of the techniques.

The courts reduced

the techniques to individual rights and the legislatures narrowly

defined the issues as technical or responded to interest group
pressures.

The result was technological incrementalism.

For the

political system to control democratically the ends to which

technologies are applied, the legislative branches will have to act more

systematically and substantively.

institutionally and morally

— is

Politics as usual

— both

incapable of addressing the extended

responsibility required by technological politics.
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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between biology and politics is not a new

subject.

The eugenics movement, beginning in nineteenth century England

and spreading to the United States in the twentieth century, is the most

developed modern attempt to connect the two.
society increasingly dependent on science.

Today, the two mix in a
The interest in biology

grows in part from what biology can do for politics, but also as part of
the political system's broader interest in science.

The subject is of interest to a political scientist because of
the great promises made for the new biology and the fundamental nature
of

the research:

it

studies the biological keys to life.

But the

political scientist is also aware of the broader science/politics
context.

The experience with nuclear physics provides the policy

background against which biology will be examined here; and it is
important to realize that that legacy was, and is, contentious.

As a

society, we approached science and technology in search of a

"technological fix" that would cure an ill or improve

a

condition.

What

society came to discover was that the fix, while often doing what was

immediately promised, also brought with
environmental hazards.

it

new problems and

Consequently, many believed that scientists

imposed horrendous burdens on the human race, while others indicted

misguided (or evil) politics.

Now, at a relatively early stage of

research, the biological sciences are undergoing strict scrutiny.

1

This work is a case study of two among the many ways
public and

private power have employed biological techniques to achieve
power's
ends.

The hope underlying this work is that these examples
will provide

insights into how best to approach the developing relationships between
politics and biology.

1

During the second two-thirds of the twentieth century, power
(both public and private) has increasingly employed science to solve

problems and conquer frontiers.

1

Most notable has been the role of

physics; but the biological sciences, too, played an important role that

dates back to the first years of the century.

Organized in 1904, the

eugenics movement sought to exploit the young field of genetics in order
to control what many

eugenicists perceived to be a growing threat both

from new immigrants and, more generally, from those of lesser than

normal mental and physical stature.

Now, governments fund, regulate,

and deploy genetic knowledge as part of their public health function.
The private sector, too, has used it as a way to regulate the workplace.
The core of this work will examine this relationship between

biological knowledge and power.

inquisitive in nature

,

The study is descriptive and

seeking simply to understand the uses to which

various centers of power have put scientific knowledge and how best to

understand those practices.

The study begins by reviewing eugenics: the

first significant modern attempt to employ the knowledge and authority
of

the biological sciences for political ends.

2

Next, two examples of

3

.

this relationship, sterilization and genetic screening,
are reviewed.
Of overriding concern is the nature of this relationship:

control its own destiny.

Does politics

From this review, it is hoped we will be

better able to evaluate the new biological discoveries and
techniques
that are now flowing from scientific laboratories into our
political

economy

II

Recently, new medical technologies have thrust previously

private medical decisions into the headlines.

Baby Fae became a public

person as a result of technologies that allowed us to extend life in
time and quality.

Baby Jane Doe and Karen Ann Quinlan became notorious

because of a refusal to employ powerful technologies

.

2

These medical

technologies, and the promise in current genetic research of greater

capabilities, have provided us with the possibility of controlling life
in a most sophisticated manner.

French philosopher Michel Foucault offered a provocative account
of society's interest in the life sciences, an account that captures a

concern of this work:
But what might be called a society's "threshold of modernity" has
been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own
[Mjodern man is an animal whose politics
.
political strategies.
being in question.
living
as
a
existence
places his
.

.

Foucault's argument did not refer to such overt threats as
doomsday.

a

nuclear

Rather, he referred to a politics that treats as a political

question the nature of the "living being."

3

His account presented

politics managing life.

It

is a

bureaucratic relationship.

The

expansion of biological knowledge offers possibilities for the political
system to achieve its goals.

Politics exploits, in a subtle and precise

manner, the fact that man has

a body.

The direction of the action is important.

person.

Politics acts on the

The purposes and goals are those of politics, not science.

all students of science accept this last point.

Not

Some observers contend

that technology is out of control; that technology grows to meet its own

needs.

This precludes meaningful political action.^

science responds to the priorities of politics.

^

Others argue that

Granted, the

consequences of a deployed technology may necessitate

a

political

response (e.g., pollution), but these all occur within a politically

defined context.

The political system when confronted with

technologically-caused problems may re-evaluate the original purpose
behind deploying the technology in question.
is

that politics can choose.

The point of this position

Consequently, two of the general questions

under study are, first, whether or not the pattern of technology's

deployment reflects political choice or rather technological imperatives
and, second, to what extent is the body treated as a means toward

political ends.
In the following discussion politics generally will refer to

policy.

This involves, for example, concerns such as regulating the

sterilization of the mentally impaired.
issues of public and private.

But politics also encompasses

By this account strict enforcement of

the ethics of
rules would, under certain conditions, interfere with

4

.

medical practice, the doctor/ patient privileged relationship, and a
doctor's expertise.

In other words,

the public crosses into the private

when it interferes with the traditionally private relationship between

a

doctor and patient, a relationship generally constrained by the ethical

framework obligating the doctor to employ whatever means are necessary
to treat

the patient.

It

is

not uncommon for the public and private to

be merged under the rubric of "power".

Three aspects of the public-

private relationship account for this.

For one, both public and private

power view science instrumentally .

science can do for them.
mixed economy.

They support science for what

Another reason follows from an increasingly

As each realm becomes involved in the other's affairs,

their interests and needs (even identity) merge.

Finally, both realms

may be seen as serving different needs of the State or Order.
follows from membership in an organized collectivity.

This

Different

distributions of functions between the public and private realm reflect
a

to

polity's decision as to how the State operates.

But both realms exist

fulfill needs of the State and in that sense share common purposes.

Unless the State is defined as a- or non-political, this implies an

interest for the political scientist in both the public and private
realms
Finally, politics has a moral and ethical component.

In many

to
ways, this dimension is what defines the polity and gives it a reason

exist.

spirit.

This perspective encompasses concerns about life, nature, and

Returning to sterilization, from this perspective sterilization

may be objected to as unnatural or against God's wishes.
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This

represents

a

paradigmatic concern while the the issues of policy and

public/private exist at the level of consensus or contentious politics.
The thrust of this work is contentious analysis: analysis where the

analyst acts as moral critic questioning the specifics of policy

(although not necessarily the paradigmatic framework) with an eye toward

ensuring that the political system understands the consequences of its
actions and that these consequences are consonant with policy

objectives. ^

Most of the following will be within the context of

institutions and programs, but it is also intended to speak to politics
more broadly understood.
This study is confined to science in the United States.

Some

argue that science needs a democratic system, but from the success of

science in the Soviet Union we know that science can survive (maybe not
flourish) in a system better described as totalitarian than democratic.
The latter allows for an unfettered research system but has a limited

capacity to control the political dimension of scientific research,
while the former, better able to deal with the political side of

science, suffers from the tendency to an exaggerated influence on

scientific practice.

The following presumes the democratic context.

Ill

The fruits of scientific research have provided us with greatly

enhanced abilities.

These extended capabilities allow us to explore

areas ranging from the vastness of space to the minuteness of the atom.
In genetics,

scientists have been able to identify the basic units that

6

determine an individual's characteristics.

Specific diseases or

conditions can be identified before birth and this knowledge
may be used
to plan reproduction.

Science continues to expand our understanding of

the role genes play in our lives and, at a slower pace, brings
with that

knowledge the ability to act on those genes to attain desirable
goals.
These impact on politics because of the values that they affect and

political officials

interest in using the techniques as policy tools.

As genetics has deepened its understanding of the human body, the

political system has made the technological fruits of this research

available to the public.
But with these extended capabilities come strains to our

political, economic, and social fabric.

appropriateness of mankind "playing God."

Some question the

Others question mankind's

ability to make these judgments, even if it is appropriate.

Increasingly couples are confronted with the difficult decision of
aborting their fetus or letting it come into the world with mental or
physical defects.

These choices wrench the lives of the individuals and

challenge the values of large segments of the population.
we continue to push these limits?

"technological faith."

Why then do

One explanation resides in a

The motives here resemble those of the old PF

Flyers sneaker advertisements: we can run faster and jump higher if we

wear the correct sneaker.
of

By adopting improved technologies "[m]embers

the society are able to do more things, more efficiently, over

further distances, at much faster speeds."'’

benchmark of progress.
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These factors become a

The use of genetic techniques has moved from the explicitly

eugenic programs to therapeutic and diagnostic applications.
stage will involve more profound genetic manipulations.

adapted to serve political ends?

The next

Have these been

What unintended ends become served 7

Confronted with extended capabilities, has the political system been
able to reflect on these abilities, identify their strengths and

weaknesses, and assess their value?

Have the value of the techniques

been compared to other means to achieve the political ends?

Caught up in a belief in technology's power, new or improved

technologies often become a part of the political agenda.

A form of

"reverse adaptation"® occurs where public and private power adopts new

technologies on the assumption that their development ensures progress.

Technological faith may best describe this phenomenon.

Salomon walks a

thin line between determinism and faith:
The idea of a science policy suggests that the decision-makers at
least intend to orient the research system towards the attainment of
certain goals, but are these goals themselves not in fact defined by
What science
the momentum which the system itself has gathered?
deems feasible 'the technically sweet' becomes in technonature
something which power cannot do without, not because it meets a real
need but because it determines the artificial needs of society.
Because it is feasible, because it can be done, it must be done,
even if the result creates more problems than it solves or even if
it solves nothing at all.^

—

—

At work are two political phenomena.

First a system of action and

reaction exists between science and politics.

While power may use

science to achieve its own goals, science's actions in turn influence

political goals (e.g., pollution or nuclear research).
power again will look to science.

In response,

This is the system's momentum.
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It

also includes the second point of political interest: the progression
of

technological development results, in part, from the unstated political

assumption that the "perfect sneaker" is indeed

a

goal worth achieving.

Technological advancement is often confused with substantive
change.

Faith in a technological fix results from the inability to see

past technological reasons for failure.

Reliance on scrubbers or tall

smoke stacks will not "solve" acid rain or industrially caused air

pollution.

Expensive purifying systems will not end water pollution

just as hazardous waste problems will not disappear through the

monitoring of dumps.

Rather, these issues need to be seen in the

political-economic context which produced them.

Science may help, but

cannot decide the political problems for us.

To the extent that we

it

rely on science for solutions we deny politics substance and endow

politics with the instrumental rationale of technique.

This reversal

and confusion is a key element of the technological fix.

When technological faith becomes overpowering, democracy

suffers.

The implications for democracy center on the ability for

reflection and debate, which is made difficult on issues addressed
technically.

The preferred position the structure gives to those who

understand its technical parts (never the whole) has direct implications
on the state of democracy:
But if matters of structure and mode of operations are to be
excluded from scrutiny by all but the appropriate experts, then the
most crucial aspects of the formative influence of technology in the
world are totally removed from any conscious, public attention or
ug
It is in this formative character that technology gives

dispute.
matter.
its claim to neutrality and becomes a distinctly political

9

This brings the discussion to the institutional question of who governs
and for what ends.

Science and technology are of political interest

because of the capabilities they offer to the political system.

Recognizing that some mental conditions are genetically transmitted or
that certain workers carry a genetic predisposition to certain workplace

hazards may lead to more precise strategies to resolve those problems.
But this reduction may also cause the system to lose track of its

political ends and adopt techniques out of a faith in their progressive
and curative nature.

In that case,

politics loses control.

The

reduction of mental health or workplace safety to genetic issues removes
them from broad political discourse.

Who is to argue against expert

evaluation that new and more precise genetic remedies should be adopted?
The danger, albeit not guaranteed to manifest itself, is that the issue

will move from one of a safe workplace to one of perfecting the

individual worker.

Technological faith may also result in overstating the
technological dimension of the issue.

Care must be taken to recognize

that a technology is both a technique and a set of a capabilities that

influences social and political values.

Missing the latter point may

allow political figures to be overly deferential to experts during
technological assessment.

The "who governs" question becomes an inquiry

into the extent to which the political, and in particular the

democratic, branches examined the substance of the technique in its
broadest political context.

10

IV

Chapters One through Three examine empirically biology and

politics through a combination of historical analysis and case studies
of contemporary practices.

The two cases (Chapters Two and Three) were

chosen to exemplify the issues, but are not intended to be comprehensive
or definitive.

They will examine how the use of science has created

peculiar problems stretching the political system's capabilities; how
the problems of science policy have merged with long-standing political

issues but provided more subtle means of handling them; and how the

political system has dealt with new scientific techniques.
issues of extended choice and capabilities.

These are

Throughout this section

runs a fundamental question: to what extent was the knowledge used to

meet a political problem or need employed because that knowledge was, in

Oppenheimer 's delightful phrase, "technologically sweet"^ and therefore
irresistible?
By way of introduction to this section, Chapter One will present
a review of eugenics

in American politics.

As one of the earliest and

most politically self-conscious attempts to link biology and politics,
the eugenics movement stands out as an enduring example.

The leading

opponent of applying genetic engineering, Jeremy Rif kin, argued that

"eugenics is the inseparable ethical wing of the age of

biotechnology."^

Many writers on the new genetic techniques either

distinguish their interest in these techniques from eugenics or show how
with
certain elements of the eugenic agenda are benign and consistent

11

sound public policy.

The eugenicists even sought to distinguish their

past from their "new" eugenic program.

Finally, those who do not

address eugenics or the issues tied to it probably should.

The slope is

slippery between the purely technocratic use of biological knowledge and
the use of biology to achieve political goals.

^

The two case studies, sterilization and genetic screening, were

chosen because of their ties to the past and future, respectively.
Early in this century, sterilization became
in part,

tool.

a

controversial technique,

because of the eugenicists' attempts to employ it as

a

policy

While this effort failed in practice (over half of the states,

however, passed sterilization laws), the technique has remained and

grown in popularity and sophistication.

If

eugenics remains an

important idea, this is one place it might appear.

In other words,

sterilization's ties to the past raise questions as to its current
practices.

The second case, genetic screening, involves practices

growing out of contemporary research.

Any significant attempt to

systematically employ genetic knowledge for political ends (as suggested
by Foucault) would necessarily need a technique to identify or screen
for those most appropriate for genetic alteration or control (or

whatever).

Genetic screening has been around long enough to develop a

history and a pattern of "benign" uses (amniocentesis).

This case may

provide a window through which to examine where the genetics-politics
nexus is heading.
Thus the proximate issues are evaluating the two case studies in
light of their eugenic background and the effect of technology on

12

politics.

Which, if either, is the dominant force?

does it make?

What difference

Reviewing these experiences with genetic techniques

provides an opportunity to examine the scope and bias of the political

system's actions.

The concluding chapter examines the political

institutions' response to technology in terms of the issues both

examined and neglected by the institutions and the characteristics of
the institutions themselves.
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CHAPTER

I

THE POLITICAL BODY

The relationship between physics and government has been, to

date, the most controversial and prominent issue in the study of science
in American politics.

This relationship grew out of the long standing

tie between government and the scientific community in the area of

weapons research.

Notwithstanding a more limited governmental

connection, another science, genetics, also has

a

rich political

history.
Inspired by the writings of Sir Francis Galton, a political

movement began in England employing the knowledge of heredity to ensure
the continuing improvement of "the race."

eugenics.

Galton christened this field

Galton wrote during the last quarter of the nineteenth

century and a group of committed followers gathered around his ideas.
In America, however, no sustained movement developed until after 1900

and the rediscovery of Mendel's work.

The American movement, primarily

middle class, consisted of sympathetic geneticists joining social
reformers.

They focused primarily on state laws, although they briefly

reached into national politics with the Immigration Reform Act of 1924
and the 1927 Supreme Court case, Buck v. Bell

.

The eugenics movement is important because of the political

agenda it enunciated and continues to advance.

Eugenicists seek to

bring into fruition the political potential of genetic knowledge.

16

Despite the fact that the movement failed to achieve its goals, the

movement turned that failure into an opportunity to redefine the
movement and to ennunciate a position and strategy that allows for the

modern use of biology to achieve political influence on the race and
body.

To understand their positions, the obligatory starting point is

Sir Francis Galton's thought.

Sir Francis Galton

Galton was in the best tradition of the English gentleman

scientist.

Few,

if anyone, would disparage his character, and his

scientific credentials were impeccable.

He made major contributions to

statistics, psychological testing, and hereditarian research.

He was a

respected scientific authority and a Fellow in the Royal Society.

A

cousin of Charles Darwin, Galton was greatly influenced by Darwin's On
the Origin of the Species and, with his cousin's support, sought to find
its applicability to society.

Galton's research focused on how our ancestor's traits were
passed down to us.

According to Darwin's theories, natural selection

ensured that the best traits were transmitted to future generations.
But, Galton feared, civilization "diminish[ed

]

application of the law of natural selection. "2

the rigour of the

Man's social

organization interfered with natural selection by interjecting
irrelevant concerns into marriage decisions (e.g., religion, class,

education).

Because natural selection is prohibited from working
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freely, Galton sought to apply the success of animal breeding to
human

breeding as a supplement.
To this end, Galton promoted eugenics.

Relying on his faith in

science, Galton believed that man could overcome civilization's

perversions through careful planning and an educated public.
interest in eugenics was not casual.

His

He hoped that the eugenic spirit

could be "introduced into the national conscience, like a new

religion."

But his new religion did not rest on ancient texts and

dieties; it relied on scientific knowledge working through an unselfish

community (nationalist) spirit.

In a quintessential statement of social

action based upon scientific knowledge, Galton elaborated on this point:
[W]hat nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do
providently, quickly, and kindly. As it lies within his power, so
it becomes his duty to work in that direction; just as it is his
duty to succour neighbours who suffer misfortune.^
The obligation to act lies with society, not with the scientist.

Once

we have the knowledge, it is our duty to use it to improve our society.

This argument contains two important aspects of eugenic thought.
it

illustrates the naturalistic basis of eugenics.

First,

Man is not choosing

the direction to improve the race, rather he acts in ways nature

dictates. ^

The bias lies in favor of scientific knowledge and the ideal

resembles something akin to the philosopher's state of nature where nonnatural forces cannot intervene.

Social knowledge, at least where the

development of the human race is concerned, is less reliable.

The

obvious lesson is that only scientific facts can be considered reliable.
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^

.

The second aspect of eugenic thought found in the
above

quotation is the strong sense of social purpose.

The eugenicist sees

himself as protecting society from itself, enabling it to move in
the
only direction that will allow for the fullest expression of the
human

potential.

In Galton,

this form of elitism takes the course one would

expect from the English gentleman scientist:
I cannot doubt that our democracy will ultimately refuse consent
to
that liberty of propagating children which is now allowed to the
undesirable classes, but the populace has yet to be taught the true
state of these things.
A democracy cannot endure unless it be
composed of able citizens; therefore it must in self-defence
withstand the free introduction of degenerate stock.

He saw eugenics as promoting democracy through the leavening of the

population.

Education will enable all classes to understand their duty

and thus be willing to sacrifice some of their own desires (e.g.,

propagating children) in order that the society can benefit.
plays no direct role.

Coercion

The successful eugenics program will work

mechanistically but also "providently" and "kindly":
The aim of eugenics [asserted Galton, in 1904] is to bring as many
influences as can be reasonably employed, to cause the useful
classes in the community to contribute more than their proportion to
the next generation.
But

true to the politics of the English middle class, class differences

offer telling evidence as to one's worth.

This is not, however, an

insidious attempt to promote one's own class and keep down the lower
classes.

Rather, Galton attempted to improve the race by ensuring that

those with the best traits bred together.

worth
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He used success to measure

9

The ideal Galton strove for was the sober, rational, and

predictable person.

Specifically, he sought to create individuals of

"more vigour, more ability, and more consistency of purpose"^
than

existed at the time.

These are the characteristics any head of state

would like to see in his citizens.

Throughout all of his writings on

eugenics, Galton emphasized the role of the state: especially what

eugenics could do for it.

The purpose of eugenics was not for enobling

individuals (although it did that), but rather to assist the state in
its missions at home and abroad.

For example, he wrote:

Let us for a moment suppose that the practice of Eugenics should
hereafter raise the average quality of our nation to that of its
better moiety at the present day, and consider the gain. The
general tone of domestic, social, and political life would be
higher.
The race as a whole would be less foolish, less frivolous,
less excitable and politically more provident than now.
Its
demagogues who "played to the gallery" would play to a more sensible
gallery than at present. We should be better fitted to fulfill our
Lastly, men of an order of ability
vast imperial opportunities.
which is now very rare, would become more frequent, because the
level out of which they rose would itself have risen.

The importance of this position lies in the juxtaposition of democratic

ideals and the statist bias.

Despite his reasoning that democracy

depends on the intellectual and moral advancement of the citizenry, the

subversive or dissenting potential of democracy is minimized by the

characteristics Galton idealizes and the social stratas chosen for
advancement and restriction.

These groups and ideals embody the values

debate
of the status quo and those who currently set the parameters of

within the governing political and social circles.

Galton

s

categories

social and
for limited propagation also included the likely sources of

political dissent.

Galton tapped into the dominant social sector's
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values, presumptively approving of them.

Here, however, lies a danger.

Doubts should center on the invisible and undebated means by which
the
ideal is assumed and left unquestioned by well-meaning people like

Galton

Galton developed a program and research agenda in order to
promote his eugenic ideas.

Their specifics are of interest to

a

study

of American eugenics in that the Americans borrowed the major issues

from Galton, even as they passed over many of the details.

For this

reason, a brief review of Galton's position will help explain the

background of the eugenic idea and the substance of the field.
Galton introduced the two strategic categories within which all

efforts at applied genetics fall: positive and negative applications.

Positive eugenics promotes those traits deemed superior.

To this end,

Galton called upon talented men and women to marry one another.
practice, this meant those of higher social rank
to embody the best traits

they currently did.

— would

— those

^0

In

society deemed

marry and produce more children than

This was their social obligation.

By increasing

the population at this end of the eugenic scale ("its better moiety"),
the race would improve and, Galton hoped, reach a point where the

weaknesses passed on by our ancestors would be eliminated.
the race would be remade.

analogies

In this way,

Again, we see Galton drawing on breeding

:

[after many generations] produce a highly bred race, with
no more tendency to revert to meaner ancestral types than is shown
by our long-established breeds of race-horses and fox-hounds.

We might

upon
To support this belief, Galton, like many eugenicists, relied
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impressionistic evidence.

For example: "the enormous intellectual

digestion of German literary men, which far exceeds that of
the
corresponding class of our own [English] countrymen, may, in some
considerable degree, be due to this practice [of German professors

marrying the sisters or daughters of other prof essors
he

]

." 12

Elsewhere,

related the professions of "notable persons" and the frequency with

which "talent and peculiarities of character are found in [these
notables'] children."^

These sorts of evidence provided the

justification for his assumption that mental traits are transmitted in
the same manner as physical traits.

accomplishment as

a

Galton's use of social and economic

standard to measure genetic worth is common among

eugenicists' writings.
Positive eugenics seeks to take what society deems as good and
to

increase its proportion in the population.

to eliminate or contain bad traits.

Negative eugenics tries

Many of these undesirable traits

have been associated with the undesirables of society.

Negative

eugenics seeks to convince these "genetically weaker" people to
reproduce less often, or not at all.

This was Margaret Sanger's

position and that of the early American eugenicists who supported both

sterilization and institutionalization for criminals, feebleminded, and
those suffering from various infirmities.

Galton's work emphasized

positive eugenics, but he recognized the negative dimension and later
others, with less benign motives than he, expanded on the theme.

Galton's research and policy agenda contained an important

institutional component.

He isolated three eugenically important
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institutions: institutions for the criminal and feebleminded,
charity,
and the customary institutions of religion and marriage.

Treatment of

criminals, the feebleminded, and those on charity needed to be
tempered
by their eugenic implications.

Galton advocated keeping habitual

criminals segregated to restrict their opportunity to continue their

depredations and to preclude

low class" offspring.

Aid to institutions

for the feebleminded, however, was suspect on the ground that it might

promote their marrying one another and producing offspring resembling

themselves
Charity cases covered the range of abnormals and needed to be

dispensed in a scientific or planned manner.

Rather than

indiscriminately supporting "needy" people, Galton urged that charity be
targeted according to eugenic purposes.

Those "down and out," surviving

solely upon charity, could only contribute more of their kind while

draining the nation's resources and degenerating "the race."
Consequently, charity should be diverted away from them to those able to

contribute to society.

He made a similar argument in regard to

educational funding: rather than waste educational support on those who
lacked the minimal skills necessary to benefit from the aid, educational
support should promote the students most likely to contribute to the
society.

In sum, Galton supported scientific charity:

planned and targeted.

rationally

This became a goal of many American eugenicists

and remains a political issue.

A final institutional consideration centered on the customary
and social forces of religion, wealth, and marriage.
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These related back

to his concerns about

civilization interfering with natural selection.

Galton cited the socially pernicious effects of religious taboos
against

interfaith marriage or pressures to protect family property through
such

extreme means as compelling a man to marry the widow of his brother.
These examples illustrated how religious and property influences

produced marriages either indifferent or hostile to eugenic concerns;
the flexibility necessary for the eugenically best to meet and marry was

denied.

Wealth, too, interfered in the eugenic treatment of

feebleminded or weak offspring.

The wealthy, able to pay for special

care, could "hide" their feebleminded and sustain them into childbearing

years.

A similar situation existed for their mentally normal but

physically weak: these children benefited from the wealthy's superior
medical care and often lived well beyond the years of comparable

children in poorer families.

In both cases, the wealthy "defectives"

could live to reproduce while the poor's defectives would not

(especially

if

charity was scientifically distributed).

Conversely,

poverty could result in the killing or hindering of the poor's strongest
children.

This would result in a disproportionate birthrate among the

weak (but rich) over the genetically superior (but poor).^
Galton desired marriages to promote good qualities and expected
this priority to supercede more traditional and basic marriage desires.

This argument illustrates the central strategy of Galton's eugenic

agenda.

To succeed, eugenics must be absorbed into the social

consciousness; people must naturally think and act eugenically.
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By way of summary, many of the key elements of American eugenics

can be found in Galton's thought.

Foremost is Galton's reliance on

science as a means to social well-being.

He sought to put into

political practice scientific knowledge as if it represented
truth.

a

neutral

This constituted a naturalistic political and social outlook; an

outlook that relied on the scientific fact as the most reliable form of
knowledge.

Four other elements of American eugenics are foreshadowed in

Galton's work.

First, Galton worked to find ways to improve the race.

This was the proximate goal of his research.

placed within a nationalistic orientation.
to

the greater social and national good.

Second, eugenics was to be
It

subsumed the individual

This was the ultimate goal.

Third, Galton exemplified the technocratic and elitist side of eugenics.
The technocratic dimension follows from naturalism.

The elitism is seen

in the paternalistic view that the scientist can know who are best

suited to marry whom and isolate the ideal characteristics for social
and genetic growth.

social conservatism.
to

The elitism is also tied into the final parallel,
The identification of good traits is closely tied

the contemporary standards of success.

The full implementation of

eugenic goals would ultimately serve to re-enforce and perpetuate the
status quo.

American Eugenics

:

1900-1930

Few people today would admit to being eugenicists.

This

the first
reaction results from the American eugenics movement during

third of this century.

This rejection does not constitute a rejection
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—

°f eugenics

core principles, rather the early tactics and underlying

political agenda of the movement repel most modern democrats.
The movement did not immediately follow from Galton's writings.

The American version of eugenics grew only after it had a scientific

field to support it.

It gained this support in 1900 when genetics came

into its own with the rediscovery of Mendel's work. 15

Unfortunately,

the movement became captured by those interested in preserving the

northern European stock as the dominant American "race" rather than
promoting the sorts of racial goals Galton advocated.

Background
Linking itself to Mendelism and the new field of genetics

separated American eugenicists' methodology from Galton's ancestral
approach, but both shared a naturalist basis.

American eugenicists

queried into biology's potential to improve society: what can biology
tell us about ourselves qua humans and about human society? 16

Natural

selection, as Darwin portrayed it, provided the outline that explained
the proper working of society and the rules by which the race could

improve.

This biological determinism knew no limitations.

The issue of

environment and heredity interacting had not yet gained legitimacy; the
most influential in the eugenics movement attributed most human traits

both good and bad

— to

heredity.

Mendel provided the scientific foundation to this view.

His

position claimed that inheritance is particular to each individual.
One's traits result from the mixing of genes (some dominant, some
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^

recessive) of one's parents.

’

In contrast, Galton believed that

inheritance can be traced in fixed proportions through ancestors.
Because of its youth, genetics lacked a sophisticated body of knowledge;

consequently, some simplified Mendel's conclusions to the so-called
"single gene theory" whereby each trait results from

a

single,

identifiable gene.
A significant implication of the single gene theory was the

rejection of Lamarquian genetics, or the acquired traits theory.
Previous to Mendel's resurrection, this view was widely accepted among

American students of heredity.

Along with Lamarquian beliefs, however,

social reform lost out as a viable policy.

If

traits are an inherent

part of an individual's genetic make-up, then the hope that better

living conditions could contribute to a strengthened person and that
such strength could, in turn, be passed onto future generations lost its

credibility.

This necessitated a move from a strategy involving social

reform to one regulating genetic stock.
A target for many eugenicists were the feebleminded and habitual

criminals.

Each was believed to have hereditarian tendencies which

could only be addressed through breeding them out of the race.

This

movement toward breeding was led by those who had previously worked in
the environmentally based reform programs: heads of prisons or

corrections departments, social workers, and directors of institutions
for the feebleminded.

In short, they were middle class professionals

who saw their values as universals and did not believe that "normal

people could continue to live the way their "wards"

27

did.^

Efforts at

reform through environmental manipulation apparently had failed.

The

problem, however, was not that the feebleminded were not cured, but that
their numbers, and the numbers of other "degenerates", were increasing.

Donald Pickens summarized their fears as follows:
The racial degeneration of modern urban society worried American
eugenists. sic
They saw the increased number of the feebleminded
in the United States by immigration and natural increase, as
definite indications of racial inadequacy.
In brief, they argued
that contemporary life increased the numbers of the inadequate at
the expense of the adequate.
The task, therefore, was of
restoration, of returning the primacy of natural selection to men's
affairs. Modern society protected the naturally inferior from their
true destiny of extinction; eugenists [ sic urged policies of
removing the restrictions on natural selection. 19
[

]

]

In sum,

biology provided the remedy for society.

The historical context helps explain the views held.

At the

turn of the century, American society faced dislocations due to the

emergence of an industrial state.

The political agenda had changed;^

the American role in the world had begun to grow; European dislocations

brought new immigrants to America; and within this country the migration
from the country to the city was in full blossom.

Much of the most

virulent strains of eugenic thought and action reflected these
nativistic, racist, anti-urban, and thoroughly

dislocations.

It was

middle class.

Many of the eugenicists were Progressives and active in

the Progressive reform movements.

The extent to which the early

American society
eugenics movement reflected the tensions then pervading

eugenicists provided
can be seen by the following thumbnail portrait of
by Mark Haller:
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Those most strongly influenced by hereditarian doctrines
were such
persons as physicians, psychiatrists, social workers,
members of
state boards of charity, and others whose direct
responsibility was
with persons who, through crime or illness, became wards
of the
state for care and cure.
Those least influenced were residents of
settlement houses, sympathizers with labor organizations, and
others
who were primarily concerned with the general problems arising
from
industrialization and urbanization. 21
At issue were deeply held views on race and class that were able
to find

expression in the eugenics movement and legitimacy behind the cloak of
genetics.

The movement brought together scientists who shared a

political agenda with social reformers who sought to preserve the past
and present in the name of the future.

Science
The scientists' link with the early movement was tenuous.

Genetics, as an area of research, was new and many of the claims made by

eugenicists (especially those dealing with the scope of problems
associated with heredity) lacked

a

solid scientific foundation.

opposition positions also lacked foundation.
progressed, the eugenicists' base crumbled.

But the

As genetic research

The legitimate scientists

left the movement as the evidence disproving the eugenicists' political

claims increased.

But the important lesson here is the link between the

scientists and political ideas.

In his study on genetics in American

society, Kenneth Ludmerer characterized this relationship as follows:
In acting upon the implications of these findings, the geneticists
were motivated by their aforementioned social commitments. This is
not to say that they allowed their presuppositions to color their
scientific interpretation of the discoveries, which they generally
did not, but to suggest that with different social commitments they
might have drawn from the discoveries another set of social
conclusions from those they in fact did draw.“
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Stephen Jay Gould made

a

related point in regard to science in general:

Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity ."23

Gould moved beyond Ludmerer and found a social influence on data

gathering and interpretation:
I believe, first of all, that satan also dwells with
God in the
details.
If the cultural influences upon science can be detected in
the humdrum minutiae of a supposedly objective, almost automatic
quantification, then the status of biological determinism as a
social prejudice reflected by scientists in their own particular
medium seems secure.^

Gould argued that culture influences our understanding of facts: "facts
are not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences

what we see and how we see it." 25

Two situations undercutting the ideal

view of science may result from this observation.

First, "some topics

are invested with enormous social importance but blessed with very

little reliable information." 2 ^

1

This describes pre-1930's eugenics.

But when the reformers succeed in invoking the cloak of science (even if

an illusion)

,

then the reformers obtain the powerful support of

Society then acts on inadequate information as

scientific legitimacy.
if

it were

adequate and science becomes implicated in the actions.

As a

result, the priorities and views of science may become "a mirror of

social movements.

.

.

.

This mirror reflects in good times and bad, in

periods of belief in equality and in eras of rampant racism.

z/

The second implication for "normal science" relates to the way

scientists ask their questions.

(This subtlety is missed by Ludmerer

who portrays the work internal to science as somehow enclosed and

sacred.)

By this account, the questions may be asked "in such a
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restricted way that any legitimate answer can only validate
preference. 28

a

social

Galton's assumption that biological worth is seen in

one's social position (success) illustrates this problem.

The early

American belief that individual traits, including intelligence,
resulted
from single genes provides an American example which had pernicious

consequences for the American eugenics movement.

Working upon this

assumption led eugenicists to recommend policies aimed exclusively at
reproduction

Program
Following Galton, the American eugenicists' program divided
along positive and negative eugenics.

The positive program relied on

education in an attempt to convince the "ideal" to marry out of social
conscience.

Positive eugenics, however, was secondary to the negative

campaign
Among the negative policies pursued, birth control proved to be
the most benign, albeit one of the more controversial.

Its advocates

sought to bring contraception to the lower and working classes.

These

people, the eugenicists feared, propagated in disproportionately large

numbers and produced weaker (eugenically speaking) offspring.
control strategy rested on two beliefs.

sickly would be numerically reduced.

The birth

First, the number of weak and

Second, decreased numbers would in

turn result in a better environment within which to raise the children

which would improve the quality of the individual.

(Clearly these

reformers did not accept the extreme biological determinism pervading
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the eugenics movement.)
the eugenicists.29

According to one historian, this policy divided

At the time,

the middle and upper classes (those

whom eugenicists desired to reproduce in greatest number)
practiced
birth control and the eugenicists' feared that loosening the
legal

restrictions imposed on birth control methods would only extend
this
pattern or spread it to the better of the lower classes (those
who
shared the values of the "better stock"— and their genes— but lacked
their money).

Consequently, birth control became a secondary strategy.

Another strategy employed was sterilization.

This, too, caused

controversy, not in the least because of its ineffectiveness.

In 1931,

twenty-seven states had sterilization laws, but California alone had
history of widespread enforcement. 30

a

The scope of the problems

eugenicists believed sterilization could address is illustrated in the
following excerpts from a model sterilization law proposed in 1922 by
Dr. Harry Laughlin, a leader of the movement's reactionary wing (but,

nonetheless, prominent in the movement in general):
AN ACT to prevent the procreation of persons socially inadequate
from defective inheritance, by authorizing and providing for the
eugenical sterilization of certain potential parents carrying

degenerate hereditary qualities.
(a) A socially inadequate person is one who by his or her own
effort, regardless of etiology or prognosis fails chronically in
comparison with normal persons, to maintain himself or herself as a
useful member of the organized social life of the state; provided
that the term socially inadequate shall not be applied to any person
whose expected exigencies of youth, old age, curable injuries, or
temporary physical or mental illness.
(b) the socially inadequate classes, regardless of etiology or
sic
prognosis, are the following: (1) Feeble-minded; (2) Insane,
(including the psychopathic); (3) Criminalistic (including
delinquent and wayward); (4) Epileptic; (5) Inebriate (including
drug habitues); (6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the
syphilitic, the leprous, and others with chronic, infectious and
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

[
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1

.

legally segrable [sic] diseases); (7) Blind (including those with
seriously impaired vision); (8) Deaf (including the crippled);
(10)
Dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps
and paupers ) 3
.

To be classified as a "potential parent of socially inadequate

offspring", only one-quarter of your offspring needed to be "socially
inadequate ."32
of

.

.

.

As Walter Berns observed:

this would "rid the world

the likes of Beethoven, Mozart, Poe, and Napoleon. "33

More popular among eugenicists than sterilization laws was the

reform of the immigration laws.
role.

Again, Harry Laughlin played a major

He became advisor to the House Committee on Immigration and

Naturalization.

He also testified on behalf of biological

considerations as an immigration standard.
agricultural breeding at

a

(Laughlin taught

Missouri normal school. 34)

articulated the fear of many that the new immigrants
Europe

— would

Laughlin

— from

Southern

weaken the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon strain in America and

accelerate the decline of the American stock.

They based their fears on

high "incidence of disease, illiteracy, poverty, and crime in immigrant

neighborhoods ."33

£n fact,

they based it on racist fears. 33

The

proportions among the various national origins within the American

population were shifting and intermarriage was becoming increasingly
common.

The older stock

— who

apparently "forgot" that they too came

from immigrant families, many of whom struggled to survive

— refused

consider the effect of a sudden immersion into a new culture on the

immigrants and translated these adjustments into genetic

characteristics

33
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Decline: The 193CTs

Among the reasons for the movement's decline was its style.
Note again the vicious language employed: "The socially inadequate

classes, regardless of etiology or prognosis." 37

"w e are rapidly losing

ground to the emotional foreigner who is biologically unlike us and
therefore cannot understand that honesty, loyalty, and moral life are

principles inherent in good minds ." 38

In part because of this language,

the movement failed to establish a democratic base.

It worked as an

elitist group lobbying state legislatures or serving as expert witnesses
before Congressional committees.

But its racist language and its

elitist core contributed to its downfall.
By the

1930's, the movement had become small and less well

accepted by the public and by scientists.

Its nasty political agenda

alienated its allies while developments within the science of genetics
proved much of the eugenics' agenda wrong.

But the democratic and

genetic indictment of eugenics alone probably would not have been
telling.

The fatal blows were inflicted by both the Depression at home

and Hitler abroad.
The depression removed from the capitalist system the image of

destiny and inviolability assigned to it by the eugenicists.
3
eugenics was a victim of unemployment." ^

how could they embody all that was good?
undercut the eugenics movement

,

Galtonian

The capitalist had failed, so
As the economic system

their racist policies proved equally

eugenicists
fatal as Hitler adopted racial standards and the American
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not only failed to distance themselves from his policies but
endorsed

many of theml^O
After achieving its greatest success, the Immigration Act of
1924, the eugenics movement slowly disintegrated.

Its political

positions on race and social status became irrelevant to the new
political period ushered in by both the Depression and World War II.
The movement faced the choice of extinction or fundamentally changing
its approach,

if not

its substance.

Interlude: Margaret Sanger
Even during its darkest days, the eugenic idea influenced other

reformers and reform movements.

While these groups did not adopt

eugenics as their cause, the eugenic idea informed their program and, as
in the case of Margaret Sanger,

became

a

major goal of their reforms.

Sanger represents an interesting example of the Progressive-era

reformer.

She championed the cause of women, especially their right to

freely choose birth control.

Her major concern was political; she

placed woman's problems into the larger context of social and political
power relationships.

But in addition, she expressed concern over future

generations and the quality of "the race."

This eugenic concern became

inseparable from her political critique and remedy.

Sanger

s

joining of

these issues makes her an important figure in the history of birth

control and in current debates over control of our reproductive

practices
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Margaret Sanger's birth control crusade sought to repeal

restrictive birth control laws to enable women to exercise freedom of
choice over their reproduction.
as a political and social victim,

While her rhetoric portrayed the woman
Sanger grounded her work on basic

biological drives shared by all women.

According to Sanger, the sex

drive was at the heart of the woman's being.
even income in importance to the woman/

1

This drive transcended

From this position, Sanger

proceeded to reject the traditional economic reforms as inadequate (but
important) and turned instead to birth control and negative eugenics.
In her analysis,

Sanger linked together the industrial order,

population control, motherhood, and the American Race. ^2

The demands of

the industrial order required a population policy that denied women

The industrialists and the

control over their reproductive practices.

nation-states required large populations to fulfill their tasks.

Her

indictment of population growth detailed such offensive consequences as:
war, famine, unemployment, and child labor.

^

To achieve others'

population goals, women were pressured into producing larger families
than they wanted or could care for.

One form of this coercion was the

denial of information about their biology, information about birth

control, and birth control itself.

Sanger argued that given a choice,

women would not reproduce so recklessly.

Family size would coincide

with economic and social conditions so as to ensure the best possible

upbringing for each child.

Birth control became an imperative need in

best
this system because, despite the parents' desire to ensure the

conditions for their children, sex remained

36

a

powerful urge that was

denied only at the women's physical and psychological peril.

Therefore,

women, through the use of birth control, could respect this
natural

drive while also controlling their families' size.

Birth control was

more natural than abstinence, more moral than abortion, and better

policy than no control.
Sanger believed that freeing women would also rebuild the race.
In part she saw the race degenerating, but her primary belief was that

the woman's potential had been underutilized.

culture and learning.

Through motherhood passes

Free the mother from her chains and improve the

conditions of childrearing and the result will be an improved person
(both woman and child).
In her promotion of race,

She used race in two ways.

Sanger joined the eugenicists' ranks.

One was her concern over "bad stock":

The lack of balance between the birth rate of the 'unfit' and the
'fit', admittedly [sic] the greatest present menace to

civilization.^^
She focused on intelligence, which she believed was inherited, as the

key standard separating the fit and unfit.

She warned about "recruiting

the next generation from the least intelligent and most unskilled

classes in the community.

"degenerate stocks

.

.

.

This became a real possibility given that

have more than the normal size of family. "^6

Race also included a cultural dimension:
The cell plasm of these peoples [immigrants] are freighted with the
*'
potentialities of the best in the Old World civilization.'
7
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^

Consistent with Sanger's naturalistic bias, she placed culture within
heredity.

This is a typically eugenic position: assigning biological

status to valued characteristics.
Sanger, however, added an environmental component to race.

She

decried the treatment of immigrants, especially their confinement to
slums.

This treatment meant we failed to gain culturally from the

diversity they added to the population; nor were they sufficiently
exposed to American culture in order to become acculturated

.

This

latter point admitted to an environmental role unthinkable to the hard
liners among the eugenicists.

The failure to socialize the immigrants

into the dominant American culture (race) resulted in a hybrid culture

(part old world, part American slum) which Sanger believed to be

inferior.

In sum,

Sanger's conception of race was hereditary, but it

also possessed an American soul:
If we are to develop in America a race with a racial soul, we must
keep the birthrate within the scope of our ability to understand as
We must not encourage reproduction beyond our
well as to educate.
capacity to assimilate our numbers so as to make the coming
generation into such physically fit, mentally capable, socially
alert individuals as are the ideals of democracy.

Hers was not a religious soul, but it encompassed more than a collection
of genes defining the race.

To achieve a distinctly American race, Sanger believed the

social system needed radical change.
open to her?

eugenics.
third.

What political alternatives were

She isolated three: Marxism, philanthropy and charity, and

the
She rejected the first two and provisionally accepted

Marxism failed on two grounds.
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First, in order to provide for

sufficient numbers of proletariat, Marxism, like its capitalist
enemy,
required a large worker population.

Marxism's second failing was its

propensity to blame others for the workers' failings.

Sanger located

the demand for overpopulation in the state, industry, and church,
but

she assigned responsibility for compliance to the worker:

When all is said and done, the workers who produce large families
have themselves to blame for the hundreds of thousands of unemployed
grasping for jobs, for the strike breakers, for the policemen who
beat up and arrest strikers and for the soldiers who shoot strikers
down.

Marxism failed to accept this and instead blamed the economic order for
the workers' condition.

Charity failed on simpler grounds.

Sanger's

goal was to prevent further degeneration of the race and to promote

improvement.

Charity did neither.

At best, charity was emotional and

altruistic: occasionally ameliorative, but never preventative.
This left eugenics.

On this point, Sanger offered a good

critique of positive eugenics and proposed a modest negative program
that could work in tandem with her birth control crusade.

The essence

of her objection to positive eugenics was its lack of realism.

positive program desired those with the best traits
the socially successful

— to

— usually

propagate to improve the race.

The

defined as
This

argument, Sanger predicted, would "fall on deaf ears" because it would
undercut a family's attempt to elevate its standard of living. 52
from the practical, she argued against it on principle.

Aside

Raising a large

family strained the psychological well-being of the wealthy mother just
as it did the mother of

unacceptable.

the poor (although not as much!) and this was

She objected to any policy premised on an increasing
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population.

Large families of all kinds— rich and poor alike—
promoted

war and famine. 53

After eliminating positive eugenics as wrong and dangerous
(an

ironic position in that positive eugenics is usually presented as

eugenics at its most benign), she confronted the negative alternative.
Her criticisms and modifications offer a preview of the post
1930's

eugenics movement.
To Sanger, negative eugenics correctly identified the

feebleminded

— among

whom she linked the insane, epileptic, criminal,

prostitute, pauper, and mentally defective

attention.

— as

a

dangerous lot deserving

She endorsed sterilization, although she added the

qualification that sterilization should only be allowed with
genetic basis and fair laws. 54

a firm

Sanger identified the marginally

intelligent as especially worrisome.

Their ability to be glib, good

looking, and outwardly normal could deceive many and the cultural and

intellectual consequences for the community were dire. 55

Sanger's

conclusion was that these people should be either segregated or
sterilized.

She preferred, with qualification, sterilization.^

The impact of controlling the marginally intelligent's

reproduction would be more immediate than the positive eugenicists'
program.

However, she found this approach incomplete.

negative eugenics on two grounds.

Sanger faulted

While eugenics recognized the

biological dimension, it misunderstood the role of sex.
57
sex to be more than biological: it was spiritual.

Sanger believed

Programs simply

aimed at marriage (positive eugenics) or the sex act (segregation) miss
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the spiritual side of sex.

Birth control filled the void.

Because

people other than married couples partake of se X 58
and all COU ples need
to maintain a healthy sex life,

her strategy was designed to allow for

this, allow for family limitation, and bring these limiting
practices to

those who most need to limit their numbers: the less intelligent
and

mentally defective (often lumped by Sanger with the lower classes).
Sanger also criticized the reductionism inherent in eugenics

thought.

She believed that the causes of reckless birth extended to

environmental causes.

The most reckless lived in the poorest areas.

Improve the environment, offer the necessary information and birth

control equipment, and the families may act more responsibly and raise

healthier children.

The approach was carried on by Frederick Osborn59

after the fall of the original eugenics crusade.
Despite her environmental qualifications, Sanger shared a

naturalistic bias with eugenicists.
animal past.

She linked the human race with its

This was the source of its strong instincts.

following excerpt, a quotation by Dr. Edward Kempf

,

The

is typical of the

eugenicist's view of man in general:
Man arose from the ape and inherited his passions, which he can only
refine but dare not attempt to castrate unless he would destroy the
fountains of energy that maintain civilization and make life worth
living and the world worth beautifying. ... We do not have a
problem that is to be solved by making repressive laws and executing
Society must make life
Nothing will be more disastrous.
them.
worth the living and the refining for the individual by conditioning
him to love and to seek the love object in a manner that reflects a
constructive effect upon his fellow-men and by giving him suitable
The noblest and most difficult art of all is
opportunities.
the raising of human thoroughbreds.*^
.

.

.
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Sanger, working outside the eugenics movement,
modernized its

theory and made it more practical and adaptable to related
reform
efforts.

She attacked the extreme threats to the race, but
relied on

voluntary action and instinct to achieve her overall goals.

She

recognized the role environmental practices have on heredity; she
linked
her eugenic goals to social and economic reform.

From within the

eugenics movement efforts began in the 193CTs to redirect its program
in
the direction foreshadowed by Sanger's interlude within the eugenics

hysteria.

Frederick Osborn, Secretary of the American Eugenics Society,

led this effort.

Frederick Osborn

Osborn's initial task was to free the eugenic idea from its
past.

To this end, he needed to distinguish eugenics as an idea from

the practice of the earlier movement and to show the compatibility of

eugenics with American ideals.

Osborn's strategy emphasized

voluntarism, democratic choices, and scientific (primarily medical)
legitimacy.

He sought to make eugenics as inconspicuous as possible.

Rather than base his policy on the extremes

exceptional 01

— or

— the

feebleminded or

rely on coercive legislative strategies, Osborn turned

to the environment as a means of directing individual choices.

He

sought eugenic goals through what appeared to be non-eugenic means.

Osborn believed that sterilization of the feebleminded provided

socially beneficial results, but sterilization and the policy of
positive eugenics which encourages strategic breeding affect only a
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segment of the population.

Those most important to eugenic

concerns, the average and marginal, are left unaffected.

Osborn

theorized that only by addressing average characteristics could eugenics
succeed.

This approach expanded eugenic's scope while lowering its

public profile.
The new eugenics, like the old, was concerned with realizing and

promoting "inborn potentialities."

distribution of births in

a

It "[sought]

to change the

way which [would] improve the average

hereditary potential of human beings

." 62

Unlike the old, however, this

involved a shift from targeting groups to targeting individuals.

Leavening the population was the goal but the strategy addressed the
individual.

On this point Osborn wrote: "There can be little doubt that

today natural selection operates mainly through the differential

fertility of individual couples and it is this kind of selection with

which the Eugenic Hypothesis is concerned ." 62

Rather than employing

means outside of the individual's life, this new approach sought to
change values: in particular those attached to the home and children. 6 ^

Osborn maintained the eugenicists' nationalist and social goals, but
they no longer comprised the central strategy nor were they used as a

means of pressuring individuals to conform.
The new strategy professed a political realism.

Knowing the

damage done to the eugenic image by sterilization laws and racist
language, Osborn searched for means that were feasible and consistent

with American ideals and values.

He settled on manipulation of the
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social environment.

This revived the balance between heredity and

environment raised in Sanger's work:
Eugenics seeks also to improve physical qualities. The more serious
physical incapacities are the responsibility of the medical
profession and public health officers. ... At the same time,
eugenics is particularly interested in the psychological traits of
intelligence and personality because these traits are of major
importance to civilization.
If there is justification for a broad
eugenics movement, it is chiefly in the part which heredity may play
in fixing limits to the psychological development of individuals .65
But within the parameters fixed by heredity, the environment plays a

major role affecting future generations.

This position is not

surprising since Darwin defined "fitness" as the closeness of fit to
particular environmental conditions.

Osborn returned to sound

evolutionary theory.
The environmental factors identified by Osborn spanned a wide

spectrum of daily life.
concern.

The birth/death ratio was of particular

Death played an important role in evolutionary theories

because death selected between the fit and unfit.

Other factors

isolated by Osborn included living and public health conditions,

childhood and family recreation, family life, and education.
The nature of the American political system was one reason

Osborn chose the environment as his strategic lever.

eugenic considerations a part of an individual
become a way of life.

s

He sought to make

outlook toward life, to

He wrote:

or developing
In a democratic country there are great opportunities
selection
such conditions of society that the processes of eugenic
66
shall be voluntary and natural
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This reversed the elitism of earlier eugenicists.

means to achieve eugenic ends subversively

;

It also provided a

it shielded the individual

from directly confronting the eugenic choice.

In this approach, Osborn

foreshadowed the modern policy analyst who promotes public ends through
indirect market means.
The change Osborn desired was one where the social environment

made the choices or provided the stimuli needed to act along eugenic
lines.

Implicit in this argument are some standards as to eugenically

desirable traits.

Despite a significant technocratic moment to Osborn's

thought, he did not look solely to nature for the definitive

characteristics.
opinion.

He hoped they would develop from indigenous public

"Local aspirations" defined what the ideal traits were and

"the eugenist

[sic] would be satisfied so long as public opinion

included a eugenic purpose as part of any environment to which it

aspired ."68
How this process would work is exemplified by Osborn's

discussion of family size.

If

the environment lacked the aspects that

would encourage an interest in large families, then those who follow

environmental stimuli would pursue other goals.

By changing the

environment, one could create the situation where those most responsive
to its best

influences would have large families and those least

responsive would have small ones.

The result would find each new

generation increasing the number of people who fit the environment well
Darwin's definition of fitness.

"The response would be voluntary, a

69
selection drawn out by the environment itself."
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While Osborn declined the responsibility of choosing (or

assigning) the traits, he maintained standards against which he could

evaluate the results.

He wisely employed an evaluative system that did

not (with one exception) depend upon science's ability to identify those

possessing desirable or undesirable traits.
trap resulting from scientific advances.

He thus avoided a potential

For example, as genetic

research progresses, more genetic diseases can be identified and
treated.

By not defining eugenic goals in terms of particular traits or

defects, the eugenic program need not be constantly redefined or revised
to match changes in genetic knowledge.

Further, this approach allowed

Osborn to define its goals using terms and categories relevant to the
populace's everyday life.
is

Where the goal is control over the body, as

true of the eugenicist, leaving open the definition of the sound body

is a better approach than specifying in detail what constitutes the

body.

In sum,

this allowed for shifting standards.

in terms of the phenotype rather than the genotype.

It

defined eugenics

This is necessary

given the role of the environment and a recognition of ambiguity or

uncertainty in genetic knowledge.
Osborn's standards cherished conformity.

This is in marked

contrast to Sanger's emphasis on diversity and genius.

Osborn's

community, from which the eugenic ideals emerged, consisted of the

upwardly mobile middle class

.

711

His standards and ideals included:

above average physique and health, sociability, love of children, stable

marriage, and the ethic of sacrifice
7
together, and well-adjusted. ^

71
.

Families should be supportive,

They should also be energetic, looking
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for good and interesting work, and future-oriented.

In other words,

Osborn's ideal environment would promote family-oriented couples
who
adopt the industrial work-ethic and would encourage them to
produce more

children than the less future-oriented and those less interested in
family values.
else.

These are reasonable standards: mainstream, if nothing

They are more cons

iant

with American values than Laughlin's

categories as defined in his sterilization law, detailed above.
As stated above, however, an exception to this culturally-based

presentation existed,

Osborn recognized the role of genetics.

The

characteristics of the environmental and genetic dimensions can be seen
in the following discussion of an individual's social value:

"Intelligence" as measured by psychological tests certainly has a
part in determining social value.
The tests used are objective,
they can be applied to large groups of people, and psychologists
have had enough experience in their use to recognize many of the
limitations within which they must be interpreted.
Tests of
genetic fitness, such as may be made by studies of ancestry and near
kin, are especially important for determining not only defective
stocks, but those of superior ability. They are less applicable to
large groups of peoples' qualities directly and objectively.
Another, and indirect method, is to measure the accomplishment of
For this purpose, criteria must be
people in their daily lives.
used which will reach the whole population.
.

.

.

Osborn relied on intelligence to evaluate social characteristics.

His

comparisons among regions, occupations, and races were based on IQ
scores.

These comparisons refuted the earlier eugenic theories which

ranked social groups according to the social prejudices of the

eugenicists.

Genetic considerations, on the other hand, could only be

seen at the individual level.

To this end, Osborn relied on heritage as

well as the use of genetic techniques, such as genetic counseling and

47

.:

screening

To overcome the onus of eugenics' past, he needed
to make

intelligence a neutral and partially hidden concept.

This he did by

relegating it to an evaluative role (evaluating eugenic progress)
while
keeping it out of an explicit policy role.
social policy goal.)

(He did not use IQ as a

Genetics surfaced only indirectly through its

scientific and medical practice.

Osborn's Themes and Agenda
Osborn pursued typically eugenic themes.

He embraced a

naturalistic argument and embedded it deeply into the social fabric.

He

linked civilization's changes with the workings of the selection

process.

The crucial change being increasing control over death.

serves as "the purifier of the higher qualities of the race." 7 ^

Death

Osborn

explained
Man's rise from apelike form to Homo sapiens was the result of
eugenic selection. The preponderant factor in the selection was the
ability to escape an early death. Even in the earliest and hardest
days death was not always a blind accident. The man with the best
natural immunities was the most likely to survive disease.
Many of man's finest qualities arose because those who cared for
their children saw them more often survive, and those who could best
7
co-operate often saved their families where others failed.
.

.

.

f)

Osborn drew a sharp distinction with other eugenic theories.
accept the argument that the race was declining.

"There is no clear

77
evidence that hereditary defects are on the increase ."

sought to continue the advancement of the race.

He did not

Rather, he

He sought perfection.

He worked within the view that nature, in its normal state, provided for
the species' slow and steady advance.

7 ft

Once death is removed as the

evolutionary mechanism, a substitute must be found in order to maintain

48

:

evolutionary progress.

He chose birth.

Thus did Osborn introduce his

major policy concern: population policies and the birth/death ratio.

Low birthrates among the more advantaged join with the declining death
rate to create a eugenic problem.

Where previously the unfit died off

before they could reproduce and the fit "had as many children as nature

brought them

now the fit (not nature) determined the size of their

families and the unfit contributed more of their own.
Earlier, Sanger had addressed this issue.

After rejecting the

belief that the advantaged (also thought of as the "fit") would

voluntarily increase their numbers, she recommended extending birth
control to the "unfit."
part of his answer.

Osborn accepted the second point, but only as a

A means had to be found to encourage the best to

reproduce in larger numbers.

With this in mind, Osborn desired that

eugenics be linked to population policies

consideration

— to

— but

only as a secondary

ensure that these factors were included.

Osborn could pursue this passive eugenic approach only after

clearing away the taint of racism held over from the earlier eugenic
agenda.

To this end, he undertook an extensive analysis of the relative

intelligence among different groupings (e.g., race, wealth, occupation,

urban/rural).

He concluded that no significant differences existed

among the groups

Policies which would restrict births in some large groups and
encourage them in other large groups may be defended on the ground
that a certain culture will thereby be strengthened. ... In some
But they should
cases such policies might appear wise or necessary.
grounds.
not be proposed on biological
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.

Osborn's conclusion was a break of major importance.

This broke

the eugenics movement from the logic behind the
1924 immigration reform

which targeted particular groups and instead substituted
policies
targeted at the entire population.

The eugenicist could now address

substantive issues believed to contribute to genetic growth (or
decline).

If

the new policies worked, resulting in the population

acting eugenically, the population would divide naturally along eugenic
lines: the best people increasing their number while the weaker

declined.

Once race, ethnic origin, or class were eliminated as

indicators of genetic worth, and genetic defects (or virtues) were seen
as

randomly spread throughout the population (what the geneticists

taught), then the best strategy was one focused on reproductive

practices
Osborn identified six aspects of a normal routine whose impact
on family life offered eugenicists opportunities to foster eugenic

values.

These included: leisure activities, local nursing (especially

in rural areas), education, medicine, public opinion, and social and

political programs (especially those associated with the welfare state).
A seventh consideration was the ubiquitous sterilization.

directly effected environmental changes.

Four of these

Three, sterilization, nursing,

and medicine, recognized the genetic component and looked to science and

technique as necessary eugenic tools.
A brief review of the seven will help illustrate Osborn's

thinking.

recreation

Leisure activities

— served

8

— by

which Osborn meant non-commercial

to teach co-operation,
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to integrate the sexes, and to

provide for physical and emotional development.

Family recreation must

be encouraged in order to promote the idea and unity of the family.

It

would make the home a happy milieu.

Through education Osborn hoped to promote a sound body and
physique, a balanced personality, and normal attitudes toward family
life.

These issues were not to play a role secondary to IQ or growth in

intellectual matters.

Eugenics would be promoted through teaching an

elementary knowledge of genetics, heredity, and environment (especially
psychology) as well as population studies which would illustrate the
social and biological implications of changes in the birth rate.

Education became important to Osborn for two reasons.
role in "inculcat ing
[

]

First was its

the ideal of parenthood as fundamental in a well-

rounded philosophy of life."^

Education was also enlisted into the

process of weaving eugenic ideals into public opinion.

Educating the

public on the nature/nurture issue and on the biological (read eugenic)
effect of population policy provided information which might eventually

influence some families' decisions on whether or not to use birth
control or have a large family.

advice on the subject.

It

might also influence those who offer

But, and this is a typical Osborn theme, it

would introduce eugenic considerations indirectly.
Any political strategy based on indirection employs public

opinion.

Osborn hoped to influence public opinion as a means to address

the marginal case

— those

not so badly off as to require sterilization or

skilled,
segregation, rather those first on relief, least educated and
and reproductively most prolific.

A properly formed public opinion
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—

would encourage these people to employ birth control measures (and may,
as the values become assimilated into the culture, allow others to

impose contraception on the most defective).

Implementing these ideas, however, requires some explicitly

eugenic actions.

Not all defectives are easily identifiable as such

and this is especially true of the marginals.

identification is helpful.

Therefore, some means of

Many phenotypically healthy carry defective

genes and these people must be identified so that proper action can be
taken.

This need is particularly acute given Osborn's rejection of

surrogate measures such as race, income, and class.

For example, a

couple where one has type A positive blood and the mate type A negative

may wish to limit the number of children they have.

On the other hand,

should they separate and remarry, this conflict may not occur and the

new couples may possess those characteristics that the eugenicists
promote and now they should have large families.

Knowing the

individuals' status allows for the eugenically preferred actions under
all circumstances.

Osborn's ideal was that those raised in the

environment of a eugenically informed public opinion would take these
steps voluntarily and routinely .

Finally, Osborn applauded the economic and social advances made
by the New Deal and developing welfare state.
the home environment were desirable.

Any changes that improved

Housing improvement, slum

clearance, extended social services, medical and child care services
in that
that relieved child-bearing burdens were all important advances

they improved the image and conditions of childrearing.
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The scope of

the services also provided institutional opportunities for targeting the

marginals and promoting birth control among the less fit.
The remaining areas for eugenic influence, medicine and nursing,

continued the themes found in the role of public opinion and social
services.

Both medicine and nursing offered a means of identifying

those with eugenically undesirable traits.

Most of Osborn's

environmental recommendations fall within the category of positive
eugenics.

He relegated negative eugenics to the realm of medicine:

If ... we have urged a new and heavy responsibility on the medical
profession, it is because no other course seems possible. Only the
doctor carries that ultimate public confidence which is necessary if
public and patient alike are to follow advice on matters of
heredity.
Only the doctor sees in intimate detail the interplay of
environment and heredity in which disease and defect may develop,
and therefore he alone is qualified to diagnose and interpret the
results

Not only does Osborn seek the legitimacy of the medical community, but
he relegated diseugenic hereditary characteristics to the category of

In order to allow the established practices of medicine to

disease.

serve eugenic ends, Osborn needed to bring within the doctors' frame of

reference the eugenic implications of birthrate changes and stress the

socially deleterious effects of genetic defects.
Nursing referred to nurses visiting communities.

Based on their

knowledge of the community, they could identify who should or should not
have large families.

They could also act as an advisor on whether or

not a family should use birth control.

Given this strategic position,

they became an obvious group for Osborn to target.

advantage

:
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Nurses had an added

In the hands of this group, eugenics seemed to lose its theoretical
and controversial aspects and to be something merely requiring the
application of experienced and practical good sense. 8 ^

Once again, professionalism aided the eugenic cause.
at a

Osborn also hinted

motivation that resembled Galton's scientific charity:
At present, the eugenic opportunities of nurses are restricted by
the time taken in caring for inadequates , which seems so hopeless
and fruitless a task. 8 ^

After assigning to medicine the eugenically interesting genetic defects,

Osborn now implies that medicine should direct its resources only to the

medically feasible.

The individual, elevated to the center of

attention, now loses its individuality.
In regard to sterilization, Osborn offered little information.

He made reference to it as one means, along with segregation and birth
0/1

control, to control defectives. 00

He also noted that voluntary

sterilization was increasing which offered possibilities for eugenic
goals. 8 ^

Aside from these observations, in his theoretical works he

minimized this controversial practice.
In his later works, Osborn made more explicit the dual nature of

his strategy. 88

The first part, generally referring to the issues

previously discussed, was environmental.
scientific or clinical approach.
these concerns

;

The second centered on the

His early works made reference to

he had never abandoned sterilization or birth control

for the disadvantaged.

By 1968, however, his interest in science as a

eugenic tool had grown, due, in large part, to advances in genetics.
attention on
Genetic research on mutations and hidden defects focused
success in life
deeper traits than could be measured by appearances and
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This clinical strategy also exemplified the technocratic
and scientific
side to eugenics.

Osborn used science as one of the two pillars (the

other being democracy) upon which he attempted to rebuild eugenics.
Each tied directly into the American political culture.

One

historically situated and the other growing in importance.
In brief,

reduce defects.

the clinical strategy sought to identify and then

To this end, Osborn advocated the use of heredity

clinics, "the first eugenic proposals that have been adopted in

practical form and accepted by the public ." 89
care;

a

He promoted institutional

though this was not a eugenically motivated activity, it served

eugenic ends in its segregation of defectives.

Osborn placed birth

control into this strategy, with special emphasis on those with little

education and low economic status.
The tenor of Osborn's writing was one of conciliation and

moderation.

The excesses of his predecessors' prevented anything else.

Clearly, Osborn desired that eugenic goals reflect community values and
he hoped that those views would exclude as undesirable the genetically

defective.

He believed that the ideal would be achieved through

voluntary and independent action.

The eugenics program was to be a

biproduct of routine actions.
There exists, however, an opening for a policy less benign than

Osborn offered.

Despite his moderation, the darker side of eugenics

lurks underneath his standards.

intelligence considerations.

Especially suspect are genetic and

How are these to be identified?

subtlety of Osborn's system is maintained by treating each case

55

The

individually rather than as a broader campaign defined by explicit
characteristics of rightness in the manner of Laughlin's extreme
program.

But even though they are not explicit, the standards of

rightness exist at the undebated level of social values.

Osborn's reliance on social characteristics worked under the
belief that social characteristics carried with them genetic traits,

even if the characteristics were not genetically caused.

This view,

when pushed to its logical conclusions, raises disturbing policy
questions which Garrett Hardin illustrates

9(9

Reviewing his analysis

.

illustrates how eugenic beliefs can influence policy analysis.
To begin, assume an economically stable population.

live in poverty can "trace their lineage
of impoverished ancestors.

7

.

.

.

Those who

through many generations

Living under these conditions is normally

believed to cause hardships for the individuals.

Hardin offered a

different twist: "It takes positive attributes to survive in
poverty.

.

.

.

The type of genetic toughness needed to survive in abject

poverty generations after generations is undoubtedly less common among
92
American suburbanites than it is among poor Indians [from Calcutta ]."

Thus the first policy consideration is the point of reference: "What
7
kind of world do we want to create ?"

If

you first define how

civilization should be, then this choice will bring with it particular
genetic characteristics.

However, if you change the environment, you

bring into the new environment people with traits best suited to the
old.
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follows that if you choose the suburban life, you are not

It

promoting the genetic traits best suited to poverty.

The fact that the

environment and genetic makeup grow to complement one another has
profound influences on policy and economic reform.

Programs that

rapidly raise the level of the economically depressed to a position of

material comfort place upon these people the burden of living in the

civilized world with genetic characteristics developed in the poverty

stricken environment (this carrying of maladjusted genes is part of what
is called the genetic

load^);

If we were to succeed in bringing instant cultural prosperity to a
population that was genetically adapted to poverty, by that very act
we would create a genetic load on the otherwise fortunate nouveaux
riches.
If our reform stopped at this point and if, following the
fashion of the world before the welfare state, we permitted natural
selection to take its course, the genetic load would be rapidly
reduced.
But those who work for economic reform also support the
welfare state. ^5

Hardin moved from this to portray the consequences of adopting

unmodified welfare state policies: creating rapid economic prosperity
among those poorly adapted to civilization.

The eugenicist's concern

centers on whether or not the newly reformed will "tolerate the

necessity

— or

even the thought of

— selective

genetic change?

Or will

they, perceiving the lack of fit between themselves and the corridors of

wealth

.

.

.

seek to pull down the structure of civilization, for their

comfort's sake?"^

if we

accept the eugenic analysis, we should do

nothing dramatic to adjust gross poverty levels.

Consistent with the

eugenic spirit, Hardin recommended a policy of economic advancement
coupled with one of population control, shifting the issue from economic
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to population policy.

Both the policy of benign neglect and population

control are preferred by eugenicists to the simple redistributive

policies because the former policies take seriously the population

question and the necessity of action only after learning how the changes
will effect genetic characteristics.

Hardin's analysis exemplified several characteristics of the new
eugenics.

He showed that policy reduced to biological considerations

produced changes of kind in public policy (from economic to population
policy).

His policy also discriminated among a large group of people by

their genes.

He believed that some would be unable to adjust to the

demands of civilized society and he justified this claim by reference to

biological characteristics.
bias in this approach.

Hardin also brought to the surface a social

Along with Osborn, his standards were based upon

the American middle class, dominated by whites.

One must ask whether

his assessment of the genes was biological or sociological.

Hardin's analysis is not completely consistent with Osborn's
theories.

Osborn found advantages in the welfare state because it

created greater opportunity for those underprivileged and allowed for
the genetically strong among the poor to rise up and escape their

imprisonment.

(This implies that the differences between Osborn and

Hardin may reside in different scientific analysis: the relationship of

genetics to poverty.)

Where the two do agree is on the importance of

population policy and the relevance of genetics to public policy.

They

each see the subtle relationship between environmental changes and

genetic traits, but disagree on how best to effect environmental change.
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The disagreement illustrates the differences between moderate eugenic

analysis (Osborn) and a new hardline analysis (Hardin), a potential
inherent in Osborn's approach.
In sum, Osborn worked to place eugenicists into the mainstream
of American society.

He developed four major areas of attack: an

improved social environment (welfare state); effective methods of birth
control; a "psychological and cultural atmosphere [which] would tend to

encourage births among the parents most responsive to the possibilities
of their environment and diminish births among the least responsive "97
;

and he enlisted the medical community to identify and reduce genetic

defects (screening, counseling, and medicine).

All of these depended

upon voluntary compliance achieved through an eugenically informed

public opinion.

Osborn followed the logic begun by Galton.

interfered with natural selection.

Civilization had

Social changes have genetic

implications and society has an obligation to the future of the human
race to take these consequences into consideration.

The human race will

only continue to grow (the alternative being degeneration, not

stagnation) if our genes are well suited to our environment and this
requires selection.

Therefore, these eugenic concerns must be a part of

our political and scientific agendas.

Osborn leaves us with one final, sobering thought.

It

exemplifies his entire approach:
than
Eugenic goals are most likely to be attained under a name other
eugenics
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Hermann J. Muller

Osborn's prediction of eugenics practiced through other means
finds partial fulfillment in genetics.

In part,

this is coincidence.

Eugenics and genetics share a concern over the public's genetic health.
[he

scientists

recommendations and research plans may cover ground

similar to the eugenicist but without his overarching plan and strategic
interests.

But

in other cases it

is

not coincidental.

Muller exemplified the latter perspective.

Hermann J.

He provided the genetic

grounding to justify eugenics.
Muller was no minor character among geneticists.

In 1946, he

won the Nobel Prize in medicine and physiology for his work on radiation
and genetic mutations.

His writings on our "load of mutations" was well

respected

Muller was also a politically interested scientist.
1920's and 1930's he professed socialist leanings.

In the

Between 1933-1937 he

was senior geneticist at the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow and

Leningrad.

In

1937 he went to Spain as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil

War and thus was out of Moscow when Lysenko purged the ranks of Soviet

geneticists (including some of Muller's close friends and colleagues).
After that, Muller moved away from his support for the Soviet Union and

socialism.

His later writings displayed occasional cold war rhetoric

but generally focused on such scientific issues as radiation

impact on the race's genetic composition.
to eugenics was a natural

s

long term

Relating his work in genetics

leap for one as politically interested as he.
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As a geneticist, Muller worked on Drosophila.

research with which he achieved his awards.

This is the

He used, however, many of

the genetic findings from his Drosophila work when he wrote
on human

genetics.

As a matter of fairness to Muller and to the field of human

genetics, it must be noted that he was not

a

specialist in it.

The

following relies primarily upon his writing on human genetics and on

eugenics, which he wrote for a professional audience, but the lay as
well.
Night

The latter is best seen in his eugenic treatise, Out of the
:

Biologist

Pi

s

V iew of

the Future^.

Because his scientific

authority (and awards) derived from his Drosophila work, it is a little
unfair to present Muller simply as seen in this body of work.

The

purpose of the following section, however, is not to present his genetic
thought, but rather to state the eugenic thinking of this geneticist.

Muller was a Darwinian.

writings.

Evolutionary thought informed his

There existed, however, some sloppiness in his thought,

especially in his popular works.

Occasionally, he appeared to lapse

into the non-Darwinian rhetoric of progressive evolution:
It [evolution] should lend us support in our struggle for a freer
world, for it shows how the most essential properties of living
things have led to their perpetual reaching out, selftransformation, and, for some of them, progression, and conquest of
the rest of nature, until from a slimy scum they have stood erect,
become aware of themselves, evolved social feelings and moral
It shows that this great
principles, and striven toward the stars.
process is still at work and that we can carry it further.

Muller's argument is not so much incorrect as misleading.

Darwin did

not define evolution in terms of ranking traits one against the other.

Rather, improvement was defined as against the environment, by how well
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a trait

helped one live under certain environmental conditions.

degeneration should be seen as
but not as a regression.

a less

Thus

efficient fit to the environment,

Evolution develops through selection among

blind variations rather than a linear progression.
The importance of natural selection theory to Muller's work

warrants a brief summary of his views on the process.

This also will

help tighten the sloppy reasoning he employed in his "political" work.
To Muller, natural selection (Darwin's contribution to evolutionary

thought) meant "heritable variation in different directions,

.

.

.

followed by differential survival and multiplication of the

variants.

Variation is an important part of the process.

alone is not the key but survival by selection is.

Survival

Muller joined

together Darwin and Malthus in arguing that a "struggle for existence"
takes place due to "differential multiplication" (some multiply, others
do not) within a finite space.

The finite space creates the necessity

for "selective elimination" of those who, if no selection existed, would

stand in the way of the best.

A relaxation of the selection process

results in a decay due to the fact that bad mutations out-number good

mutations.
a

(Decay does not mean regression of the species, but may mean

vulnerability eventually leading to extinction.)

Eugenicists relied

upon Darwin's theories, but Darwin himself was unable to determine what

mechanism provided the necessary variation.

This forced the

eugenicists to look for indirect means to achieve their goals since the
answer to the evolutionary process eluded them.

Genetics answered this

question of heredity's mechanism; genes and mutations.
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Finally,

mutations provide the means through which the necessary variation is
achieved.

In nature, mutations occur constantly and when the mutations

produce a variation that better fits the environment, it is selected
for, while the remaining are selected against.

In this regard,

mutations are necessary because diversity is essential to selection.
Muller turned to eugenics for reasons similar to Galton and his
followers.

Civilization interfered with the process of natural

selection.

Despite the hopes of some that the social struggle was

synonomous with the struggle for existence, Muller concluded that "it
now appears that the social struggle under our modern civilization does
not lend

[itself]

to the reproductive survival of

useful to the species. "103

the germ plasm most

improvements in such things as medicine and

living conditions allow many to reproduce who otherwise "would have been

genetically proscribed

Civilization's interference in the

selection process necessitates a corrective reaction.

That is Muller's

understanding of eugenics' role: "the conscious social direction of
human biological evolution." 105

In his earlier eugenic thought,

capitalism was the major villain.
capitalist system.

He focused on two aspects of the

One was the extent to which economic inequality

masked an individual's true worth.

Echoing Osborn, Muller argued that a

and
dominant class could hide their weak offspring or that the financial

psychological costs of pregnancy may prevent some of the genetically
best endowed (but financially poor) from reproducing.

To Muller, this

hide the
illustrated how the distribution of economic rewards could

distribution of genetic value.

Muller placed a high value on ensuring
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—

that all with "the more valuable genes" reproduced in increasing numbers

while the genetically inferior were limited.

^6

The economy was also faulted for creating an artificial view of

man.

According to Muller (the socialist), man is naturally "a hunting

animal and he hunts in packs.

Man is goal oriented and social; the

artificial economy made man individualistic and contentious.

Rather

than joining into fairly large social groups, economic man joins smaller

conflicting groups (e.g., race and religion) that create

dissatisfaction.

Promoting a eugenic effort aimed at directing

evolution within this system would be difficult.

Eugenics would require

co-operation rather than conflict, and sacrifice would have to be

a

social rather than a private (for self or family) concept.

Muller the scientist also outlined threats to evolution.

Most of

his eugenic recommendations follow from this aspect of his critique.

The selection process should select against those mutations harmful to
the individual's survival.

But even when it works correctly, each

individual will carry four to eight mutant genes

which will be slightly detrimental.

1

08

— their

genetic load

If all works properly,

these

particular mutations should slowly work their way out of the system as
new ones take their place.
at

this point.

Civilization's advances affect the process

By allowing those to reproduce who otherwise would have

died (or not reproduced), the genetic load is continued and even

extended.
to

It

is extended because new mutations occur and will be added

those that should already have been eliminated.

Compounding the

problem are new mutations artificially created by civilized life.
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Most of these mutant genes are recessive (in a heterozygous

state they do not determine the characteristics).
that this does not mean they are harmless.

But Muller contended

Most are "effectively

dominant" in that "most of their total damaging effect on the population
is exerted

through their action while in heterozygous condition."

^9

Their effect accumulates within the population, diluting the gene pool.
This "effective domination," combined with the effect of medicine and

other of civilization's advances, makes the genetic load of interest to

eugenics.

Three strategies are available to control this load: avoid

creating new mutations, promote the disproportional birth of those with
the best genetic qualities (and likewise limit the reproduction of the

others), or design our own genetic components.

Preventing artificially induced mutations in an industrial world
is not an easy task.

Muller studied radiation's effect and warned

against extensive exposure to it.

Even though its demonstrable effects

are negligible, the accumulated effect over several generations combined

with a natural mutational load would serve to increase our genetic load.
And "we already have more than enough for comfort."

When we add the

relatively recently discovered threat from chemicals, the breadth of
this attack on our genes becomes apparent.

Further, both radiation and

chemicals are central elements of our economy and defense strategies.
with
This fact alone makes significant alterations in our relationship

these "threats" unlikely.

Thus the first strategy may be both unwise

and impractical.
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:

The remaining two alternatives depend upon science.

Civilization in its current form is the source of our weaknesses.
Natural selection provides the standard against which we should judge
our current state and science provides the means to this end.

Muller

wrote
For in this phase man, and man alone, is acquiring the eyes of
science wherewith to see the structure of nature and to guide his
inventive hands towards the intelligent control both of the bit of
cosmos immediately encompassing him and to that within himself.
Not only does science provide the tools through which we can consciously

direct our evolution, but science also is the guiding philosophy:
But the time is coming when the true literary man cannot afford to
remain aloof from the thought and knowledge of this age
[evolutionary theory] else he will be unable to write of the real
world in which men of modern outlook think, dwell, and have their
11 ?
^
being.
He will develop into an acrobat amusing the ignorant.
,

Ironically, Muller argued that our only hope of overcoming

civilization's intrusions is through the great creation of civilization:
science!

The petty feuding and repressions of our economic system must

yield to the authority of science's commands.
truth through science, so must we act.

science and nature is more complex.
well as Truth.

As we see the natural

But the relationship between

Muller saw nature as an object as

Science can remake nature; science will improve the

human condition beyond any hope offered by nature.

"Nature in general

must be reconstructed by us for ourselves, on an ever grandeur

scale.
Use of our scientific knowledge to improve our life underlies

Muller's thought.

We organize our society based on what we know to be
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natural; we will reproduce based on science's evaluation of our

contribution to the future.

Muller embraced positive eugenics.

Science also informed Muller's rejection of negative eugenics.
This approach sought to eliminate (or decrease) bad genes, but Muller

argued that mutations make this impossible.

Traditional sterilization

programs cannot work against recessive genes.
Muller outlined a modest negative program.

Against this caveat,

By genetically identifying

the major carriers of defective genes, one could attack the defectives

with a higher probability of success than if the program was aimed at
the entire population.

Even though defective genes remain, the most

genetically dangerous cases can be controlled.
a

Once we know those with

high proportion of mutant genes, we can reduce the level of mutations

by obtaining the individuals' abstention from reproduction.

carries with it two problems.

This

One is the definition of a bad gene.

Muller admitted that this depended upon one's point of view.^^
other is when good genes are present along with the bad.

The

Since most

people are carriers of defective genes, this becomes a serious problem.

Consequently, Muller concluded that rather rhan relying on eliminating

defectives, we should concentrate on promoting admirable qualities.
This strategy first needed social reform to free the best to

surface and flourish.
theories.

At this point he followed Osborn's social

Next, however, Muller broke from Osborn and advocated planned

reproduction.

The demands of evolution, not love, must dictate

reproduction.

Aside from concern for economic equality and improvement

regain the
of the conditions for raising children, Muller proposed to
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social nature of man previously stripped away by the economic system.

Eugenics depends upon a social sense which would re-enforce eugenic
activity: it needed a context whereby it was possible to act for the
good of the general population.

"Thus, socially as well as

individually, must ends tend to become means, and means ends." 11 ^
is

This

similar to Osborn's eugenic dimension to society but Muller pushed

the practice far beyond Osborn's work.

genetic load with a dual pronged weapon.

Muller's strategy attacked the
He coupled the "ameliorative

techniques, such as medicine, with a rationally directed guidance of
1

reproduction."

1

C

°

This latter is included "as a necessary complement to

medicine, and to the other practices of civilization, if they are not to
defeat their own purposes

."

1

^

Muller did not leave the defectives to

suffer, but at the same time he sought assurances against the care of

defectives becoming

a

means to their reproduction.

Muller's third alternative was the most daring and most

exploitive of scientific research.

Here, Muller argued for planned

reproduction irrespective of marriage.

The best men and women should be

sought out and joined, but through the use of artificial insemination
and egg transplants, this need not cause an undue intrusion into their

lives . 118

The genetic fix was in.

Muller recognized this plan's effect

on social sensibilities:

Only social inertia and popular ignorance now hold us back from
putting into effect (at least in a limited and experimental way)
such a severance of the function of reproduction from the personal
11
love-life of the individual
.
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This illustrates the pre-emptive role of science.

conventions must adapt to "natural" needs.

Social

Love, "a matter of

imperative emotion", does not by itself serve reproductive needs well.
In fact,

it "degrades

the germ plasm of future generations."

But if you

"unyoke the two, sunder the fetters that from time immemorial have made
them so nearly inseparable,"^^ then you can maintain the bond of Love
and allow the race to develop rationally and free of civilization's

perverting influences.
Muller brought the genetic issue to the surface.

He campaigned

to bring direction to the use of the new genetic techniques rather than

allow them to become a part of the unplanned, irresponsible health care
system.

Echoing Osborn's claim that eugenics seeks to release innate

potential, Muller championed a population possessing "the innate quality
of such men as Lenin, Newton, Leonardo,

Pasteur,

possess their varied faculties combined. "^-21

...

or even to

u n iik. e Osborn,

Muller

promoted diversity, in the form of greatness, in his population,

although his standards paralleled Osborn's.
Had we adopted his plan (and assuming it worked), mutations,

while continuing to exist, would be in balance (at a tolerably low
level) and no longer be sustained by civilization's blind medical

practice.

Furthermore, positive traits would be of higher quality and

in greater numbers than they would have been without human intervention.

the belief
In sum, Muller wanted to bypass natural selection based upon
i

that man can do better.

22
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Muller worked within Osborn's environmental strategy but placed

greater emphasis on genetic considerations.

He spoke with the authority

of the geneticist, expecting all to see the urgency of his message

because of its scientific foundation.

questioning Leo Szilard

s

His work, however, leaves us

dictum^~^ that a scientist and politician

speak with different purposes: one truthfully, the other committed.

Conclusion

The new eugenics broke free from the racial and class based

excesses of its youthful practice.

It accomplished this by moving away

from defending the "old guard" and instead integrated itself into the

mainstream of society, sharing the public's aspirations.

No longer

elitist in tone or practice, eugenics encased itself in democratic
values and practices.

It

became thoroughly middle class.

The extent to which racist or classist charges can still be

levelled against eugenics, they reflect racism within the society.

Osborn attempted empirically to disprove the racist conclusions of his

predecessors.

He displayed, however, an upwardly mobile middle class

bias which, in his time, included a white bias.

At the risk of

splitting hairs, Gould's argument of scientists reflecting their
cultural context better describes current racial or class biases within
the eugenics movement than do comparisons to the earlier eugenicists'

prejudices
Along with integrating themselves into daily life, the

eugenicists sought to influence the medical community (defined to
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include genetic science).

By becoming only a secondary part
of this

highly respected profession, eugenicists hoped to
find an effective
means to implement their agenda and
their issues.

a

source to lend new legitimacy to

This is the side of modern eugenics that rightly
has

received attention 124
.

The movements into the mainstream of society
and

into the scientific community represent the two tools or
strategies of

modern eugenics.

Confronted with apparent genetic degeneration or

threats to future evolutionary development, eugenicists looked to either

environmental manipulation, genetic intervention (either through
regulating procreation or direct genetic intervention)
of

the two.

,

or a combination

Of course, other concerns may motivate the same actions.

This dual purpose is something Osborn hoped to exploit; it also makes

isolating eugenics difficult.
This presents the observer with a dilemma.

confronting the contemporary student of eugenics

is

The issue
to decipher whether

or not the eugenics movement has moved so far away from explicit action

that events, even though they may produce eugenic results, cannot

legitimately be classified as eugenic.

Another way of stating this

draws a parallel to the courts' efforts to deal with segregation.

They

have had to determine whether conditions which produce segregated

results (de facto segregation), but are not the result of official

policy or acquiescence (de jure segregation), should be considered

segregation within the law.

^

in the case of modern eugenics,

the

concern is over practices that have eugenically desirable results.

Osborn's politics should move eugenics from d£

71

j

ure to

d_e

facto

practices.

It now becomes necessary to take the theories
presented by

those who desired eugenic programs and determine whether or not
a

coherent eugenic idea exists that can be distinguished from the
tools
its proponents recommend.

Eugenic concerns can be discerned by reference to views of the
normal.

Implicit is a belief that a standard (or standards) of human

development exist against which to measure the race as a whole.

This is

grounded in a naturalistic interpretation of evolution and modern

civilization's relationship to evolution.

"Defective" is defined in

reference to the ideal racial stock, not in terms of deviations from the

average human.
In a study on genetic engineering,

the English philosopher

Jonathan Glover raised the issue of distinguishing eugenics from the
emerging genetic techniques 126

An advocate of selective usage of

.

genetic engineering, he attempted to distinguish his position from
eugenics.

First, he set forth the common agenda: altering "the genetic

composition of future generations."
The first was environmental

— tax

He suggested three strategies.

policy, health care, poverty relief.

Next was eugenics, which he defined as "aimed at altering breeding

practices or patterns of survival of people with different genes."
Finally was genetic engineering: "[the use of] enzymes to add to or
subtract from a stretch of DNA."

l

9Q

He then presented the following

explanation of his approach:
The main reason for casting the discussion in terms of genetic
engineering rather than eugenics is not a practical one. Many
eugenic policies are open to fairly straightforward moral
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objections, which hide the deeper theoretical issues
[of genetic
intervention].
Such policies as compulsory sterilization,
compulsory abortion, compelling people to pair off in
certain ways,
or compelling people to have more or fewer children
than they would
otherwise have, are all open to objection on grounds of
overriding
people s autonomy.
Some are open to objection on grounds of damage
to the institution of the family.
And the use of discriminatory
tax- and child-benefit policies is an intolerable step
towards a
society of different genetic castes.
His objection to eugenics, however, was not absolute.

He

supported genetic screening and counseling which "are eugenic because
part of their point is to reduce the incidence of severe genetic

abnormality to the population."

^

i

Eugenics, it seems, is acceptable

when used against a disease: as therapy.

He adopted genetic engineering

as his preferred tool to affect future genetics.
in

He framed the approach

familiar language: the negative/positive distinction employed by

eugenicists
His analysis raises several questions, the answers to which may

help narrow down the meaning of eugenics today.

Glover lumped the three

categories together as possible means to his broader goal of genetic
influence.

But are the three comparable?

In order to make them so,

Glover defined eugenics as a technique: simply breeding strategies.

Within the context of genetic manipulation, eugenics was reduced to a
status equal to that of tax policy or engineering.

problematic understanding of eugenics.
the eugenic approach.

This is, at best, a

First, Glover mischaracterized

His emphasis on compulsory strategies is typical

of the way many view eugenics.

Unfortunately, this characterization

follows from the early eugenic policies and misses the shift wrought by

Osborn and Muller.

Muller's endorsement of artificial insemination
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(AID) represented an approach to reproduction different from eugenicists

before him.

His genetic strategy offered a more direct form of human

intervention than either the environmental strategies or those aimed at
marriage.

The leap from AID to surrogate parenting, in vitro birth,

embryo fusion, or cloning is small compared to the leap from traditional

reproductive strategies.
and the latter of kind.

The leap of the former is one of difference

Muller provided a strategy that was of the same

genus as previous eugenicists but verged on a new species.

If

Muller

did not actually adopt the techniques of the genetic engineer, the

distinction between the two lacks

a

meaningful difference.

Thus, the developing strategy of eugenics, which on its face

supports Glover, has begun to make the wall between genetic engineering

techniques and eugenics "even more warped and twisted than

expected."

I

Aside from this shift within eugenics, Glover confused a

technique (engineering) with a theory or strategy (eugenics).

To argue

that something is eugenic is to say that it seeks to affect genes in

light of a preconceived ideal (e.g., sociability, IQ, physique).

Eugenics brings with it the dual theoretical foundation of evolutionary
theory and idealized man.

eugenics

— especially

It seems consistent with the logic of

in light of Osborn's desire to promote eugenic ends

without explicitly using eugenic means
techniques.

— to

include the use of genetic

The essential test is the context of their usage, not the

tool itself.

It follows that genetic engineering should not stand alone

to achieve
as a discreet strategy but rather is a means used by others

broader goals.
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A distinction between eugenics and genetic engineering can be

drawn.

It revolves around,

on the one hand, seeking the ideal man or,

on the other, therapeutically correcting deviations from the average

man.
far,

Some genetic techniques may be used, if research progresses this
to cure spina bifida or Down's Syndrome.

the individual level, are not eugenic;

curative medicine.

These interventions, at

they are within the tradition of

They seek to bring the individual up to the level of

the average or typical body.

To qualify as eugenic, they would have to

be done for breeding purposes in an attempt to affect the norm.

Simplistically stated, the therapeutic approach works on an empirical
view of normality while the eugenic embodies a normative or idealized

understanding
This distinction becomes complex when one considers Osborn's

writings.

His desire to move eugenics from the social level to the

individual proved shrewd.

If

Osborn succeeded, a therapeutic or

contraceptive technique or practice may appear individually benign, but
serve, in the aggregate, eugenic ends.

therapeutic level.

Eugenics practice moves to the

Consequently, looking at the appearance of an action

may not reveal its full nature.

Thus enters the slippery slope.

Aware of this, Amatai Etzioni offered a classif icatory scheme
that may help clarify these issues.
as

He divided the genetic intervention

(individual or
to purpose (therapeutic or breeding) and as to client

social service)

.

The second he modified to include voluntary or

coercive social service.

(See Table 1.)

Assuming Osborn succeeded in

be seen how
forming a eugenically sensitive public opinion, it can
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Table

l

Genetics in Politics

Therapeutic Goals

Breeding Goals

individual
Service

1.

e.g., abort deformed
fetuses on demand
[intervening to
correct congenital
genetic defect]

3. e.g., AID, parents'
choice of donor features

Societal
Service
Voluntary

e.g., encourage
people to abort a
deformed fetus

4.

Societal
Service
Coercive

5
e.g., require
genetic test before
marriage license is
issued

[6.] e.g., prohibit feebleminded persons from
marrying

2

[

e.g., urge people to use
sperm from donors who
have high IQ's

.

. ]

Source: Amitai Etzioni, The Genetic Fix: The Next Technological
Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, Colophon Books, 1973), p. 104.

easily these categories collapse into eugenics.

The extent to which

eugenic goals have infiltrated into the society should increase the
likelihood that individuals would employ genetic techniques and employ
them in ways that would encourage eugenic ends.

For example, a

eugenically aware couple of average intelligence but with some history
of mental illness in their past would be more prone to AID than the non-

eugenically aware.

Furthermore, among couples who employ AID, the

eugenically aware would be more likely to shift from individual service
to societal service and
is

take the donor with a higher IQ.

meant by acting in a way to encourage eugenic ends.

This is what
The belief that

all six cells could be motivated by eugenic ideals (and especially the
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that the participants are unaware of the eugenic background
to

their decisions) is one issue that draws attention to these

practices
A more optimistic position presents therapeutic goals as

offering the possibility of a genetic policy but not in themselves

implementing eugenics.
provides a good example.

The genetic test as a condition for marriage

This would provide the genetic information a

eugenicist would want in order to determine to what extent the couple's

offspring would contribute to their generation's genetic health.
couple would then act accordingly.

The

On the other hand, the information

may be used by the couple to determine their chances of producing an

abnormal child and they may then act based on their willingness and

ability to financially and psychologically care for such

a

child.

The

fact that this child would continue a line of "bad" genes becomes

irrelevant.

Concern over the future gene pool is not the same as

concern over the social cost of care for the handicapped.

The former is

eugenic; the latter is economic.
By thinking of Etzioni's chart as simply an analytical tool, it

may survive the complexities introduced by Osborn's strategy.

Speaking

broadly, eugenics is more concerned with breeding than therapeutics.

Because it attempts to use therapeutics to achieve breeding goals does
not diminish the sense to which breeding is involved.

most interested in societal service.

Eugenics is also

Where Osborn promoted individual

choice, he meant what Etzioni called voluntary societal service
the
(although the individual in Osborn's society did not always know
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social basis behind his actions).

The tendencies of this chart are such

that the genetic engineering approach Glover tried to place next
to

eugenics can easily fit in any of the the six cells while eugenics tends
towards 3, 4, and 6.

The chart also places the types of therapeutic

genetic interventions as would be involved in "gene therapy" in separate
cells than eugenics:

1

or

2

as opposed to 3, 4 or 6.

In the abstract, a distinction can be drawn between eugenics and

genetic therapeutic techniques.

That distinction resides, in large

part, in the difference between Etzioni's therapeutic and breeding

goals.

It

is one of

facto / de jure issue.

determine.

intent.

This does not, however, answer the de

In practice,

intent may be impossible to

The issues become ambiguous.

The ambiguity results from the

joining of purpose between eugenics and genetics.

Genetics searches for

an understanding of how genes work and how they can be manipulated.

The

assumed purpose of manipulation is the remedy of current genetic defects
and the prevention of future ones.

This is eugenics' purpose except

that eugenics justifies itself in terms of the idealized race while

genetics is within the medical category of disease.

This distinction

becomes important when the two conflict: correcting the immediate

genetic defect but not sterilizing the patient in order to prevent its

transmission to future generations.

To conclude: actions that fall

within Breeding Goals should be considered de jure eugenics.

On the

other hand, therapeutic actions that lack a long-term impact fall within
a different

social category, that of disease.
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Both eugenics and genetics may fall under a broader category,
one that speaks to the needs of the society's dominant power centers.

This view is reflected in the writings of Jeremy Rifkin.135

while

maintaining the genetic dimension, he argued that eugenics also served
economic goals, as he (over)stated
The new eugenics is commercial, not social.
In place of the shrill
eugenic cries for racial purity, the new commercial eugenics talks
in pragmatic terms of increased economic efficiency, better
performance standards, and improvement in the quality of life. The
old eugenics was steeped in political ideology and motivated by fear
and hate.
The new eugenics is grounded in economic considerations
and stimulated by utilitarianism and financial gain. 136

Rifkin dismissed too quickly the social nature of eugenics' goals.

What

he did capture was the extent to which eugenics sought to minimize

deviance and impediments to social control.

Already mentioned is how

Osborn's standards stress the extent to which people should be well
adapted to the work demands of an industrial order.

Muller promoted

physical well-being, social feeling, and high intellect.

1

B7

Sanger

often justified her position with the economic language of efficiency
and utility.

In sum,

the eugenicists sought to ensure that society was

populated by individuals who efficiently fit their environment which was
the current culture and economy.

To summarize, eugenics is distinguished from other attempts to

influence characteristics by its reliance on an idealized norm.
society as
Premised on Darwinian evolutionary theory eugenics added the
be
creator of ideal characteristics toward which evolution should

"encouraged" to move.

The primary strategy has been to influence

basis.
reproductive practices on an individual and voluntary

79

However,

:

the rapid growth of genetic technologies offers means capable of

attacking the genes directly and must now be included in the eugenic
arsenal.

With these tools, society may now assume the task of directing

nature and adapting nature to the demands of the political economy.
What is wrong with eugenics?

Why do supporters of the new

biology try to distinguish their techniques from eugenics and the new

biology's critics wrap eugenics around it?

An obvious answer is the

mistaken belief that eugenics is synonymous with its despised past.

The

force of this concern is seen in the American Eugenics Society changing
its name to the Study of Social Biology in 1972.

There is truth in this

issue, but the concerns run deeper.

Another part of the answer lies in what goes along with calling

something eugenic.

Eugenics not only implies, but asserts, a political

dimension to science.

It presents a framework that transcends the

science within which the research proceeds.

objective science.

This violates the norm of

Questions are not being asked just because they are

intellectually interesting.

Nor is science separate from its

technological application.
Other problems remain.

Eugenics is premised on the belief that

our civilization's problems can be lessened through biological means.

This tends toward a biological reductionism.

Glover illustrates this

issue
less easy to sympathize with opposition to the principle of
changing our nature. Preserving the human race as it is will seem
an acceptable option to all those who can watch the news on
It is
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television and feel satisfied with the world.
It will appeal to
those who can talk to their children about the history of
the
twentieth century without wishing they could leave some things
out

i:5y

Unless you support the parade of horribles marching across our evening

newscasts, you should support efforts to biologically change our nature

which in turn will improve our world.
violence are located in genes.

In other words, poverty, war, and

Galton would have approved.

From this perspective, it is easy to slide into a form of

technological imperative.

As this approach takes hold, issues

increasingly will be defined in biological terms and focused on the
individual (e.g., genetic screening in the workplace).

Ironically, if

the technological imperative progresses far enough, it would usurp

political prerogatives and undermine eugenics which, at its base, is
political.

If this

is

true, the world of biotechnology^^ would grow

irrespective of eugenic needs.

In that case,

the justifications for

using technologies would adjust to match the new capabilities of

technology.

An example may be abortion.

narrow role of protecting a mother's life.

Abortion long served the
As newer, safer, and easier

methods of abortion developed, and related technologies developed which
could lead one to want an abortion (e.g., contraception and

amniocentesis), pro-abortion forces sought to "enlarge the concept of
what is therapeutic" and redefine the nature of the fetus.

political rationale had to adjust to accomodate the changing practices
resulting from the greater capabilities of the technique.

The result

was first the reform laws of the 1960's and later the Supreme Court
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decision. 141

On the other hand, we could argue that the eugenic

environment encouraged the development of these techniques resulting in
political (i.e., eugenic) considerations co-opting

scientific/technological developments.

In either case,

the issues are

seen in biological terms and this is a manifestation of the

technological and naturalistic bias whereby we look to science to solve
our problems.

Returning to eugenics' flaws, another one flows from eugenics'
own base: Darwinian evolution.

scientific theories is

a

Basing any political philosophy on

precarious act.

As has been discovered in the

nuclear power/weapons field, scientific theories and interpretations
change and these changes may undermine the political beliefs supporting
the use of that science.

American eugenics matured under the wing of

Darwinian evolution modified by Mendelian genetics.
theory is fiercely debated.

Today, Darwin's

Stephen Jay Gould, for example, argues that

Darwin correctly identified natural selection as the mechanism of

evolution but misunderstood the process.

Rather than being a process of

slow and gradual change (an important element supporting eugenics),

evolution is, in fact, a series of "big bangs" followed by centuries of
no evolutionary change.

Rather than being a slowly evolving variation

of a species, we represent a branch of a species from which a part

became isolated and then adapted to its new environment, creating a new
species that remains unchanged until another splinter breaks away.
this is true, then the premise of eugenics is undermined.
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Another premise of contemporary eugenics, deleterious mutations,
has also been challenged.

mutation load is

a

means to preserve the species, not, as Muller argued,

a threat to survival.

mechanism by which

According to Rif kin, some now argue that the

This new argument claims that mutations are the

a species

fine tunes its relationship to the

environment in order to preserve its nature.

Mutations do not change

the evolutionary nature of the species, rather they allow adjustments to

small environmental changes.

Regardless of the final outcome of this

debate (the gadflies still compose a distinct minority of natural

historians) it illustrates the precarious nature of scientific theories.
Because many political positions sustain themselves by custom and

acceptance, the undermining of their theoretical underpinnings may not
"trickle up" to political practice.
Another problem, and one more serious, is the idea of normality

underlying eugenics.

Darwin's work embodied a standard: "best fit".

The eugenicists turned "best" into a normative position reflecting where

we should be rather than the empirical where we are.

All eugenicists

argue that as a society we must establish standards as to what we want
as

the "best fit".

This becomes the idealized norm.

(This does not

preclude a certain amount of deviation around the norm.)

Osborn sought

market sense)
to legitimate this process by democratically (in the free
to
choosing the characteristics and he succeeded in shifting the debate

this procedural issue, as Etzioni illustrates.

certain biological
At issue is a public policy which welcomes

—

qualities.
features over others e.g., energetic over lethargic
the family
limiting
for
call
our
to
nature
This is rather similar in
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size.
1

Some are influenced by it, others ignore it. . . . In short,
no longer saw a contradiction between a genetic policy
and a

democratic society.

This resolves the problem if the fundamental question concerns the

nature of an authority and what it chooses.

democratic choice.
dimension.

It is hard to argue against

But, this form of democracy also embodies a coercive

The danger of the idealized norm

the therapeutic medical interventions

who fall outside the norm.

— lies

— and

this also applies to

in our perception of those

They face stigmatization; in the extreme, a

status less than human: a freak..

Drawing upon his research on the social status of freaks, Leslie
Fiedler raised some important concerns regarding normality which provide
an important perspective on eugenics and conclusion to the Chapter.

He

characterized our relationship to freaks as an "image of the secret

self."^^

We looked upon them with fear and wonderment, bringing them

into our religion and then our entertainment (e.g., carnival sideshows).

Both confer a moment of legitimacy on them.

The development of

technology allowed us to move into a third stage and "repair" freaks.
The Greeks portrayal of their gods in "idealized human form" raised

"normal

...

Today, the norm is not

to its highest power.

expressed in our gods, but in ourselves.

In the past,

the "secret self"

could be confined to religious belief, the sideshow of a carnival, or
the movie screen.

Today we can exorcise it with the genetic scalpel.

The belief that we can remove our secret self denies humanity

complexity.

"It is especially important [argues Fiedler] for us to

realize that finally there are no normals at a moment when we are
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striving desperately to eliminate Freaks, to normalize the
world." 147
Our uncomfortable wonderment of freaks involved a recognition
that they

were a part of us; that others viewed us as freaks.

Who has not lived

through the insecurities resulting from perceived inadequacies
and

deformities?

They often occur at night and are controlled as we age,

but few can eliminate them completely. 148
by the shifting understanding of normal.

1950's.

The issue becomes compounded

Few wanted to be Black in the

Today, those who, in the 1950's, wore their whiteness proudly

look for Indian blood.

The big busts of the 1960's (real or artificial)

gave way to the liberated bust of the 1970's.

If

they were alive today,

how would those "repaired" by sterilization early in the century feel
about our current view of normality?

Forgetting our self begets a dangerous kind of politics, as
Fiedler appropriately warned:
I sympathize with [the dwarf's] stand [against being seen as
abnormal], insofar as the war against "abnormality" implies a
dangerous kind of politics which begins with a fear of difference
and eventuates in a tyranny of the normal.
That tyranny, moreover,
is sustained by creating in those outside the norm shame and selfhatred particularly if they happen to suffer from that vast
majority of "deformities" which we still cannot prevent or cure.

And

—

And this is what Osborn sought to do.

His campaign to turn public

opinion into a force to direct marriages along eugenic lines would
create the subtle force in society that leaves as illegitimate those

unfortunates who do not measure up to the ideal and damns those who do
not try.
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CHAPTER II
STERILIZATION

One of the eugenicist's strategies was to promote sterilization

policies.

The last chapter noted that this strategy failed.

Sterilization, however, has continued.

At present, most sterilizations

are for contraceptive purposes and are performed routinely without

controversy.

As a technique, however, it remains embroiled in

controversy.

Needless to say, those writing on the subject (especially,

but not exclusively, the critics) are quick, to recall its eugenic past;
the technique's defenders distinguish their support from the

eugenicists.

The following recounts many of the complaints and explores

the contemporary basis for the controversy:

is

it

eugenics revisited or

some other dimension of politics?

Historical Review

Sterilization is not a new technique to power: its cruder form,
castration, was used earlier in Europe as a penalty for rape.
were exceptional practices.

But these

Castration's extraordinary nature made it

awkward to use as a technique of general policy.

Not until

1894 when a

Swede performed the first vasectomy and 1897 when a Swiss doctor
did a
performed the first sterilization of a woman through the abdomen

become
technique offering a more precise means to control reproduction

available.

performed the
In 1899 an Indiana doctor named Harry Sharp
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first eugenic sterilization in America.^-

Some eugenicists, as was noted

in the last chapter, had grand plans for sterilization.

They hoped to

sexually "kill" those who represented a biological threat to others.
The eugenicists' legislative strategy achieved their first

success in Pennsylvania in 1905.

The governor, however, vetoed the bill

allowing Indiana, in 1907, the dubious honor of being the first state
with a eugenic sterilization law on its books.

chronology of early state laws.

Table

2

presents a

Those laws passed before World War

tended to be punitive and loosely written.

After World War

I,

I

the state

legislatures paid closer attention to procedural due process safeguards
and avoided the punitive dimension that had been disallowed by the

courts as cruel and unusual punishment.
The justifications employed by sterilization's proponents ranged

from individual freedom to protecting the state.

Gosney and Popenoe

stressed the therapeutic rather than punitive nature of sterilization.

Sterilization "is a protection to the subject, to his family, to the
state, and to future generations."

2

In their review of sterilization in

California, Gosney and Popenoe tried to present sterilization as a

moderate and responsible policy.

They stressed that it was "merely an

adjunct to supervision of the defective or diseased."*^

They limited its

use to those whose mental disease or defect was a menace to the state;
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Table

2

Sterilization Laws
Year

State

1907
1909

Indiana
California
Connecticut
Washington

1911

Iowa

New Jersey
Nevada
New York
Kansas
Michigan
North Dakota
Wisconsin
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Oregon
South Dakota
Alabama
North Carolina
Delaware
Montana
Virginia

1912
1913

1915
1917

1919

1923
1924
1925

Idaho
Maine
Minnesota
Utah
Mississippi
Arizona
West Virginia
Oklahoma
Vermont

1928
1929
1931

Source: Mark Haller, Eugenics: Hereditarian
Attitudes in American Thought (New Brunswick, N.J.
Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp. 133-137.

where the condition is perpetuated by heredity; and where sterilization
was the best means available to deal with all or part of the condition.^

Sterilization, although defended as a means to protect the

individual, actually was used to advance the states' interests.
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Sterilization's proponents were determined to define
acceptable genetic
characteristics.

For example, they argued that "no one [had] any
right

to carry the gene of

Huntington

s

chorea or hemophelia into another

family.
The negation of

individual rights found even stronger support in

George Mangold, Head of the St. Louis School of Social Economics.

He

"was angered by the appeal to 'individual liberty' as an objection to

eugenic measures.

The price of such tender concern for the rights of

individuals, he warned, would be 'racial deterioration, stupid

citizenship and social disintegration.
all possible justifications:

®

Thus Mangold linked together

race, polity, and society.

Gosney and Popenoe continued the social theme.

entitled "Sterilization For Eugenic Reasons"'

In a chapter

7

they included three

subsections: "Cutting off Bad Heredity";® "Cutting off Carriers of

Defects";^ and "Cutting off Underprivileged Children."^

The first two

fit easily into the eugenic logic, but the third can only be explained
as a social goal.

Under this heading sterilization is employed to

prevent the mentally deficient parent from raising children out of a
fear that the child "could not expect to have normal, healthy, happy

lives."

11

This applies even if the condition is not inherited.

epileptic parent, for example, fell under this category.
is

the most cost effective means to handle these cases.

12

An

Sterilization

13

To summarize, the early sterilization movement purported to seek
the reduction of mental disease for biological purposes, but in fact it

also served the interest of the state and economic and social reformers.
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The movement was, however, more rhetoric than
action.

With the

exception of California and North Carolina, few states
vigorously
exploited their sterilization authority.

Even though most states did

not repeal the laws, sterilization became disgraced as a
policy tool

along with the eugenics movement.

however

,

What this controversy demonstrated,

was that the eugenics movement was more than an attempt to

apply science for the betterment of society; it also rested upon

a

vision of the social order premised on a view of the normal.

Contemporary Sterilization Practices

Despite carrying the onus of eugenics, sterilization did not die
out as a practice.

Voluntary sterilization has been a long standing

method of contraception and in recent years has become the most common
method of contraception.^
The rejection of the coercive eugenic approach has not abated

controversy over sterilization.

The practice has been surrounded by

persistent debate centering around the issue of voluntary consent.

Principally, it involves three groups in society: women, those on
welfare, and the mentally ill.

Welfare, Women, and Coerced Sterilization

Reviewing sterilization practices and alleged abuses in the

modern context illustrates the difficulty of identifying eugenics after
Osborn.

His theory was to make its practice as hidden as possible and
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rarely, if ever, under the name eugenics.

Osborn's agenda included

issues only indirectly related to genetics, further complicating the
issue

Another complication is the extent to which sterilization has
become an accepted form of contraception.

While controversial in some

cases, sterilization is a widely accepted technique and thus its

practice may represent nothing more controversial than extending the
best available technique to those unable to afford it on their own.

If

this is eugenics, and it is not clear that it is, it is not the hard-

line practiced in the early twentieth century.

There is no shortage of allegations of abusive practices

inflicted on women and, in particular, women on welfare.
called "systematic and widespread." 16

Abuse has been

The following will review the

nature of these alleged abuses and attempts to respond to the

allegations.
to

Following this discussion, data will be examined in order

evaluate the allegations.
The evidence supporting charges of abuse is circumstantial and

anecdotal.

Many of the abuses are thought to result from the private

agenda of doctors and carried out within the context of the special

doctor-patient relationship.

Suspicions about doctors' attitudes has

received some empirical support.

In a survey of 105 doctors in an urban

southeastern United States community (80% of the local doctor
as
population) the doctors characterized those on public support

use oral
insufficiently "reliable," "intelligent," or "motivated" to

contraceptives.

16

limited
The public patient was seen as "a person with
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education, who may not even be able to count, let alone sustain the

motivation for contraception over

a long time."

of the woman on public support was ten years.

(The average education

17
)

As a consequence,

the

doctors recommended the pill for 73% of their private patients, IUD for
15%, and sterilization for only 6%.

In contrast, for only 24% of the

public patients was the pill preferred while the IUD was method of

choice for 58% of the public patients and sterilization for 14%.

When

queried on their treatment of AFDC recipients who had at least three

illegitimate children, 40% believed contraception should be mandatory
(49% said voluntary) and among those recommending sterilization, 46%

desired compulsory (51% voluntary).

Fifty-eight percent supported

withholding public assistance for additional children.^

"Compulsory

sterilization or the withholding of public support for additional
children was favored by 77%. "

This was highest among those doctors born

south of the Mason-Dixon line (80% as compared to 47% from other
90

regions)

Many opportunities occur during common medical practices for the

doctors to act on these beliefs.

The best opportunities exist during

labor, the postpartum period, while the woman is sedated, or during an

abortion.

21

Other allegations include doctors refusing to perform

abortions unless they are able to sterilize the woman as well.

Known

to
abuses include threatening the withdrawl of welfare benefits; failure

asking for
inform the patient of alternative forms of birth control; not

medical
consent in the person's native language; or conditioning
22
services, welfare, or employment on becoming sterilized.
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But even granting the existence of these occurrences, it is not

clear that they were legally coercive or illegitimate.

Pierce 23 illustrates the difficulty of such labels.
of three obstetricians in Aiken County,

only one taking on new patients.
for delivery of her fourth child.

medical expenses.

The case of Dr.

Dr. Pierce was one

South Carolina, but he was the

In 1972, Virgil Walker consulted him

She relied on Medicaid to pay her

Pierce informed her that his policy was not to

deliver the third child of those unable to pay their own bills without
also sterilizing them.
to find a new doctor.

If

she did not consent to this, she would have

This was a longstanding policy on Pierce's part.

Walker twice resisted his demand but finally consented, believing that
her further protests would be futile.

By the time she was sterilized,

she had signed three consent forms.

A divided Fourth Circuit court did not find this to be coercive.

Decided in 1977 and announced by Senior Circuit Judge Bryan, the court

concluded that because Pierce had previously made known his position, he
could not be held in violation of any laws.

Citing her signature on

three consent forms, the court concluded that "[a]t no time [was Dr.

Pierce] shown to have forced his view upon any mother;"

0

/

this despite

her having twice refused to consent out of a desire to remain fertile.

Dissenting, Judge Butzner agreed that Pierce should be left

unrestricted on medical issues, but Butzner contended that Pierce's
motives were economic and social, not medical.
issue.

This is the pivotal

Doctors participating in the Medicaid program serve as the

medical
representatives of the program but are to be left alone on
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25

issues.

Thus if Pierce was acting on his professional judgment, he was

within his proper realm.

However, if the actions represented social or

political values, then he fell under the color of state law and

abandoned the special position granted doctors.

As evidence to support

his argument, Butzner related that Pierce had told one of the plaintiffs

(Brown) that his tax dollars paid for her to have children and that he
was tired of supporting them. 26

As a matter of policy, Pierce made no

sterilization demands on those privately paying for his services.
Butzner argued that this supported the claim that Pierce's policy

derived from economic rather than medical concerns. 22

The plaintiff

Brown had received no pressure from Pierce until he discovered that she
was not paying privately.

Pierce then requested her consent for a

sterilization, she refused and he immediately released her from the
90
hospital “°
.

Butzner also contended that Pierce was an integral part of a

government program, and thus fell under the color of state law.

As a

matter of policy, Medicaid doctors interact with the patient unimpeded.
This freedom, contended, Butzner, anointed the doctors with an

administrative role.

(The fact that Pierce based his policy on economic

considerations underlined the administrative character of his
position. 2 ^)

Previously, Pierce had accepted $60,000 in Medicaid funds

(thus his involvement had not been minor)

accept medicaid patients.

sterilization.

30

and had freely chosen to

State law prohibited any coercive

In other words, Butzner refused to draw a clear
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distinction between private practice and the public program.
to convict

He wanted

Pierce.

This case illustrates the difficulty of generalizing on these

issues.
as

Pierce (or his policy) pressured the patient, but not so much

to coerce,

in a legal sense.

A decentralized and somewhat ambiguous

program allowed protections against coerced sterilization to be defined
out of the case.

The dissenter would have this be a case of

government ally coerced sterilization; the majority defined it as a
matter of private choice.
Less ambiguous public attempts have been made to sterilize those
on welfare.

The efforts to tie sterilization to welfare have been

persistent.

Julius Paul documents a sordid history of efforts along

these lines.

He identified twelve states that in the 1960's expressed

"various degrees of interest in punitive sterilization."-^
of the proposals passed.

Again none

Virginia and North Carolina, after attempts at

coercive legislation failed, passed voluntary sterilization laws in 1962
and 1963, respectively.

Several states had one house pass a law only to

have it defeated in the other.

Paul argued that these efforts

represented the beginning of the modern eugenics where eugenic and

economic goals merge:
Whereas the earlier eugenic efforts were aimed at cutting off the
'defective germ plasm' of the American population before it
'drowned' us, current efforts would be aimed at cutting off both the
defective germ plasm and welfare p^^ments in order to avoid economic
strangulation of the public purse.
In

linked
1973, four states considered laws that would have

sterilization to the reception of AFDC benefits.
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In New Hampshire,

legislation proposed a $1000 incentive to welfare recipients
who

successfully applied to the welfare office for sterilization.
was eventually killed. 33

The bill

in Tennessee a bill was introduced to deny

welfare payments to any female who became a mother of more than two

illegitimate children unless she submitted to sterilization.
refused, any further children would be considered orphans.

If

she

This

received a favorable report from committee but died at adjournment. 3 ^
Two bills were proposed in Ohio.

One would deny AFDC funds to those

with two or more illegitimate children.

The other would sterilize any

father who failed to support his minor children. 33
received action.

Neither bill

Finally, a legislator in Illinois introduced

legislation offering free sterilization and a $100 incentive to couples
who fulfilled certain residency, income, and family considerations.

The

bill, after receiving an unfavorable committee report, died in the
O£

legislature.

On the other hand, in 1974 Massachusetts passed a law

which prohibited tying sterilization to welfare benefits.

The failure

of the bills seeking coercive sterilization bespeaks of an official

reluctance to employ coercive sterilization.

It cannot be ignored

that

the only one to pass prohibited coercion.

Relf v. Weinberger: The Federal Government Responds
The allegation of abuses reached a head with the federal
18
government in the 1973 case of the Relf sisters.

four years

,

regulations.

Over the previous

the federal government had been working on sterilization
39

The Relf case resulted from the sterilizing of two black
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sisters Minnie (fourteen) and Mary (twelve and retarded) Relf.

The

sterilization occurred at an 0E0 funded agency, the Montgomery County
(Alabama) Community Action Agency, on June 14, 1973.
involved.

AFDC funds were

The Relfs alleged that they were coerced into being

sterilized; the agency reported that their mother consented by marking
an "X" on a consent form.
In response to the publicity accompanying the sisters'

sterilization, HEW issued regulations to prevent further abuses in
federally funded programs.

These regulations provided for written

consent, a review board for those under 18 years old, legally

incompetent minors must be given the above protections and in addition
the approval of a state court of competent jurisdiction, and, finally,

sterilization of mental incompetents of all ages receive approval of the
review board and a court, but they do not need to personally consent
the consent of their representative was considered suf f icient

.

^

while

these regulations provided an improvement over the previous condition,

they were challenged in court by the National Welfare Rights

Organization (NWRO).

The case was consolidated with that of Katie Relf,

the two sisters' mother.

NWRO challenged the regulations as inadequately protecting women
from pressure to be sterilized in order to maintain their welfare

benefits.

The court found that "uncontroverted evidence [existed] in

the record that minors and other incompetents have been sterilized with

federal funds and that an indefinite number of poor people have been

improperly coerced into accepting

a

sterilization operation under the
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^

:

threat that various federally supported welfare benefits would be

withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible sterilization ."^ 1

The

court determined that the legislation establishing the relevant programs

required voluntary consent.

The court proceeded to investigate as to

whether or not HEW's regulations assured voluntarism.
The court placed the issues into the context of reproductive

privacy
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the right of privacy
entails the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
.
.
Involuntary sterilizations directly threaten that right.
.

Within this context, "sterilizations are permissible only with the
voluntary, knowing and uncoerced consent of individuals competent to
give such consent."

J

In the absence of specific statutory guidance,

the court defined voluntary to mean the uncoerced exercise of free will

based upon information necessary to reach a decision by people of

sufficient mental competence to appreciate the significance of the

information.^^

Under this definition, the mentally incompetent is

unable to consent and the guardian should not be allowed to consent on
the incompetent's behalf
a

This differs from the accepted practice of

guardian consenting to surgery for an incompetent.

The difference

between the procedures lay in sterilization's nature and permanence.
In regard to welfare abuses, the court ruled that the

regulations inadequately protected the woman.
provide at the outset for the oral notification

New regulations must
that no federal

benefits can be withdrawn because of a failure to accept
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sterilization."^ 6
consent form.

This notification must also be displayed on the

The court also addressed sterilization's constitutional

status, concluding that sterilization of the mentally incompetent or

coerced welfare recipient constituted involuntary sterilization which

"invades rather than compliments the right to procreate."^ 7
In sum,

the court concluded that HEW's procedures to assure

voluntary consent were adequate with two exceptions.

First that the

mentally incompetent could not voluntarily consent and second that the
regulations inadequately protected against welfare abuses.

Both of

these exceptions are important to the politics of sterilization.

Determining who can voluntarily grant consent became

a

central point of

contention in cases arising late in the 197CTs and into the 1980's.

In

part this concern reflects sensitivity to the eugenic legacy haunting

sterilization.

As the Relf court recognized, if one demands

voluntarism, consent cannot be granted in the case of the mentally
defective.

Thus the difficult task of the defenders of sterilization of

the mentally defective is to finesse this dilemma and the Relf ruling.

The significance of the finding of welfare abuse points up the

social (welfare) side of sterilization.

It should warn the government

that sterilization, even when it is not being used as a systematic and

coercive policy tool, is subject to abuse and must be monitored with
On this point, the court warned:

great care.

murky.
The dividing line between family planning and eugenics is
issue,
at
regulations
the
And yet the Secretary [of HEW], through
population
of
methods
seeks to sanction one of the most drastic
men and
control the involuntary irreversible sterilization of
irresponsible
limiting
women. . . . Whatever might be the merits of

—
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reproduction ... it is for Congress and not individual social
workers and physicians to determine the manner in which federal
funds should be used to support such a program. We should
not drift
into a policy which has unfathomed implications and which
permanently deprives unwilling or immature citizens of their ability
to procreate. °
Reflecting on the evidence so far, no apparent policy exists

promoting sterilization for eugenic purposes.

government has acted to prevent abuse.

On the contrary, the

On the other hand, these cases

of abuse, while not being systematic, are also not isolated.

Their

location, in the medical community and welfare programs, provides a

structure that supports and hides their practice.
it

Those who recommend

as a means of birth control must recognize that legitimating it at

that level carries with it the real possibility of hidden abuse.

Although eugenics may not be at issue, sterilization remains
controversial for other reasons.
concerns.

Empirical studies have focused on two

One centers on discrimination, the other on contraception.

Illustrating the first position, a Note in the DePaul Law Review
presented the following indicators.

The percentage of Black women

sterilized is almost three times that of white (32.5% to 11.6%); Black
and Latin American women's sterilization rate is almost two-thirds

higher than white women; non-white welfare recipients are twice as
likely to "elect" sterilization than are white welfare recipients;

welfare recipients (regardless of race) are twice as likely as nonrecipients to be sterilized

To examine these contentions and the

relative merits of the contraception view of sterilization two sets of
data will be examined.

The first is a survey by the National Center for
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Health Statistics (Tables 3-6) and the second is
a National Survey of

Family Growth (Table 7).
Table

3

Choice of Contraceptive Method Among Currently
Married Women
15-44 years old, 1973, 1976, 1982 (in percent)

Black Female

White Female

All Rac

1973

Sterilized

13.6
7.6
26.3
1.2

IUD
Pill

Diaphram

8.2
25.1
2.5

8.6
6.7
25.1
2.4

1.8

9.6
6.3
22.6
3.0

9.5
6.3
22.5
2.9

21.0
5.9
15.6
3.3

17.0
4.8
13.4
4.7

17.4
4.8
13.5
4.5

6

.

1976

Sterilized

10.9
6.2
22.2

IUD
Pill

Diaphram
1982

Sterilized
IUD
Pill

Diaphram

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Advancedata
(December 12, 1984) :3.

Examining first the data collected by NCHS, one finds reasonably
consistent evidence supporting the contraception explanation.
data, however, contain

a

significant limitation.

of the studies are restricted to married women.

The NCHS

Based on surveys, most
By excluding single

women and thus also underrepresenting minorities, both prime targets for
the alleged abuses, the surveys build in a bias against the eugenic and

anti-welfare explanations.

Nonetheless, this body of data is the best
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data base available and offers important information.

It

also Includes

one study including single women.
Based upon the NCHS data, sterilization is best explained by age

and parity (the number of live births)

contraception.

Table

3

— both

indicators of

portrays a decade long movement away from the

pill toward sterilization.

During this period, the change was most

pronounced among white women.

The increased popularity of sterilization

among this group accounts for it becoming the most common form of
Table

4

Percent of Women 15-44 Years of Age Cont raceptively Sterile

Marital Status
and Parity

Contraceptively Sterile

All women

17.4%

Parity 0
Parity >1

29.2

1.4

Never married
All parities

1.3

Parity 0
Parity >1

7.9

Currently married
All Parities

27.8

Parity 0
Parity >1

33.0

Formerly married
All parities

19.9

Parity 0
Parity >1

23.2

Advancedata
Source: National Center for Health Statistics,
(February 11, 1985):2.

Ill

)

.

birth control.

Table

4

re-enforces the contraception explanation.

Those most likely to be sterilized are those married with at least two
live births.

remain fecund.

They have their family and no longer feel the need to

Breaking this data down by age confirms that increased

family size and age are central to explaining sterilization.

Nonsurgical contraception among the 30-44 years old group is 28.1% while
the comparable rate among the 15-29 years old is 43.2%.

Sterilization,

on the other hand, ranges from 3.7% among the younger women to 22.6%

among their elders.

Among the currently married, the 35-44 age group

weighs in with a 42.3% sterilization rate in 1982 compared to
rate in 1976.

a

27.6%

These figures are consistent with the contraception

explanation
Table

5

Choice of Contraception Among All Women 15-44 Years Old, 1982 (in
percent

Black Female
Black Male
White Female
White Male
All Blacks
All Whites
All Races

Sterilized

IUD

Pill

Diaphrara

14.2
0.7
11.6
6.7
15.0
18.4
17.9

4.7

—
3.8
—
—
—

19.8

—
15.1
—
—
—

1.8

—
5.0
—
—
—

3.9

15.5

4.5

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Advancedata
(December 12, 1984) :2.

,

no.
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On issues of race and welfare, the data fail to support

arguments of gross abuse.

Tables

3

and

5

point to the greater power of

contraception over race as explanatory variables.
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While some race

.

differences exist they are not large.

The races differ over the method

chosen and, generally, the blacks choose the most effective means (even
though, as a group, they are less likely to use contraception). 51
6

offers the closest to direct support for welfare abuse.

Table

Two

qualifications, however, limit the significance of the findings.

First,

the differences among the income levels are not large and, second, the

change in rate of sterilization from high to low income women is

greatest among the whites.

The second point indicates that if these

findings reflect abuse it is directed at factors related to income, not
race

Table

6

Contraception by Income and Race Among Currently Married Women 15-44
years of Age (in percent)
Percent of
poverty level

Whites
Sterile

Blacks
Sterile

18.9
19.0
13.1
10.0

26.6
25.9
24.0
20.3

<100
100-149
150-199
200+

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National
Source: U.S.
Statistics, 25 Monthly Vital Statistics Report 3
Health
for
Center
1976):14,16.
(October 4,
Further support for the contraception interpretation, but also
support for welfare biases, is found in a study by Thomas Shapiro.

study drew from a 1976 National Survey of Family Growth.

His

The sample

widowed,
interviewed included women married, divorced, separated,

single, and living with their own children.

children were not included.

Table
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7

Single women without

summarizes his findings.

Again,

race does not stand out as an explanation but welfare
achieves a level
of significance absent in the NCHS data.

Table

7

Sterilization Rates (per 1,000) by Race and Welfare Status
Race

Minority

White

Number of live births

Welfare Status
Recipient
Nonrecipient

—

0

6

4

1

3

19

11

16

2

77

125

3

185
307

128
183

303

260
433

115
173
274

—
—

—
—

220
160

130
130

Poverty status
<150% poverty
>150% poverty

150
86

181

203
133

166
120

Welfare status
Recipient
Nonrecipient

160
110

220
130

—
—

—
—

Age
15-24
25-34
>35

25
128
192

27
117
166

42
224
371

43
125
161

4+

Race
White

Minority

96

Source: Thomas Shapiro, Population Control Politics: Women,
Sterilization and Reproductive Choice (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1985), p. 98.

Interpreting the significance of these findings is more

difficult than identifying the pattern.

Consistent with the NCHS,

Shapiro's data present a rapid increase in sterilization as the number
of births increase.

recipients.

It also presents large increases among welfare

As a matter of official policy, the government through its
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welfare program does not advocate sterilization.

The data in Table 7,

however, cannot be explained simply as displaying a greater desire to

become sterilized.

Shapiro presents other evidence isolating welfare as

a significant variable.

He found welfare recipients planned to be

sterilized at a rate 38% greater than nonrecipients.
became sterilized, however, at a 91% higher rate. 53
than voluntary contraception must be present.

They actually
Some factor other

A reasonable inference is

that while no systematic effort to coerce the welfare/poor into

sterilization exists, greater pressure is often brought to bear on them
than nonrecipients.
if

The data presented above is what one would expect

the cases of Dr. Pierce and the Relf sisters fall into a gray zone

between isolated incidents and government policy.

One can imagine

social workers or Medicaid doctors pushing for the most effective means
of contraception.

Given that sterilization has gained in popularity

among the population as a whole and is clearly the preferred means of

fertility control among those desiring an end to fertility, recommending
it

to clients need not appear to the counselor to be coercion or

irresponsible.

In fact,

it would be natural because it fits so well

into the contraception environment.

Thus, as sterilization gains

acceptance within the mainstream of the American population, care must
to
be taken to ensure that its new found legitimacy does not carry over

less acceptable policy agendas.
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Sterilization and the Workplace
While most attention has centered on public misuse of

sterilization, it has also been the center of controversy in the
private
sector.

On October 9,

Cyanamid Corporation.

1979, OSHA issued a citation against American
At issue was the company's policy of removing

fertile women from jobs where they would be exposed to dangerous levels
of

toxic substances (Female Protection Policy).

OSHA believed this

amounted to forced sterilization and violated the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970.

At issue was a policy shared by the major

chemical producers: Dow, Monsanto, DuPont, General Motors, Allied
Chemical, Bunker Hill Smelting Co., St. Joseph Zinc Co., Eastman Kodak,
and Firestone Tire and Rubber.

The company appealed the ruling and in Secretary of Labor v.

American Cyanamid Corporation -^ an administrative court rejected OSHA's
action.

The court concluded that the Female Protection Policy fell

outside OSHA's regulatory authority.

The judge argued that Congress

intended the agency to protect the worker against injury or ill-health

resulting from the work-place and in this case, neither the work process
nor work material altered the physical integrity of the employees.

Granted, the policy had an effect on the workers' decisions to be

surgically sterilized, but the court concluded the influence was
indirect.

The direct causes were social and economic (and a desire, to

keep the job) and consequently outside the company's control.

But in

fact the choice the company offered, job or surgical sterilization, is

comparable to the choice between job and exposure to sterilizing
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chemicals, which the Act covers.

The company countered by noting that

they offered other employment, comparable in pay but not necessarily

comparable in quality.

At present,

the company has disbanded the policy

and the other companies cited in the case claim they do not require

sterilization.

Temporary Sterilization
Advances by science have expanded contraceptive options and

simultaneously widened the sterilization debate.
the increasing use of the drug Depo-provero

.

Most notable has been

A form of contraception

where an occasional injection provides protection, this drug (along with
new chemical castrations) has raised concerns among feminists.

One of

the major objections against traditional sterilization procedures was
its permanence.

This objection can now be overcome without the

inconveniences of a daily pill.

Unfortunately, the health side effects

52
may be problematic,
specifically some have questioned the chances of

pregnancy after ceasing to use the drug.
Of greater policy concern is the early signs that judges may

find the flexibility of these drugs useful in sentencing.

Following the

pattern of earlier public practices involving sterilization, these

judicial practices are few and exceptional.

A federal court in Georgia

did not specifically endorse sterilization but reacted to a conviction
for stealing by sentencing a woman to five years probation on the

condition that she "not birth any additional children.
1979.

That was in

Since then, a few judges have moved directly into the
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sterilization/Depo-provero controversy.

In 1983, a South Carolina judge

sentenced a rapist to a thirty year minimum sentence or the
option of

castration.

Inititially, the judge preferred physical castration but

later relented and accepted chemical castration. 57

Joseph Frank Smith

of San Antonio, Texas, was the first to receive Depo— provero in
a rape

case as part of a condition for a ten year probation.

At The Johns

Hopkins University, one hundred— fifty men are currently undergoing

experimental court ordered therapy involving Depo-provero and
counseling. 58
If

Depo-provero is used to control the sex drive.

these remain isolated practices, there will be little cause

for concern.

These practices have, however, been the subject of debate.

In 1971, Nicholas Kittrie identified this movement as the "therapeutic

state." 59

This state "divests" certain practices from the normal

workings of the criminal justice system:
This process of divestment has not been motivated, on the whole, by
societal willingness to begin tolerating the conduct or condition
previously designated as criminal. Instead, divestment has most
frequently indicated a shift from criminal sanctions to a different
system of social controls. Thus divestment, carried out in the name
of the new social emphasis upon therapy, rehabilitation, and
prevention as contrasted with criminal law's emphasis upon
retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence has produced new types
of borderland proceedings and sanctions, lodged between the civil
and criminal law.*5 5

—

—

*

At its heart, divestment denies individual responsibility.

It

"suggest[s] that external conditions, while contributing to criminal

developments, are not controlling, but that an inner imbalance is
prerequisite to crime.
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a

The therapeutic state moves from criminal to therapeutic; it

transforms legal issues into medical.
foundation of this state.
.

.

.

Kittrie places science at the

"It speaks not in terms of moral judgment

but in concepts reputed to be descriptive and scientific

("mentally ill," "socially delinquent," "psychopathic," etc .)." 62

The

scientific basis ensures that our understanding of events will be
technical and descriptive because the issues behind those terms will be
treated in a scientific manner, in this case through the science of

medicine, and moral categories will not only fail to describe the
issues, but mislead the society as to the meaning of the issues.

Calling someone "good" or "evil" carries with it a different

understanding of how to deal with him than calling him "psychopathic."
In other words,

to,

the misnomer would result in practices either irrelevant

but probably inimical to, a proper and successful handling of the

person's problems.

Neither the "criminal" nor society would be any

better off.

punishment plays a lessened role, what then is the goal of

If

this system?

According to Kittrie, it is "tinged with a lingering

desire to defend society by isolating and controlling socially dangerous
persons

." 63

Against this background, the Depo-provero programs and

sentencing option make perfect sense.

Rape enters the therapeutic state

when defined as an abnormal sex drive (the language, not coincidentally,
is

the same as Sanger's).

Those committing the act cannot be held

their
personally responsible and the state's interest lies in correcting

defects.

Through a chemical treatment, their problem, and therefore
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their threat to society, can be controlled.

Two problems with this

approach can be raised.

One criticizes the releasing of those who

commit violent acts.

they are the animals that the act implies why

If

are we safe when they are released?

necessarily violent.

The answer is that they are not

Their violence stems from a chemical imbalance or

psychological disturbance.

The other objection, more abstract than the

first, criticizes locating the corrective measures in the body.
as

if

we returned to the medieval practice of mutilation.

It

is

This

criticism is met by the retort that the body is the appropriate target
because it is where the problem is located.
To date, the use of permanent or temporary sterilization in the

criminal justice system has been an exceptional practice.

The

technology necessary for it, under the political framework suggested by
Kittrie, is now being developed.

It

remains an area worth watching in

the future and is quite possibly the next area of controversy involving

sterilization .64

Sterilization

,

The Courts, and Mental Incompetency

One area where the issues of the therapeutic state have long

been a subject of open debate is the sterilization of the mentally

incompetent.

sterilization.

These practices are the direct descendents of eugenic
The issues discussed in the previous sections question

the extension of eugenics to social welfare and the extent to which

abusive practices occur.

Sterilization and mental illness, on the other

hand, has a long history of known abuse.
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The contemporary battleground has been the courts.

Two cases by

the United States Supreme Court have set many of the issues, but most

cases remain in state courts and occasionally in the lower federal

courts.

The issues have ranged from legal arguments over jurisdiction

to extending constitutional rights.

The first significant case on sterilization was Buck v. Bell . 65

Previous to this case, lower courts explored sterilization's

constitutionality against due process and cruel and unusual punishment
charges, but Buck is the case from which the current lineage descends.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes defended a Virginia

statute against procedural and substantive due process and equal

protection challenges.

His opinion remains "good law," although it

ranks among the most disgraceful of the Court's pronouncements.

Holmes'

defense of the law against procedural due process and equal protection
claims has remained relatively intact.

It is his

foray into the

substance of sterilization policy that continues to draw criticism.
The contested Virginia law allowed for sterilization of inmates
of state institutions for the mentally impaired after a special board of

directors approved a written request from the superintendent of the
institution.

The inmate received notice, a guardian to defend her

interests, and an opportunity to attend the hearing.

All evidence was

in writing and the proceedings subject to judicial appeal.

Holmes

concluded that these procedures "most carefully considered" the rights
of the patient.
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The statute found sterilization to be in the interests of the

patient and welfare of society.

The law presumed that the mental

deficiencies were based in heredity but "if [the inmate was rendered]
incapable of procreating [he or she] might be discharged with safety and

become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and society
The principal attack on the statute and the thrust of Holmes'

short opinion dealt with these substantive conclusions.

Holmes wrote:

In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the
specific findings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of
law that the grounds do not exist and if they exist they justify the
result .6®

Given the politics of the Court in 1927, this was the liberal and
prudent response.

While a conservative majority used the due process

clauses of the Constitution to render void state and national economic

legislation, Holmes deferred to legislative judgment if he believed a
(S9
reasonable man would uphold the legislation's reasonableness.

Despite his restrained finding, Holmes' dicta journeyed into

substantive issues.

He made two claims for sterilization: social need

and social obligation.
to protect

Under social need, Holmes placed society's right

itself against the "menace of incompetency."

"It is better

for all the world [Holmes wrote], if instead of waiting to execute

degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from

continuing their kind."

Then, in the most infamous line in the opinion,

root
Holmes extended the argument by implying that heredity was at the

enough."
of these problems: "Three generations of imbeciles are
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^

Having accepted the eugenic claim of heredity, Holmes was able
to

join sterilization and social obligation.

Because the individual may

be a threat to the public welfare and the threat results from a flaw in

the individual's nature, then the society's right to preserve the social

welfare at the expense of the individual's freedom justifies imposing

sterilization on mental incompetents.

Afterall, society asks people to

die for their country, can anyone argue that sterilization constitutes a

greater deprivation of liberty?

When the state finds an important

social interest at stake, the individual's social obligations extend to

allowing the state to act on his/her body.

In Holmes' words:

We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
It would be strange if it could
the best citizens for their lives.
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
The principle that sustains
.
these lesser sacrifices.
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes.
.

.

One must ask whether the social costs of "imbecility" are comparable to
72
those of war or even those of communicable disease (small pox).

failing to require a demanding standard of proof that

a

By

serious social

threat existed and that sterilization was the only realistic remedy,

Holmes left the impression that a legislature need only find bodily

intrusions to be a reasonable policy in order to mandate sterilization.
Holmes legitimated sterilization but with two significant

qualifications.

He deferred to legislative judgment and required

procedural safeguards.

While Holme's embrace of eugenics taints the

the issue and in
case, his procedural arguments continue to dominate
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fact have been made more stringent.

Recent courts, however, have not

shared his deference to legislatures.
Since Holmes wrote, two significant changes in the issues as

defined by the courts have changed the debate.

distanced themselves from eugenics.

First, judges have

Holmes' reasonable man could uphold

the Virginia statute because of the eugenic rationale.

focus on the well-being of the patient.

Now the courts

The issue of defining and

obtaining voluntary consent has become the central issue while Holmes
disposed of the patient's right through the due process finding.
The second, and most complicating, development is the

introduction of the politics of rights.
the context of

fundamental rights, the stakes of the debate are raised

and the issues become more complicated.
to

By placing sterilization within

Skinner v. Oklahoma

73
,

This development can be traced

the next significant Supreme Court case.

Skinner involved the punishment of criminals, not eugenic

sterilization of the mentally defective.

Procedurally correct, the

legislation failed a narrow equal protection claim because

it

punished

those who had been twice convicted of a felony involving moral terpitude
but did not punish those whose non-felonious crime was of equal

magnitude (e.g., embezzlement).

Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,

found this created an "invidious discrimination" between intrinsically

equal offenses.

Douglas wrote:

We are dealing with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race. . . . Ln evil or
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reckless hands it [sterilization] can cause races or
types which are
inimical to the dominant groups to wither and disappear.
S trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes
in a
sterilization law is essential. ^
.

[

]

This argument foreshadowed his creation of the privacy right
in Griswold
v

*

Connecticut and its later expansion in the birth control and
abortion

cases. 75

Even though Douglas decided the case on narrow grounds, he

raised the stakes sufficiently to make sterilization hard to achieve.

A

right to procreate severely constrains the legitimacy of forcing

sterilization on those unable to voluntarily consent. 75
During the next twenty years, no major cases surfaced.

In the

early 1960's, however, sterilization returned to the policy agenda. 77
in

1962, an Ohio probate court approved sterilization for a mentally

incompetent eighteen year old woman.
decision.

0

No legislation supported the

The judge justified his action on two grounds: to protect

Nora Ann Simpson from further pregnancies and to avoid "additional
79
burdens upon the county and state welfare departments."

In 1965 and

1966, three California cases, and in 1966 another in

Ohio, joined with Simpson in establishing a small trend toward promoting

sterilization.

80

Two California cases offered sterilization as a

condition for probation and the second Ohio case resembled Simpson

.

All

five cases relied on a social interest in sterilization.
By 1970, however, the trend among the courts on this issue had

shifted to extending deference to legislative action (generally meaning

legislative inaction).

In 1968, the Nebraska Supreme Court voted to

sustain a law requiring sterilization before leaving an institution for
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the mentally impaired. 81

Although agreeing that mental deficiency

accentuates sexual, impulses," the Court concluded that
the issue
belonged in the legislature.
The Nebraska court worked with the benefit of a
statute.

Between 1969 and 1979, courts drawn into the controversy without

statutory grounding declined jurisdiction. 82

a

The reasoning ranged from

treating sterilization as extraordinary medical treatment requiring

explicit policy support, to concerns over the legality of sterilization
(

again needing legislative resolution) to fears that in the absence of a

statutory base the judges would be denied judicial immunity.

All of the

courts were concerned about judicially imposing sterilization on one
unable to voluntarily consent.
In 1978,

the tone of these decisions began to change.

The

following passage from Guardianship of Tulley illustrate how the

jurisdictional concern was brought together with

a new

constitutional

right:

Whether in absence of statute the court is authorized to order the
involuntary sterilization of a mentally incompetent ward when, as
here, the guardian consents to such an operation, and the procedure
The awesome power to
is justified both medically and socially.
deprive a human being of his or her fundamental right to bear or
beget offspring must be founded on the explicit authorization of the
legislature. .
.

.

.

.

.

This court did not want to hide the compulsory nature of sterilizing a

mentally incompetent.

But the reasons go beyond the extraordinary

nature of sterilization: they touch upon a fundamental right.

All

infringements on this right were suspect and must be accompanied by
strict scrutiny.

In this case, a statute authorized sterilization for
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those institutionalized.

The court refused to use this as justification

for someone not institutionalized.

The next year, in Hudson v. Hudson,

the Alabama Supreme Court refused to authorize sterilization because of
the "profound constitutional and social issues."

It

singled out the

right of marriage and procreation enunciated by Douglas in Skinner. 8 ^

While these courts were refusing to act, the Federal courts sent
a different,

albeit mixed, message.

Relf v. Weinberger, discussed

above, required strict guidelines and excluded the mentally incompetent.

Three other cases, on the other hand, greatly expanded the availability
of sterilization.

In Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital 8 ^ the First

Circuit Court of Appeals prohibited a municipal hospital from denying

voluntary sterilization while offering other comparable non-therapeutic
surgery.

The court relied on Roe v. Wade° ° and Doe v. Bolton 0

in

establishing a fundamental interest in procreation and required

a

compelling rationale to permit some surgery and deny others without
88
significant differences in risk or cost.

The court concluded that

this violated equal protection guarantees.

The case did not involve a

mental incompetent, but it did assert a judicial role in a state with no
statute and it asserted sterilization as a positive right.
The second case proved to be more assertive and daring.

Ruby v.

Massey^ involved mentally incompetent minors whose parents sought their
sterilization.
and Hudson.

Ruby continued the constitutional theme found in Tulley

choice,
But now, the right was an affirmative one involving

the exercise of which the courts must safeguard
to Relf,

.

After making reference

the court argued that the choice must be voluntary.
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ReU

did

require voluntary choice, but for that reason excluded the
incompetent.
The Ruby court ignored this last point and looked for an
acceptable

mechanism to achieve choice.

After rejecting the parents, the court

concluded that the courts represented the answer.

They reasoned that

given the fundamental rights involved, only the courts could ensure
6

^ ^

consent.

At this point,

the court noted that the Connecticut

statute inadequately distinguished between those institutionalized and
those not and concluded the case by applying to both groups the

requirements found in the statute.
In 1976, a three judge federal panel in North Carolina addressed

the constitutionality of involuntary sterilization. 90

North Carolina

required a director of a state institution or the county director of
social services to institute sterilization procedures under the

following conditions:
(1) when he feels that sterilization is in the best interests of
the mental, moral or physical improvement of the retarded person,
(2) when he feels that sterilization is in the best interests of
the public at large,
(3) when, in his opinion, the retarded person "would be likely,
unless, sterilized, to procreate a child or children who would have
a tendency to serious physical, mental, or nervous disease or
deficiency; or, because of a physical, mental, or nervous disease or
deficiency which is not likely to materially improve, the person
9 *
would be unable to care for a child or children."

The court upheld the constitutionality of the law.

attempt to distinguish itself from eugenics,
eugenic.

92

Despite the court's

point three is clearly

In fact it closely approximates Osborn's position and verges

on the goals of the early eugenicists.

The result was validating

involuntary sterilization and genetic rationales.
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Few courts, however,

.

have used this as precedent and none for eugenic purposes.

On the other

hand, no court has repudiated it.

Hathaway and Ruby transformed the sterilization issue from
procedural arguments over jurisdiction into a debate over constitutional
rights and the courts' role in protecting them.

By 1980, the state

courts had begun to follow this lead and actively debated the

substantive issues.
The Matter of the Guardianship of Hayes, 93 decided by the

Washington State Supreme Court in 1980, set the tone and direction of
the new set of cases.

Rejecting self-restraint, the court disposed of

these precedents as merely expressing a preference for the legislature

over the courts.

Placing itself as the guardian of the incompetent's

interests, the court detailed strict guidelines to be met before any

sterilization could be approved.
scientific thicket.

Finally, the court entered into the

The court turned to science for assurances that

sterilization was the least intrusive strategy and would remain that way
for the foreseeable future.

Specifically, it asked science for

assurances that no new treatments or relevant contraceptive techniques
were imminent
This point was not unanimously accepted.

In his concurring

opinion, Justice Stafford concluded that the court's reliance on the
"It is too much to ask the moving

state of science was too demanding.

litigate such
party, the alleged mentally ill person or the judiciary to
9
nebulous eventualities of science." ^

from Justice Roselini in dissent.

But the telling commentary came

He argued that the majority falsely
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assumed that the person affected was indifferent to the operation.

By

this, Roselini meant that the court imposed its own policy preferences
on the individual since it lacked any standard derived from the person's

own evaluation of her position.

The court tried to meet this objection

by requiring the lower court judges (it is in the lower courts where

these decisions were to be made) to assess the individual's attitude

toward sterilization.

But the problem with this is that the reason the

case was in the courts in the first place was because she was mentally

incapable of making a meaningful statement on the issue of consent.

The

dissenter painted the court as part of the imperial judiciary: entering
on its own into a controversial area without first obtaining legislative

guidance and acting in such

a way as

to permanently alter a person for

whom the court purports to speak.
While Hayes broke the barrier, In re Grady

attention.

^

Q

c:

has received the

In Grady, the New Jersey Supreme Court sought to resolve the

elusive issue of consent.

The court reasoned that the situation was not

the equivalent of compulsory sterilization (that involves her

resistance), nor was it voluntary because she cannot consent.

The court

proceeded to create a third category of neither voluntary nor compulsory

sterilization.

Having created this, it sought to give it content by

defining the issue as one of constitutional right.

They reasoned that

sterilization.
the constitutional right of privacy extended to voluntary
On the other hand, one also had a right to procreate

involuntarily sterilized.

not to be

"Implicit in both these complementary

meaningful choice
liberties [wrote the court] is the right to make a
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between them.

The court recognized that Grady herself couLd
not make

the choice, but they believed that a court could approximate
what she

would have done, working on the assumption that she would have
acted in
her own best

interests.

In

fact, the court believed that they must act
I

because her disability should not serve to limit her constitutional
i

rights.

"To preserve that right and the benefits that a meaningful
l

decision would bring to her life,

it may be

necessary to assert

it on

her behalf ." 97
The extent to which this actively brought the court into the

substance of the issue can be seen in the following.

The court
i

acknowledged that most precedents worked against its ruling but argued
i

that Grady's constitutional right of privacy was paramount; only her

ability to exercise

it was

lacking.

The court became the neutral
i

guarantor of that right, acting benevolently on behalf of her interests:
i

We do not pretend that the choice of her parents, her guardian ad
But it is a genuine choice
litem, or a court is her own choice.
designed
further
the same interests she might
to
nevertheless one
pursue had she the ability to decide herself. . . . Our Court should
accept the responsibility of providing her with a choice to
compensate for her inability to exercise personally an important
constitutional right.

—

I

But wait,

from where did the right to be sterilized materialize?

The court traced this right to two sources.

The first root lay in the

United States Supreme Court's right of privacy.

99

This right grew out

of cases ensuring one the right to prevent or terminate pregnancy.

The

specific right to be sterilized, the second root, was developed in the
lower federal courts, including Hathaway and Ruby .
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The leap by the court is not entirely appropriate.

Does the

right to prevent conception necessarily include all means to that end

including a positive guarantee that the right will be exercised?

The

following excerpt from a 1977 United States Supreme Court case confirms
the New Jersey court's characterization of the issue as a matter of

reproductive choice.

Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan wrote in

Carey v. Population Services International:
the underlying premise of these decisions [Griswold v.
Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird] that the Constitution protects
"the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into
the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."
Eisenstadt v. Baird, holding that the
protection is not limited to married couples, characterized the
protected right as the "decision whether to bear or beget a
Similarly, Roe v. Wade, held that the Constitution
child." .
protects a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
"Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of
pregnancy.
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State."
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

But sterilization differs in kind from the contraceptive methods

involved in the privacy cases and the facts in Grady differ in the
nature and degree of the government's involvement.

In the cases

establishing the privacy right, the technique allowed for future choice,
including a choice opposite to that made at the time of the case.

(Obviously this does not apply to the abortion decisions when viewed
from the fetus' perspective.)

Sterilization, on the other hand, in its

present state precludes future choice.

It

would appear that the

sterilization
courts expanded the right to include sterilization because
was the most effective means to prevent pregnancy.

In doing this, the

as the
court reflected the movement in society toward sterilization
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preferred means of contraception.

Reflecting current social practice,

however, is no substitute for sound constitutional reasoning.

Does the

decision mean that all new scientific breakthroughs would/should be
granted similar status?

What if the legislature sought to regulate the

contraceptive techniques out of
it

fear for a patient's health or because

understood the technique's effectiveness differently from the court?

At what
it

a

point does a technique reach the stage where a court can anoint

with this exhaulted status?
The state courts have divided on this issue.

The most direct

response to the Grady case came from the Wisconsin Supreme Court in The

Matter of Guardianship of Eberhardy.

This court commented:

The fault we find in the New Jersey case is the ratio decidendi of
first concluding, correctly we believe, that the right to
sterilization is a personal choice, but then equating a decision by
others with the choice of the person to be sterilized. It clearly
is not a personal choice, and no amount of legal legerdemain can

make it so.^^
The court then proceeded to the central issue:

Any governmentally sanctioned (or ordered) procedure to sterilize a
person who is incapable of giving consent must be demonstrated for
what it is, that is, the state's intrusion into the determination of
whether or not a person who makes no choice shall be allowed to
procreate j^^The public policy of the state is inevitably
involved

This raises a two part criticism of the Grady decision.

First,

the decision effectively denies the political branches a substantive

role.

Relying on a fundamental right precludes the state legislature

from addressing the policy issues except at the margins.

To further

complicate the matter, the court included the interpretation of
particular
scientific knowledge in the creation of the right and in its
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application.

In Eberhardy

the Wi sconsin court expressed concern over a

court's competence to deal with these technical issues.

Specifically,

the court questioned the depth of any court's understanding
of

contraception, about the retarded
as

s

ability to raise a family, as well

the relationship of the sterilization policy to other policies

dealing with the mentally retarded.

^

A court, factually limited to

those parties presenting briefs, cannot obtain the well-rounded

understanding of the issue that the legislature can.

In effect,

the

court froze out from political consideration several sensitive and

integral issues.
Secondly, accepting for the moment sterilization as a right,
what governmental action prompted the court's intervention?

Brennan's

summary of the privacy cases concluded that they protected against

"unjustified intrusions by the state."

But, as Eberhardy observed, the

only governmental intrusion here was by the court.
state, deprived Grady of the right to act.

Nature, not the

This is a significant

difference and cannot be seen as a logical and minor extension of the
privacy right.

Paradoxically, the New Jersey court's decision allowed

for one to sterilize another in order to protect the latter's privacy!
In its desire to make this right effective, the court acted prematurely.

Another issue within the Grady opinion focuses on the standards
used to protect the interests of the incompetent.

In this area, the

Grady court pursued a course of "strict moderation."

As was already

noted, the goal was the best interests of the incompetent and the court

required a moderate evidentiary test: the evidence, taken as
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whole

,

.

must be clear and compelling.

Most courts have followed this or a

similar approach (although requiring the evidence taken individually
to
be clear and compelling).

Others have required medical necessity and

still others required substituted judgment combined with a preponderance
of evidence standard.

^6

In determining the patient's best interest,

the Grady court saw

itself as a facilitator, authorizing but not compelling sterilization.
In future cases,

the probate court, involved because of the existence of

an individual right, would review the facts of the patient's condition

and life situation, determine whether or not these conditions provide

clear and compelling reasons for sterilization and, if so, approve the

sterilization request.

To this end, the court considers: the likelihood

of exposure to sexual activity,

the availability and feasibility of

alternative contraception, the possibility of serious trauma or
psychological danger from pregnancy, and the incompetent's ability to
care for a child or the possibility of a future marriage to someone who

could provide adequate child care.

The court also reviews scientific

and medical considerations, specifically: permanence of a person's

(in)ability to understand reproduction and contraception, future changes
in feasibility of alternative contraception, and evidence that

scientific or medical advances may occur within the foreseeable future
to improve the patient's medical condition or contraceptive

alternatives
The court provided several safeguards to avoid abusive

sterilization.

They include a guardian ad litem to argue the case

135

sterilization and to cross-examine witnesses, independent
medical and psychological evaluation, and, while the incompetent need
not be present for the hearing,

the judge should meet with the patient

(not necessarily formally) and attempt to ascertain the person's views
on sterilization

1011
.

Aside from the court's need to divine the future of science,
these are difficult standards to meet.

But the court believed them

necessary given the potential conflict in interest between the guardian
and patient and to prevent judicial abuse.

These standards have been

criticized as too restrictive by legal scholars and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.

1

09

In the latter case,

the court required

protective standards similar to those listed above (with less emphasis
on future scientific discoveries) but lowered the standard of evidence

required to that of preponderance of evidence.

The court also replaced

the best interests test with the doctrine of substituted judgment.

Rather than the court paternalistically determining the best decision,
the court decides what the patient would decide if he or she were

competent.

This drew the charge from the dissenter that "the court

today has decided that the probate judge has the power to divine the
110
wishes of a severely mentally retarded woman ."

Consequently, the

process of divining has been moved from science qua medicine to

psychology.

Returning to the Wisconsin case, an opening exists through which
to

raise general questions about this line of cases.

Working from its

interests
base of legislative deference, this court faulted the best
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test as inappropriate.

In practice,

this test works from experience—

both through experience gained from other cases and adjusting
to

experience in current application.

Based on fact-finding, the court

determines the best interest of the individual but reserves the option
of

second thoughts" and the opportunity to correct errors.

case of sterilization, this is not possible.
to correct

the errors.

But in the

No judicial method exists

Given a court's limited understanding of the

technical issues, the difficulty in obtaining a thorough presentation of
all issues and interests, and the permanence of the procedure, the court

concluded that judicial action "unguided by well thought-out policy

determination reflecting the interests of society, as well as the person
to be sterilized,

are hazardous, indeed. "^2

The Wisconsin court's underlying criticism of this line of cases

(articulated as a criticism of the Grady case in particular) is that
they ignore the social dimension and interest that must be present given
the role of social institutions in the decision to sterilize.

concern cuts in several directions.

This

First, the existence of social

interests suggests legislative action before judicial intervention; or
at

least the court prompting the legislature to act, as the Wisconsin

court did.

Second, the interests of the individual must be protected

against coercive state interests.

The fact that the court accepted

jurisdiction in this case (it simply declined to exercise it) signifies
its recognition of a judicial role in this matter.

believed that the legislature

advocate groups involved

— learning

— could

But the court also

the issues from the multiple

provide better guidelines protecting the
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individual than could the courts.

The court, afterall, could reject the

legislature's actions.
These criticisms reflect disagreement over the proper role of
the courts and which institutions should possess primary responsibility
for setting sterilization policy.

A criticism of greater importance to

this work links the issues of these cases to issues of science policy.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Coffey discussed how social biases

could enter through expert testimony and distort the issues of the case.
In his opinion,

Justice Coffey made an argument on the influence of

social ideas on science.

His argument on the sterilization issue's

inexorable link to social value deserves to be quoted at length:
It is my belief that this decision is a most difficult one and
should never be made by courts alone as it involves a value judgment
central to the constituent fabric of our society. We all ought to
be involved in making this decision whether we participate as a
litigant, judge, attorney, physician or as an American citizen,
In an age when the courts are
voting for elective representatives.
for the first time declaring retarded individuals to be of equal
worth with other individuals in our society and under our
constitution, mandating equal educational and training
opportunities, it seems anomalous that equal justice is being
threatened. This is a decision on a subject matter which our
society will be grappling with for years to come.
I question the physician's judgment in this case based on the
court record presented for review and wonder if it is an attempt to
substitute the quality of life ethic for what should be the sanctity
In this case, it is most important to
of life ethic in medicine.
examine the rationalization involved in this medical management
decision in order to understand the implications of this recent
development in medical ethics and its significance for the
profession and society as a whole. The rationale is easy to
understand in relation to the new quality of life ethic so
eloquently propounded by the social engineers of the Twentieth
Two questions are presented: Should a group of doctors [,]
Century.
whose only basis for this fundamental and irreversible medical,
surgical procedure according to this record is the guardian s
request based upon a fear that this young retarded adult may in the
in the absence of statutory
future have sexual contact with a man[
,
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guidelines and authority be allowed to substitute their
judgment for
society and assume complete control over the individual
and
subordinate her to their own ideas of what is good for her
wellbeing?
Does any court ever have direct power over the
body of a
living person in the absence of showing that the life of
the person
is in jeopardy requiring medical attention?
11 ^
I think not.
Coffey questions the court

s

right to regulate the incompetent's life.

Of course, he does not deny the state's right to do so, he simply

questions the institutional location of that regulation.
These cases do not represent sterilization abuse of the same
sort discussed in the previous sections.

For all their faults, the

courts' decisions demonstrated an understanding of the promises and

dangers of sterilization.

While the culmination of the line of cases

was to approve sterilization under narrowly specified circumstances, it

did not represent the resurrection of the old eugenics.

probably approve of this resolution as

it has

Osborn would

the virtue of producing

eugenic outcomes while being justified on other grounds (birth control).

Coincidentally converging with eugenic goals, however, is not
sufficient grounds for labeling something eugenic.

Osborn recommended

striving for eugenic goals through other means but he also desired a
tacit public consensus on eugenic ends.
here.

With the exception of the

North Carolina,

Buck,

This clearly was not the case

court and the federal court in

the courts distanced themselves from eugenics and,

instead, relied upon the technological fix.
and technical solutions;

The courts sought neutral

the virtue of sterilization was its simplicity,

precision, and permanence.

Through an array of procedural safeguards,

the individual was protected against abuse while science entered through
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expert testimony on the state of scientific knowledge and on the

condition of the patient.

All issues were reduced to legal and

scientific terms.
The problem with this approach is that the issues are not simply
legal and technical.

sanctity of life.

At stake are societal decisions on the quality and

Who makes a fit parent?

institutionalized for mental reasons have?
patients be organized?

What rights do those
How should care for these

These are among the issues at dispute behind the

decision to sterilize, not just the narrower issues of the patient's
health.

The questions are first and foremost legislative.
The necessity of emphasizing the failure to employ the

democratic political channels is due to the nature of technocratic
solutions: they bypass the political realm but embody within them

political values because of the context of its practice (e.g.,

alternatives foregone).
the patient:

In this case,

she must be sterilized.

the solution places the burden on
It is the ideal solution in times

of scarcity since most alternatives would be labor intensive.

The

Wisconsin court recognized the limited benefit of technical solutions.
It

refused to take this approach without first pressing the political

issues to the attention of the political branches.

Social theories, new

medical ethics, and political values belong in this discussion; the

sterilization issue belongs in the give and take of pluralist politics.
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CHAPTER ILL
GENETIC SCREENING

While sterilization practice has moved from eugenics to
welfare

genetic screening has remained embroiled in the politics of

genetics.

This practice, varying widely in method, purpose, and

effectiveness, has proven to be the most successful legacy of the
eugenics movement and epitomizes the strategic concerns outlined by
Osborn and Muller.

Specifically, it operates under the rubric of two

respected professions

— medicine

and genetics

— and

thus successfully

hides its eugenic origins.

Genetic screening, as compared to other forms of screening,
focuses on an unrealized risk for an individual or his/her offspring.
It

is

:

[a] systematic search in a population for persons of certain
genotypes. The usual purpose is to detect persons who themselves
are at risk or whose offspring are at risk for genetic diseases or
genetically determined susceptibilities to environmental agents.

Conventional screening (e.g., for german measles or venereal diseases)

ordinarily deals with those whose physical proximity to the screened-for
disease places them at risk.

Genetic screening, on the other hand,

focuses on factors within the person: his/her genes or the fetus' genes.
In this

respect

,

it

resembles such developing genetic techniques as gene

therapy and gene recombination.

All act upon the individual per se
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rather than the environment.

This, of coarse, was the direction in

which Osborn's thought evolved and where Muller's began.
As

is

true for most tools, genetic screening is most interesting

for the consequences resulting from its use (and it will be in these

consequences where the proof of the eugenic pudding will be found).
They are varied and often controversial.

It offers apparent benefits

for future generations ("potential people") who, without screening,

would include many carrying debilitating defects "diluting" the gene
pool

,

but now will be aborted or not conceived or whose doctors will

know their condition and be able to offer treatment at a crucial moment
(e.g., PKU babies) or, at a minimum, offer support to the parents.

These are "apparent" benefits because treating them as benefits assumes
a social, but potentially contestable, understanding of what is normal

and presumes that a particular deviation from this norm is undesirable
and justifies acting on the body up to and including death.

Screening represents a technical fix.

The tests can identify

the condition of a fetus for many disorders and thus relieve parental

anxiety over the future child's health or allow a parent to abort the
fetus and avoid the trauma of a handicapped child.

The principal

alternatives available to one after screening are abortion or doing
nothing.

Eventually, alternative actions, which are now exceptional,

will become more routine.
to

Fetal surgery or therapy will allow doctors

repair the defective fetus.

These, however, are not available to

most people screened or for most impairments.
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The consequences of this practice lead in two directions.
is

into the politics of abortion.

First

Even though the genetic information

provides no moral basis to justify abortion (this would rest upon

a

qualitative argument regarding acceptable physical states), an
imperative toward abortion exists.

Abortion becomes reduced to

a

therapeutic technique, stripped of its moral overtones despite the
failure to establish that the genetic defects uncovered are

abnormalities requiring therapy as opposed to unfortunate acts of
nature.

In fact,

this carries over to other types of screening as well

and is neatly represented by the expected chain of events laid out in
the following statement by two genetic counselors:
[A] combination of screening for carrier status, amniocentesis, and
selective abortion of a defective fetus enables a couple to achieve
desired normal biological parenthood, provided the couple at risk
monitors each pregnancy. Thus, by following these procedures the
couple has neither to relinquish socially approved biological
parenthood nor to give birth to a defective child."

This statement hints at the second political aspect.

essentially a technical answer it works in
eugenic.

a

Even though it is

particular direction:

A risk is that the logic justifying narrow health care can

extend to social concerns.

The extent to which screening and

"therapeutic" actions resulting from the screening become accepted as
health issues, other issues, less clearly related to health, may become
invested with this instrumental reasoning.

In other words, anything

health
that is within the reach of screening's gaze assumes the public

classification.

This would allow abortion, the extent to which it can

broader range of
even be thought of simply as a technique, to reach to a
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Issues under the protective shield of health
care.

This would be Ideal

from Che eugenicists's perspective because it
hides the controversial

eugenic element
What the discussion of these issues will illustrate
is the

extent to which modern genetics fits into the modern eugenic
hypothesis;
the extent to which institutional settings affect the
value of a

technique; how technical developments push politics; and the
political

consequences of extended capabilities.

Not all types of genetic

screening have the same political implications.

Prenatal screening, for

example, is more closely associated with abortion than is neonatal.

Consequently, it is necessary to examine each separately and through
that analysis search for threads of commonality.

Prenatal Screening

Prenatal diagnosis involves examining a fetus when certain

characteristics of the parents indicate
It

a high risk of an inborn defect.

explores the possibility of hereditary disease or congenital defects.

Prenatal diagnosis primarily employs five techniques.
involves removing a sample of the amniotic fluid.

Amniocentesis

The test evaluates

fetal chromosomes and therefore excludes testing for specialized cell

diseases such as sickle-cell anemia.

A second technique is fetoscopy.

This allows the researcher to view the fetus and placenta.
aid in drawing out fetal blood or in fetal skin biopsies.

It can also

This is one

means to diagnose hemoglobinopathies and is used in fetal surgery.
However, it has a higher miscarriage rate than amniocentesis.
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Ultrasonography provides a means to examine the physical condition of
the fetus and its age without having to invade the amniotic sac.

Use of

ultrasound can aid in diagnosing neural tube defects and such

correctable defects as cleft palate.

Neural tube defects are also

tested for through measuring the alpha fetoprotein's in the maternal
blood.

This, however, must be conducted in conjunction with

ultrasonography and amniocentesis since the gestational age of the fetus
is

important and amniocentesis provides a more accurate analysis of the

alpha fetoprotein levels.
the development stages.

A final and promising technique is still in

Chorionic villus sampling involves inserting

a

catheter "trascervically under sonographic guidance to a location within
the villus of the chorion frondosum."^

This technique is seen as an

alternative to amniocentesis during the first trimester.
amniocentesis, it is confined to chromosomal analysis.
a higher

earlier.

miscarriage rate but

is

Like
It

suffers from

undertaken approximately four weeks

Another problem of concern to researchers is a 1.7% rate of

error between the test and the actual state of the fetus.

Prenatal diagnosis offers the parents few options.

Fetal

therapy and surgery are not yet well developed and can be relegated to
the background at this point.

Before doing so, however, it must be

observed that in the long run, they will become meaningful alternatives

which will operate along the same lines as the following discussion but
in a more subtle way.

The screening techniques developed before these

option
therapeutic possibilities were developed and the only realistic
was abortion.

Thus the context within which these techniques were
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introduced was one of eugenic abortion, not strictly therapeutic

medicine
Putting aside, for the moment, festering political controversies
(s«g», abortion)

,

prenatal screening is well within the modern health

and family care paradigm.

This includes a search for information on a

patient's condition and their treatment as allowed by the state of
medicine.
It can

Prenatal screening is a powerful information gathering tool.

identify approximately ninety conditions

6
.

In this sense,

it

is

just one more technique in our search for control over our health and
body.

In sum, it is part of a technical fix (technically repairing

damage)

Unfortunately, it cannot be removed from its political context.
That context is health care including the option of abortion and the

pressure of normality as a norm influencing our actions.

To the extent

that the issues of abortion and normality influence the reception of
this new technique

— it

illustrates how new technologies become

politically contentious when introduced into unprepared institutional
and intellectual contexts.

Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life

Wrongful life and wrongful birth cases are the most enduring
political response to the introduction of this technique.

They allow an

examination of how this particular technique has affected society and to
draw generalizations about science/ technology
political context.

s

introduction into

a

The issues in this legal controversy were framed in
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the 1967 New Jersey Supreme Court case Gleitman v. Cosgrove

.

7

Although

screening techniques were not at issue in this case, the issues remain
the same in the subsequent cases involving amniocentesis and Tay-Sachs

screening.

Gleitman involved a woman who contracted german measles

early in her pregnancy and whose doctor failed to inform her of the
possible adverse effects of this disease on a fetus.
had she known, she would have aborted the fetus.

predicted defects.

She contended that

Her child had the

The Gleitmans brought two causes of action.

the child sued to collect for damages resulting from his birth.

mother sued for similar damages.
court.

First
The

Both causes were rejected by the

The plaintiffs did not allege that the doctor caused the defects

but rather that the doctor's negligence was the proximate cause of the

birth of an impaired child.
cause) was the injury.

If

The fact of birth (or life in the infant's
the doctor had practiced properly, the

parents would have possessed the information upon which they could have

prevented the birth.

Therefore, the argument concluded, the doctor was

a proximate cause of an injury.

In rejecting this claim, the court followed two lines of

argument.
law.

First it rejected the claim because of the nature of tort

Tort law measures compensatory damages; it compares the injured

state to what would have been had no negligence occurred.

The court

defined the choice as follows: "the infant plaintiff is therefore
required to say

...

that he should not have been born at all.

other words, comparing life to nonlife.

The consequence of this

position was that no legally cognizable question existed.
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In

^

The infant plaintiff would have us measure the
difference between
his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence,
but it
is impossible to make such a determination.
This Court cannot weigh
the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence
of life
itself.
By asserting that he should not have been born, the
infant
plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his
alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the
comparison required by compensatory remedies.

Secondly, the court added that a policy issue was at stake: the right to
life.

The court concluded that "it is basic to the human condition to

seek life and hold onto it however heavily burdened

." 10

While most of

the court's opinion placed the issue into the context of the competence
of a court to handle the issue of compensation, in fact the court's

opinion reflected a reluctance to enter into a sensitive area of public
policy.
The court correctly interpreted the issue as one similar to the

issues surrounding eugenic abortion.

But the eugenic position was

rejected because it contained an instrumental view of life: "The

sanctity of the single human life is the decisive factor in this suit in
tort.

Eugenic considerations are not controlling.

here about the breeding of prize cattle

." 11

We are not talking

Although eugenics is not

strictly applicable because the condition is not genetically based, in
the subsequent cases involving genetic disease it will be.

court has identified is the desire for "normal" children.

What the

The stand of

this court became the issues around which later arguments were waged.
Is this a policy appropriate for a court?
If an

Is it even a public policy?

abortion can be obtained legally (which all courts, including the

Gleitman court, conceded), is it the place of a court in tort law to
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prevent abortions just because they are eugenic?
to enter

The court's reluctance

into this area denied one legal avenue to eugenic
child birth.

The New Jersey Court, valuing life as an end, rejected the
invitation to
set standards to guide the instrumental manipulation of life.

Dissenters challenged the court's policy stance and rejection of
the parents' suit.

No one dissented in support of the infant's cause.

Justice Jacobs argued that measurable damages existed.

Granting the

legality of abortion, the issue to Jacobs became compensating the
parents for expenses due to the "abnormal" child.

The injuries were

actionable because their manifestation (but not cause) resulted from
poor medical advice that precluded abortion.

The extra costs are

measurable and, presto, the suit is justiciable

.

^

Jacobs dismissed the

policy issue by denying its existence in this context.
But there is no policy favoring the breach of duty here or its
immunization. Nor is there any dispute that the Gleitmans could
have terminated the pregnancy lawfully outside New Jersey. i

Jacobs proceeded to review the abortion law and concluded that it did
not preclude abortion in this case.

impediments existed.

14

Consequently, no explicit policy

The majority, on the other hand, rested its

decision on a societal consideration favoring life over nonlife: "The
right to life is inalienable in our society ."
The difference is significant.

15

Aside from raising questions of

judicial legislation, the social values are what the abortion and,
later, the screening technologies challenge.

The effectiveness of this

challenge, combined with persistence by those wishing to change the law
in Roe
so as to take advantage of the advancing techniques, culminated
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v. Wade 16 and its constellation of reverberations throughout
the legal

system.

In the wrongful birth and wrongful life cases, Roe^s influence

was to provide the wedge that broke the grip of the Gleitman decision.
Roe not only removed the controversy over the legality of abortion, but
it

also undermined the position of those claiming an unqualified policy

supporting life.

This changed attitude was reflected as early as 1975

in cases which dealt with pre -Roe events.

In that year the Texas and

Wisconsin Supreme Courts both accepted the wrongful birth arguments and
granted the parents the possibility of extraordinary expenses.

1

^

Although both of these cases involved German measles, they promote an
environment favorable toward prenatal screening.

The courts relied upon

extraordinary expenses as a means of circumventing the problem of
measuring life against nonlife.

In reaching its conclusion, the

Wisconsin Court relied upon the argument that the mother had been denied
the opportunity to receive an abortion and this constituted an injury.

This, however, does not adequately address the life versus

nonlife issue.

The Texas court finessed this by changing the calculus:

Previous Texas cases have indicated this distinction between the
cause of action which seeks damages for wrongful birth or life and
the cause of action seeking re^gvery of those expenditures required
because the child is deformed.
The previous cases granted cause when the birth resulted in a deformed

child and denied it in those cases where the child was healthy.

Thus

not consider
the court can measure normal versus deformed life and need

the option of no life.

This, of course, is the distinction motivating

those undergoing prenatal screening.
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This distinction also places into

.

two different categories dealing with deviations from perfection
due to

deformity and those where the deviation is a matter of preference
(e.g.
eye color or sex).

The former is given a special position, while the

latter is accorded no support under the color of law.
is

Thus perfection

meant in terms of the biological or medical average.

In Jacobs,

the

court not only supported the abortion right but also eugenic abortion.
If

the deformity is what is important, then it is imperative that the

health care system offer all opportunities to avoid it if the parents so
desire

Unfortunately for the eugenicists, this position was not

universally accepted.

While in New Jersey and Washington^ the wrongful

birth claims were accepted, courts in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, and

New York

20

rejected the argument that a child has the right to be born

free from deformity.

But in dismissing the claims the Alabama and

Illinois courts, and a dissenter in New York, raise important issues

which address concerns underlying all of the cases.

Briefly, they focus

on the extent to which technology brings with it new rights (including a

right to the technology) and raise a concern over the sorts of questions
the application of this technology imposes on the political system.

One

argument, raised in dissent, claimed that technology, once developed,
should be accessible to individuals.

When it is denied them and the

denial causes harm, the denial should be actionable.

Judge Cook argued.

Certain facts of life of the 1970's must be recognized and accepted
One such fact is the legal right of a mother to
at the outset.
Another is the developments and
abort a pregnancy
carriers of Tay-Sachs disease^nd
identify
application of tests to
their yet unborn offspring.
in
the occurrence of that disease

....

158

In other words,

the law must accept technological developments as

entitlements for those who desire their use.

If

it

is not the

technology that the person is entitled to, then it is the right to birth
a physically normal child.

The conflict between the court and its

dissenter appears to reflect the difficulty a new technology faces as it
enters into the existing setting.

The new technologies offer new

possibilities but their status remains in doubt.
The Alabama court took a slightly different approach:

We are not unaware of the rapid progress made in medical science in
recent years. Many mysteries of the how and why of human
development have succumbed to medical knowledge. However, we do not
understand that the state of the art in the medical profession is
such that it can be said that no child need be born deformed. c

The implication is that by extending our capabilities we extend our

rights; if the "state of the art" assured that "no child need be

deformed" then the court would have granted the cause.

The right to

23
exploit our extended capabilities appears to be what the Grady court

found.

There the most efficient technology was extended as a matter of

right.

Although non-voluntary sterilization is socially controversial,

the interest in controlling the mentally impaired and extending access
to technology overrode the controversy.

is, at present,

too controversial.

In this case, however, abortion

Although the moral issues raised by

abortion have limited the extent to which prenatal screening is extended
as a matter of

extension.

right, the trend among the courts appears to favor its

It will be worth looking again at

whether the lure of technique triumphs.

If

this issue to determine

they do continue to extend

slope.
access, the courts may find themselves on a slippery
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Since the

justification used to extend access is to prevent deformed
children, the
courts would find themselves confronting the difficult issue
of

determining

by whut stendnrd und by whom would perfection be

defined?"

This would open up the possibility (more likely a

probability) that the understanding of perfection would move from the

medically expected to the desirable.
becomes widely accepted.

This is most likely if abortion

Under these conditions, it becomes harder to

justify denying some parents relief while granting it to others.

In

other words, the distinction between different deviations from

perfection raised by the Texas court will collapse.
To what extent should the courts build technological

developments into their decisions?

Is

it

proper for others to decide on

the child's behalf what it means to be a "whole functional human?"
a

child have a right not to be born?

Does

The wrongful birth cases struggled

with this issue and have slowly moved toward accepting the imperative of
technology.

The wrongful life cases have begun to pick up on these

questions but with a different resolution.

The courts answered these

questions by rejecting the children's claims but accepting, sub
•

silentio, much of the argument.

In the

1982 case, Turpin v. Sorting,

?s

the California Supreme Court granted the infant a cause of action in

regard to extraordinary expenses incurred because of the infirmity.

Denying general damages (the central wrongful life position), the court
claimed that it was not accepting the wrongful life argument.

But, it

reasoned, if the parents can collect special damages why not the infant
who will continue to have expenses after the parents are no longer
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responsible and why should the infant depend upon
parents to sue for the
damages?

Lhe court

reached this compromise because

it

wanted to

support the child's claim but found measuring life versus
nonlife an

impossible framework but extraordinary expenses were
to

calculate

.

27
~

a

manageable figure

Thus the court was abLe to give the infant somethi

without having to deviate explicitly from the precedents which
denied
the possibility of wrongful life.

compromise may make sense

— it

Politically, the wrongful life

extends the principle into a new area

without enlarging the principle itself.

The Texas court's recognition

of the normal versus abnormal trade-off, on the other hand, is the most

accurate reflection of the Issues.
These cases represent pressure placed upon the political system
to

incorporate Into law the advantages of new technologies.

The courts

incorporated these screening techniques into the requirement that
physicians and Laboratories provide accurate and complete professional
services.

While these are not unreasonable goals in themselves, when

placed into the context of the alternatives available after their use,
they produce politically sensitive and not entirely salutary results.
The

Logic of the cases is that the doctor's negligence resulted in an

impaired child who otherwise would not have been born.
liable for damages resulting from the birth.

The doctor is

This places onto the

doctor the responsibility to inform the patient of tests available to
them.

It aLso

provides an incentive for the doctor to promote abortion.

That underlying these cases is a model of normality can be seen
by the reason they exist.

They are brought by parents who want children
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but do not want "defective” children.

The courts distinguished these

cases from accidental birth wrongful birth suits (e.g.,
failed abortion
or sterilization).

At issue in the defectives' cases is whether
the

parents should be able to determine the nature of their
children.
is

a

This

qualitative step beyond Roe which allowed parents to determine
the

fact of their children.

When the courts finally relented and allowed

a

cause of action against physicians, it was because the courts accepted
this eugenic goal: determining the children's nature.
The dialogue among the judges as the courts worked out the legal

contours of this position approached eugenic issues.

Part of the modern

eugenic movement was an attempt to blend together genetic and

environmental issues.

The following excerpt illustrates how the courts

approached this:
The Court proceeds on the notion that the claims of the
infant plaintiff are based on her "wrongful life". "[T]he gist of
the infant's complaint is that had defendants informed her mother of
the availability of amniocentesis, Sharon would never have come into
existence"
It is acknowledged by the majority that this
thesis injury consisting of a wrongful life poses insuperable
analytical problems in admeasuring damages. "[P] lacing a value upon
non-life is not simply difficult it is humanly impossible."
Nevertheless, the Court does not rest its rejection of the infant's
claim upon the inordinate difficulty of measuring damages for her
"wrongful life", as did the Court in Gleitman. Rather, the Court
now says: "[As a matter of law,] Sharon has not suffered any damage
Sharon,
cognizable [in] law by being brought into existence." .
the Court states, has been given life and even with a handicap it
"is more precious than non-life." .
An adequate comprehension of the infant's claims under these
circumstances starts with the realization that the infant has come
into this world and is here, encumbered by an injury attributable to
That injury does not consist of the
the malpractice of the doctors.
Rather, the injury consists of a
child's afflicted condition.
diminished childhood in being born of parents kept ignorant of her
defective state while unborn and who, on that account ^were less fit
to accept and assume their parental responsibilities.

—

....

—

—

.

.

.

.

.
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Osborn's eugenic hypothesis posited that eugenics could best be achieved
by working it through conventional practices such as medicine and family

life/ planning

.

He sought to imbue the middle class life with a healthy

environment which favored the fit over the unfit and supported those
best able to produce the fit.

Consequently, public policy consistent

with that goal would have to promote wholesome family settings and the

freedom of the fit to reproduce (thus the welfare state).

Handler

objected to the majority opinion because it posited, as a matter of
public policy, that life, regardless of its quality, is sacred.

Handler, on the other hand, started with Osborn's quality of life

position and sought to provide the institutional conditions whereby the
ideal or normal would take precedence over even life itself.

in other

words, Handler desired to write into law both halves of Osborn's thesis:
the rejection of genetic flaws and the promotion of a eugenic

environment.

The court accepted only the first.

The courts have not accepted as such the arguments in favor of

wrongful life, but in their acceptance of the parents' position, they
have come close.

What several courts have established is the parents'

right not to have defective children and that this carries a duty to the

medical community.

The Washington Supreme Court, for example, stated

that because of the advances in medicine, "parents have a right to

prevent the birth of a defective child and health care providers a duty

correlative to that right

." 30

of the medical process and,

Consequently, screening has become a part

from the physician

component of normal medical care.

s

perspective, is now a

Politically, it has increased the
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feasibility of eugenic family planning, although when
assigning

it

this

exhaulted position, the courts did not do it for eugenic
reasons,
but rather in the name of normality and parental choice.

Politics
The politics of prenatal screening falls into two contexts.

first is family health care; the second is abortion.

The

Approaching

prenatal screening through the wrongful birth and wrongful life cases
aids in identifying how the two link together.

The court cases grew out

of a health care concern over identifying the status of the fetus in

order to ensure that parents had as much choice in the family planning

decision as was legally possible.

Thus the health care component

depended on the diagnostic ability of the medical practitioner.
The principal consequence of correct identification was

abortion based on parental assumptions about quality of life

considerations (both their's and the infants").
this possibility led to malpractice charges.
the screening techniques.

prevent abortion.)

Into this setting entered

They offered greater precision and power in

identifying genetic defects.

opportunities for abortion.

The failure to offer

But this extended capability increased the
(It also offered information which might

Thus the pressure of malpractice and the goals of

family health both provide pressures toward recommending prenatal

screening
By itself,

the technique simply offers information.

neutral and, for most tests, effective.
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It is

But no technology exists in a

.

vacuum divorced from social institutions.

It is

the social context

disclosed in the court cases that makes the clinically effective
technique of questionable social efficiency

31
.

In practice,

two

contestable practices are enhanced, abortion and quality of life
considerations. 32

Evaluation of the technique cannot be separated from

these consequences (as well as an improved health of infants that may

result

)

The politics of prenatal screening in the context of these cases

illustrates two factors inherent to technology in general.

One is a

social push toward the technology, the second the technology's push on

society.

At the first level,

the political institutions applied

pressures to introduce and expand the use of the technique.

This

pressure resulted from the malpractice cases where the doctors, in order
to protect

themselves, are under pressure to provide their patients with

as much information (or inform them of the availability of the means to

obtain that information) as is possible.

An example of this is the

action of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
recommending to its members that they inform their patients about an
alpha fetoprotein (AFP) prenatal screening test even though the College
did not endorse the test.

California has also promoted the use of the

technique in its AFP screening program.

By setting-up a program making

the test widely available, it has placed the physicians in the position
of facing malpractice if they do not inform their patients.

33

The other consequence is the force of the technique's push on
the political system.

In this case, the principal push is on the
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abortion controversy.

But it works in two ways.

Although not

a latent

controversy to begin with, prenatal screening increases
the relevance of
abortion to family planning.

Expanding the availability of the

technique increases the number for whom abortion may become
option.

It may also prevent unnecessary abortions.

a live

However,

identifying soon to be aborted fetuses is the part that causes

controversy among the antiabortionists. 34

(it is the killing of any

fetus, not net lives saved that concerns them.)

Because abortion is the

principal remedy, it is of necessity a part of screening.
however, is also on the antiabortionists to compromise.

screening in no way legitimizes abortion per se

,

Pressure,

Although the

opposition to abortion

used to avoid the suffering of an infant's death (e.g., lay Sachs) may

seem unnecessarily restrictive.
Against this background falls the California AFP screening
program.

Under the California program, all who provide prenatal care

must distribute a brochure (written at a sixth grade reading level) to

each patient.

The patient is asked to sign a form indicating consent or

refusal to consent to the blood test.

This is to re-enforce that the

program is voluntary but also to protect the doctors against malpractice
suits.

Most insurance covers the forty dollars cost of the testing.

The two principal diseases uncovered are neural tube defects (about 80%
of the serious cases) and Down's syndrome (20% of the cases).

35

This is

potentially significant because spina bifida, one of the NTD's, may be
treatable so as to allow the individual to live a normal life.

Successfully identifying those afflicted may allow for improved neonatal
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care.

While many states offer prenatal screening, this program
is the

only systematic AFP program.

It

is also the first major use of the AFP

blood screening technology in the United States; the technique
receives

wider use in Europe.

^

Despite clearly benefiting many children, the program remains

controversial.

One element of the controversy reflects issues running

through the malpractice cases: the conflict between abortion and the
pressure to offer screening.

California made

a

careful attempt to

distance the program from abortion: it included the necessary follow-up
testing (amniocentesis and ultrasonography) in the initial fee, but

excluded payment for abortion and ensured that the failure to abort did
not preclude other forms of state assistance.

abortion remains an issue.

Despite these efforts,

In defending the program against this

concern, the argument made by the chief of California's Department of

Health genetic disease branch, Dr. George Cunningham, is telling:
It is a question of
It is not a question of offering abortion.
offering a test that offers information about the state of a
pregnan^. What a person does about this depends on her own set of
values

This defense fails.

When the options, as was noted above, are abortion

or neonatal care, then the provider of the information is not innocently

providing information.

The state can reasonably expect that many will

terminate their pregnancy

— in

fact this is a goal because they hope to

reduce the costs of health care.

It is blinking at reality to then

argue that the state bears no responsibility for the actions it made

possible.

At this point the pressure of malpractice enters.
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Doctors

opposed in principle to abortion and who, because of their beliefs do
not desire to participate, must confront the possibility of being sued
for

failing to offer their patients the information.

Barring statutory

action removing prenatal screening from malpractice claims, an unlikely
event indeed, the doctor's moral dilemma cannot be solved by abstaining
from the program.

Thus, the program forces upon unwilling participants

involvement in activities to which they object in principle and for an
end (abortion) that lacks a powerful moral defense that other socially

controversial and mandatory programs, such as desegregation, possess.
Finally, controversy surrounds this form of screening.

The

blood test does not provide definitive information, and is, in fact,
OO

subject to error because it depends upon the date of conception.

°

The

second battery of tests will provide answers by the twenty-fourth week
of a pregnancy,

late in terms of abortion.

counseling to help the mothers who receive
the appropriate conclusions.

The program depends upon
a

positive blood test draw

This is an important part of the program

because it is crucial if unnecessary abortions of normal fetuses are to
be avoided.

Concern over the possibility that women will not accept or

understand this procedure and insist on

a

possibly premature abortion

has been a part of the controversy over this program.

It only re-

enforces the critical link between prenatal screening and abortion.
Concerns over how successfully the testing could be carried out given
process led
the two stage (and potentially very misleading initial test)
has
the FDA to delay approving the test from 1980 to 1983 and
39
contributed to its slow acceptance since its approval.
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To summarize, prenatal screening, conceived within the

preventive medicine rubric, is part damage control (alerting the medical
providers to the special needs of the neonate) and part the struggle for
normality.

It also

highlights a theme of science in politics: extended

capability coupled with extended responsibility imposing
act where no pressure previously existed.

a

pressure to

The techniques have extended

our ability to know the nature of our children.

This potential,

however, created within the political and health care system a pressure
to exploit

it.

After the wrongful birth cases blossomed, the pressure

carried with it the force of law.

available.

This response was not the only one

The extended capability could have carried with it the

responsibility to apply the technique prudently: fully aware of the
moral, religious, and philosophical implications of legislating and

acting on visions of normality.

To a certain extent this concern was

present (often noted in the early court opinions), but it was, at best,

secondary.

The direction of the response reflected a belief in the

value of technological advances and the belief that their application

improves our well-being.
cannot be denied.

The veracity of this belief in this case

But it is too narrow.

It misses the pressures placed

upon the political system by expanding the abortion debate.

It ignores

the extent to which even the technical application of the technology

revitalizes the eugenic strain in American society.

With extended

capabilities comes extended responsibility, but initially this

responsibility is seen only in technical terms, almost as
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if

the

technology brought with

it

a set

of blinders to obscure problems

residing outside the logic and framework of the technology.

Newborn Screening

Newborn screening examines inborn errors of metabolism.

^

The

most widely practiced form of screening^ it encompasses
diseases such
as: Tay-Sachs,

1986 survey

A2
z

Sickle Cell Anemia, and phenylketonuria (PKU) disease.

A

found that thirty-eight states mandated a neonatal

screening program and five had no mandatory program but a good

compliance rate in their voluntary programs.

Thirty-eight states

required screening for at least one other defect and sixteen states
three or more (including: Hypothyroidism, Homocystinuria

,

Maple Syrup

Urine Disease, Galactosemia, Tyrosinemia, or Sickle Cell Anemia). The

remaining five offered at least one other test.
The most common form of screening is PKU.

PKU is a defect in

the enzyme phenylalanine used to transform the amino acid phenylalanine

into tyrosine.

If

untreated it results in severe mental retardation.

Treatment consists of a special diet low in phenylalanine but it must be
started at infancy.

An inexpensive diagnostic test became available in

1961 when Robert Guthrie developed a simple, yet sufficiently reliable,

blood test for the disease.

The test involves removing a drop of blood

from an infant's foot and measuring the amount of phenylalanine

present.

^

In 1962, Massachusetts began a voluntary PKU screening

program and made it mandatory the following year.

During the 1960

s

several states joined Massachusetts in programs, 43 by 1973 and 48 by
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,

Some objected that the early programs were premature;
that they

began before PKU

understood.

,

the Guthrie test, and the treatment were fully

The programs, however, proved benef icial

Although accepted as

an ideal preventive health program" 4 ^ and

"a model for screening programs

program.

4 -*

," 47

controversy still follows the

Most states test when the infant is three days old and at
this

young age, many false positives occur.
for a follow-up test is important. 4 ^

Under these conditions the need
The specific dietary strategy has

been questioned, 4 ^ although at present this is not seen as a limiting

factor on the program.

Some variation exists among types of PKU and the

screening program and the normal PKU diet do not cover all variations.
While this does not threaten the integrity of the program, it

illustrates how illusive a comprehensive screening program can be.^O
Another problem with PKU programs follows from their success.
Those diagnosed early and successfully treated are usually assured of
the possibility of marriage and parenthood.

Many choose to reproduce.

Unfortunately, many of their children suffer from retardation.

This

results from maternal PKU which produces retardation from elevated

levels of phenylalanine in the maternal plasma, not a metabolic problem
of the offspring.

To alleviate this problem, it is necessary to

identify "PKU mothers" and counsel them on the implications of their

condition and the need for a special diet while pregnant.

Quebec,

Canada, undertook a genetic registry program including all people known
to have PKU.

The latter were "recalled" at twelve years and counseled

on reproduction and PKU.'*^

This has been advocated by the American
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Based on the 1986

survey, 37 of the 43 states responding, had (34) or were developing
(3)

some form of follow-up on those treated in infancy for PKU.
In this case, "improving" the public health resulted in

deleterious unintended consequences.

New institutional arrangements

were needed to identify the new "target" population and arrange for

treatment (when possible).

responsibility.

Again, extended capabilities extended

This, however, brings to the surface the extent to

which screening may invade privacy.

A genetic registry may provide a

means to identify and then treat PKU mothers but it also increases the
extent to which society possesses a centralized control over

individuals' genetic information.

The trade-off is fraught with traps

which cannot be avoided as long as we extend our technological control
over life.

Most technological advances bring with them the need for

human management of the new environment
by nature

— and

— management

otherwise provided

this control and management ultimately centralizes access

to the information relevant

to the new environment.

On balance, newborn screening offers a major opportunity to

improve public health.

The principal dangers lie in adopting programs

before the testing techniques and treatment are fully developed and in
the extended responsibility thrust upon the health care system to meet
the new challenges created by the successful use of the technology.

The

former may result in false expectations which could undermine the

legitimacy of these programs or, in the extreme cases, severe damage to
the child due to faulty diagnosis or treatment.
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The second danger

.

speaks to the political concerns of privacy, freedom, and
social

responsibility

Carrier Screening

Neonatal screening and, with advances in fetal care, prenatal

screening address the condition of the living.
at

Carrier screening aims

future generations by identifying the genetic health of prospective

parents.

The emphasis behind this form of screening is to allow for

more informed reproductive decisions.

Of all three forms of testing,

this one is the most intrusive into a person's life.

It also has been

the most politicized.

Perhaps because it is removed from the here and now, the

politics of carrier screening has been less a part of public health and
family planning than a part of interest group politics.

The

contentiousness and controversy surrounding this form of screening is
rooted in programs whose origin, as well as transformation, resulted
from interest group politics.

Currently, the main value of carrier screening is as a tool

guiding reproduction.

If the prospective parents know which deleterious

genes they carry, then they can estimate the probability of a child

suffering from a disease.

Combined with prenatal screening (where you

can determine if the worst case materialized, then abort) this can be a

powerful means to assure a "successful" birth.

If no prenatal

tests

is
exist, the couple faced with two carriers must judge whether the risk
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acceptable and, if not, consider adoption, AID (Artificial Insemination
by Donor), or no children.

This information properly applied could result in a reduction in
the number of children born with genetically transmitted diseases.

It

would simultaneously lessen the burden on families and the health care
system; both motives of those promoting carrier screening.

Paradoxically it could have the effect of increasing the number of the
deleterious genes in the pool.

Without the prenatal screening,

would have to determine whether or not the risk was acceptable.
would opt out, ending their gene line.

a

couple

Many

Now, a variety of techniques

exist which allow the genes to be passed on.

For example, the couple

could conceive and then prenatally evaluate the outcome, aborting if

necessary.
carrier.

Alternatively, they could use AID if the donor was not

a

In a similar vein, they could hire a surrogate mother, again

assuming she was not a carrier.

Prenatal screening results in a 50%

chance that the recessive gene is passed on (assuming they abort an

affected fetus); both AID and surrogate parenting carry a 25%

probability that the gene is transmitted.

To the eugenicist this is a

disaster because the eugenicist strives to eliminate or limit the genes
in our genetic load.

The controversy over carrier screening, however, has not focused
on its diseugenic potential but instead on its political consequences.

Intended as a good faith means of improving family planning, it has
of
instead been bombarded with controversy centering around questions

privacy, stigmatization, and racial bias.
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This practice highlights one

of the troubling aspects of information:

discrete item.
which

1

it

is not a tangible and

The testing provides information about me the use
of

cannot always control.

One concern is dishonesty.

The

information is supposed to be confidential but the records are not
totally under my control and the information may be released without

permission or knowledge.
is

Another concern is that once the information

known, it cannot be withdrawn.

Others will know something about me.

They are free to make judgments and take action accordingly.
this is also possible with tangible items.
peg me as a yuppie.

desire, however,

I

ray

If

I

Of course,

own a new BMW many may

To some, this is an undesirable stigma.

If

I

may be able to eliminate or mitigate the stigma.

I

can sell my BMW and otherwise make clear that what others perceived as a

yuppie life was either a case of mistaken identity or a brief fall from
grace.

At

present,

I

cannot change

ray

genes.

Information cannot be

traded or withdrawn in the same fashion as tangible goods and

consequently may create conditions outside of my control.
Adding to the problems associated with the transfer of

information is the substance of this information.

Screening identifies

a person's genetic essence, not substances invading the body.

The

information describes me; how people (including me) interpret the
information is also how, in part, they understand me.
breaks into two parts.

This concern

First is confusing the identified trait (sickle

cell trait) with the disease (sickle cell anemia disease) and second is
a

stigma attached to the carrier as a result of the confusion.

The

the
trait means you carry the recessive gene (are heterozygous for
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trait) but you do not have the disease and the heterozygous
state may
not carry any deleterious symptoms.

reproduction.

The only concern is over

The disease is self-evident: you are homozygous for
the

condition and therefore have the disease.

Unless this distinction is

clear in peoples' minds (and experience with sickle cell screening

demonstrated that

it was not)

being identified as carrying the trait can

easily be interpreted as having the disease.

Since for sickle cell

anemia that can mean extended hospitalization and possibly

a

shortened

life span, potential employers or insurers may (and did) discriminate

against those carrying the trait in order to avoid the hardships the

disease's symptoms impose on an employer (lost work time, sick pay) and
an insurer (payments).

S3

If

the trait is identified early enough, it

may affect parental or a teacher's expectations toward the child or even
the child's self-understanding.

It

may also affect the extent to which

others see the person as a desirable marriage partner.
The concern over stigmatization distinguishes carrier from

neonatal and prenatal screening.

It does not negate the value of

Prudence,

screening but does dictate prudence in implementation.
however, has not always characterized these programs.

Tay-Sachs and

Sickle Cell Anemia screening have been the leading programs.

began in 1970 and Sickle Cell Anemia shortly thereafter.

Tay-Sachs

Both programs

have been recounted in detail elsewhere and only the key lessons will be

discussed here.

54

The Tay-Sachs program is considered a success and Sickle Cell

Anemia a failure.

Tay-Sachs began as a pilot program in the Washington-
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:

Baltimore area.

It was

organized through the community involving

community leaders— including churches and schools.

"Fourteen months of

planning, leadership training, personnel development,
and public

education preceded the Baltimore-Washington pilot
program." 55

After a

successful pilot, the program expanded so that by
1980 only

children

13

were born with Tay-Sachs in North America, down from the
previous

average of 50-100.

(Although how much of this can be attributed to

screening may be debatable given that only 10% of the eligible

population is reported to have been reached by the screening
programs .) 5 ^

Participation was voluntary.

Sickle cell anemia screening started because state governments
were petitioned by the Black community concerned about sickle cell

anemia but believing that governments were not responding.

Tabitha

Powledge's observation, which to a lesser degree applies to the later
federal legislation as well, captures the failure of this early

movement
It has become increasingly clear that the arguments in favor of
sickle cell screening have had more to do with politicians' desires
to do something dramatic (and comparatively inexpensive) for a
neglected population, and doctors' desires to encourage black
interest in health in general, than with the medical wisdom of a
current program of carrier screening per se. J

In fact,

reading the congressional testimony as these programs developed

and were later revised, confirms Powledge's observations.

jump out.

Three points

First, Democrats were using this as a vehicle to criticize a

Republican Administration's agenda; second, the representatives were

straightforward about the program's purpose as serving a neglected
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^

group; and finally, the concern for the neglected group overshadowed

concerns over stigmatization, the absence of a cure, and care in
planning the program

.

in their haste to respond,

not carefully planned.

the states' programs were sloppy and

Some of the sins included: inadequate

involvement of the community in planning and insufficient attention to

educating the community to the nature and goals of the programs.

Some

states punished those failing to screen: four states levied fines and
five either withheld marriage licenses or school attendance.

latter being a sanction irrelevant to the condition.)

(The

Inadequate

counseling left many who carried the trait confused as to their status
and options.

Finally, the lack of confidentiality (by 1974 only four

states provided for confidentiality in their statutes) and a

misunderstanding over the meaning of carrier status caused some
employers to dismiss carriers and insurance companies to refuse
coverage.

At this point, the black community not only rejected the

programs but many believed them to be an attempt to limit their
population.

(SO

The lessons that have been drawn from this program center on

management and planning.

Many states mandated the screening but failed

value
to adequately educate the target population as to the nature and
of the program.

Consequently, many felt threatened or misunderstood the

meaning of the test results.

Closely related to this was the failure to

resources
draw people into genetic counseling, due in part to inadequate

when the program was begun.

Unclear before entering the program as to
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its value and procedures, many who tested positive for
the trait left

believing they had the disease or that their value as a parent
was

diminished.

The advantage the Tay-Sachs program had on these
issues

were community involvement in establishing the program and an
extensive

educational effort designed to explain the nature of the condition,
what
the testing would provide, and the counseling services available
to work

through the findings.
The recommendations follow easily: firmly ground the programs in
the community; ensure extensive education (including tertiary actors,

such as employers and insurance companies) before beginning the testing;

provide genetic counseling as a continuous part of the program; and keep
the testing voluntary.

These recommendations would alleviate most of

the problems uncovered in the Sickle Cell experience.

A solid genetic

education (note that Osborn, too, advocated this) and genetic counseling
are the best remedies to the problems that Sickle Cell Anemia programs

encountered.

Other valuable conditions include strict confidentiality

of the results, a prenatal test expanding the choices available to two

carriers, and a clearly identifiable population to whom a program can be

addressed.

From this base, carrier screening could be extended to

Thalassemia (population of Mediterranean descent) or identifying those
at

risk for hyperlipoproteinemia (coronary artery disease) or alpha-1

antitrypsin deficiency (susceptible to lung and liver disease).
In fact,

screening policy.

this has been the direction of national carrier

The political response to the controversy over sickle

cell was not to stop the screening but to reform and enlarge it by
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bringing carrier screening under the public health cover.
Congress passed the Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act. 61

In 1972

This Act was

broadened in 1976 to encompass Sickle Cell, Cooley's Anemia, and
TaySachs.

Amendments in 1978° J provided for basic and applied research,

training, testing, counseling, information, and education for a
wider
range of diseases.

In 1979 and 1980, 34 state genetic service programs

received funds through the National Genetic Diseases Act. 64

The next

significant change occurred during the 1981 budget reconciliation
process.

The funds for genetic programs were folded in with public

health monies in the Maternal-Child Health block grant. 65

The

controversy resulting from Sickle Cell did not repudiate carrier
screening, only sloppily designed programs.

Reflecting upon the outcome of these controversies, a narrowly

conceived screening program is reasonable.

The screening programs are a

technical approach to a genetically based condition.

Regardless of

debates over social definitions of disease, sickle cell anemia is
painful and causes suffering.

Tay-Sachs kills.

These conditions occur

because of nature (with society's intervention confined to the act of

conception).

Furthermore, this has an advantage over prenatal screening

in that a remedy may involve not having children rather than abortion.

This eliminates the question which haunts the abortion decision: can

someone with sickle cell anemia live a happy and normal life?
can.)

(Many

In this context, offering screening to those whose family history

indicates a need seems reasonable.
broad or mandatory programs.

This does not, however, justify

Mandating neonatal screening for treatable
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conditions can be justified under the health provision of
police powers.

a

staters

But in the diseases screened for here, treatment is not

possible and mandating screening risks stigmatization, decimating some

people's self-image, and invading privacy.

The only state interest that

could justify mandating the screening would be to limit the number of

carrier couples.

Seeking to achieve this goal through mandatory

screening is not too far removed from prohibiting marriage between two
carriers.

At present,

that remains unacceptable.

But if society is

unwilling to do the latter, it should not undertake the former.
In the case of screening for genetic diseases (or traits),

society and science's interests join easily and comfortably.

For

science, the social focus on the genetic dimension provides

justification for research into the basic causes.

It also increases its

authority over the society as the definitive interpreter and principal
implementor of its knowledge.
to improve its health.

For the society, it has the opportunity

The working assumption is that the best way to

attack disease is at its most fundamental point.

That, too, is the goal

to gain total control over the workings of genetics

of the research:

(albeit, piece by piece).
The bargain struck between science and society (some call it

Faustian for both) reflects the technical nature of health care.
Nature

— the

body

— is

reduced to an object to be addressed technically.

the being
All moral meanings attached to the being are stripped away;

becomes the body.

This is why the fact that the screening has dealt

with genetically based disease is important.
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Screening approaches the

condition from a narrow and technical perspective; this limits the
scope
of what it can find.
of genetics which,

Its definition of the situation will be in terms

fortunately, is also the source of the problem and

the key element in any solution.

stigmatization becomes clear.

At this point,

the danger of

What this involves is transferring the

technically defined problem (that person x deviates from the average
genetic condition) into a moral one.

Social evaluations of the person

should not turn on the technical identification per se but rather on

societal (political, economic, moral) considerations.

The point behind

genetic identification is that the knowledge should empower the
individual, not the society over the individual.
While offering power to the individual, this recommendation does

have limitations.

system.

Principal among them is its reliance on the medical

Not everyone has equal access to it.

Trust in health

providers, a regular relationship with the system, and resources to
enter into it fully differ across income, occupation, and region.

Another concern centers on questions of power.

Focusing on the genetic

dimension re-enforces the relationship between a doctor and patient: the
doctor acting on the patient.

In fact, it places the patient in an even

more passive position since his role in relating symptoms can be

replaced by a sample of his blood.

Of course the fact that as a society

we generally accept this authority of doctors helps legitimize the

genetic approach.
In relation to genetic disease, therefore, carrier screening can
be appropriate although not without limitations.
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Enthusiasm for the

technique, however, is not confined to disease.

For example, according

to James and Margaret Thompson, "It is theoretically
possible to screen

adult populations to identify members who are at risk for
one of several

kinds of disorders that could be forestalled by diet, by
avoidance of

smoking, or by other health-promoting measures that are matters
of lifestyle rather than of medicine.

it has

already been used in the

workplace to identify those susceptible to exposure to certain hazardous
substances and has been suggested as a means to improve AID.

In these

cases, screening is being extended to events which have genetic aspects
but which become actuated by societal or human intervention.

In other

words, the blame for any illness can no longer rest principally on the
gene.

This key change limits the force of the argument for a technical

explanation and solution to the problem.
The practice of screening in the workplace has been limited and

controversial.

It operates on the premise that carriers of a trait, who

under ordinary circumstances would not suffer from the condition, may be
at

risk if certain environmental insults were to trigger the condition.

For example, some fear that the sickle cell trait could interfere with
the blood's oxygen carrying capacity and this might be a problem for

those exposed to oxidizing chemicals.

The idea of screening is to

identify those with such hypersensitive conditions and assign them to
less threatening jobs.

While sickle cell is not

a

good prospect for

screening (the connection between workplace insults and adverse
reactions has not been shown),

deficiency

(

ft

7

glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase

G6PD) and serum alpha-1 antitrypsin (SAT) were considered
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A

viable.

The former, which disproportionately affects black males
and

Mediterranean Jews, can predispose carriers to anemia due to
oxygen.

a lack of

The latter may produce lung disorders. 68

This form of screening has never been widely practiced and has

declined over the past dozen years.

According to an Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) study, seventeen companies have tested and
only five continue.

survey of nine chemical companies conducted by

the author confirms the general conclusion of the OTA report.^ 0

Seven

report no current screening, one screens for sickle cell trait at the

request of black employees but does not use the results for placement.
The five who commented on the issue portray application of the technique
as premature.

Two left open the possibility of future screening if

scientific developments warrant.
screening. ^

OTA reported 53 considering future

In communication with the author, one company reported

abandoning screening because "the tests were not shown to be helpful in
providing a safe and healthful workplace."

Controversy exists, however,

over the reasons testing was abandoned, raising the possibility that the
72
company was selective or misleading in relating its findings.

in sum,

the use of screening is not a significant part of employment practices

but remains a viable long-term option.
As a result of at least an intellectual acceptance of this

technique, the issues surrounding and logic behind it deserve

discussion.

Workplace screening differs in at least one important

respect from the disease screening previously discussed.

In the latter

a
programs, simply being a carrier of the trait was not considered
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problem for the carrier.

But in the workplace, it is the problem.

raises the problem of stigmatization in its most naked form.

This

This fact

alone has proved controversial and raises one of the many objections
to
this practice.

First, the tests risk shifting the burden of a safe

workplace from the employer to the employee.

If a means exists to

identify any who apparently are at risk, then the pressure to eliminate
the harmful substances diminishes.

Certainly this fails because it is

so dependent on current knowledge.

How certain are we that others do

not possess unknown conditions which places them at risk?

If

the

workplace can be cleaned up enough to diminish general risk, are not
these better odds to play?

If

later discoveries demonstrate that they

were at risk all along, they have good reason to claim preventable

negligence.

It also smacks of blaming the victim.

It

is one thing to

focus on the victim when nature victimizes him (disease) but it is

inappropriate when environmental conditions, within social control,

precipitate the problem.
Another concern highlighted here is ethnic bias.

Two of the

three tests stated above are disproportionately ethnically linked.

Even

though the genetic condition is real, should only some groups

systematically have to bear the largest burden in remedying the problems
of workplace safety?

Especially when alternative policies exist?

problem is magnified (but not created) when those groups have

This

a history

of being stigmatized in the general society.

Finally, while evidence exists to suggest a genetic
of this
predisposition to susceptibility to chemical insults the science
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field is still developing.

The conclusion by the OTA on the state of

the science of workplace screening is illuminating:

The biological foundations of the concept of genetic screening to
identify predispositions to occupational disease are sound.
In
addition, most of the well-studied traits are reliably identified by
easy and inexpensive tests.
It should be recognized that other
biological variables such as age, nutritional status, preexisting
diseases, and lifestyle also affect the body's susceptibility to a
variety of environmental insults. The study of factors affecting
susceptibility to occupational diseases, therefore, should not stop
with a quantification of genetic influences, as important as they
may be, but also should incorporate the other biological

variables
First, given the state of the art it would be inappropriate to screen
for job related purposes.

The ambiguity of the situation leaves serious

doubts as to what the hazard threshold level should be and provides no
clear ground to claim that those whose screening identifies possible

susceptibilities are significantly more at risk than those whose
genetics are "better" but whose "other biological variables" are the
same or worse.
slope question.

More generally, the OTA conclusion raises the slippery
If

it

is

legitimate to control the workplace by

limiting workers' job options based on their genes, then it also could
be appropriate to control other "biological variables," several of which

involve personal choices (lifestyles).

Once the logic of approaching

risks in the workplace through the individual is accepted, then it is a

small step to expand that regulation to other relevant factors.

These

of
might include such factors as lifestyles which affect the quality

(pregnancy).
work (alcoholism) or conditions involving third persons

focusing on the
But even in these cases the problem remains that by
the work conditions.
individual may eliminate the imperative to improve
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As scientific understanding advances, the scope of relevant factors
with
a biological element grows;

the scope of surveillance and control may

grow as well.
The slippery slope alone is not an adequate reason to dismiss

this approach.

Making difficult discriminations is the nature of

policy-making.

What is troubling about this approach is the apparent

transferring of a technical model to concerns that extend beyond the

merely technical.

Focusing on the biological dimension implies that the

problem is a health problem.

In part it is.

But to accept that as the

overriding problem is to confine solutions to the isolation of

environmental insults to individuals as the insults become known.

In

other words, the problem can be addressed adequately by identifying the

person's biological status.

This ignores the risks others face because

the tests only demonstrate risk, not safety.

While the relevance of a person's body is undeniable, focusing
on the body is an attempt to reduce the issue to a level amenable to

scientific investigation.

The promise of science in this case is to

improve the employers ability to fine tune the workplace.

Most of the

occupational health issues that triggered the interest in screening grew
out of our exploitation of scientific advances.

Pharmaceuticals,

chemicals, and plastics are all components of science driven progress.
nature,
Science provided these advances through its ability to control
to exploit

the workings of nature consistent with our priorities.

many benefits result from this, so do unintended costs.

While

That is the

"Without chemicals, life
tradeoff behind the chemical company's slogan:
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itself would be impossible."

externalities.

Three options exist in response to these

First, we could abandon the scientific advances.

accept this modern day Ludditism.
the consequences.

advance?

Few

Second, we could simply "write-off"

What are a few extra cancer cases compared to a
great

Obviously this is unacceptable as a general rule.

Finally

(and coincidentally most reasonably), science could be marshalled
to

explain and remedy the consequences resulting from our exploitation of
its earlier advances.

problems.

Scientific advances often create new scientific

Where nature once provided the balance and counterbalance, an

artificial world demands artificial balance.
The consequence is that science is called upon to expand its

control in such a manner that the previous gains can be retained.
must be made to adapt to the new environment.

Man

The lure of genetics is

that it opens up the body as a means to that end.

This was the insight

of the eugenics movement and it is part of the modern interest in

genetics.

Science/technology once adopted tends to perpetuate itself.

Since scientific knowledge is by definition incomplete (the goal, not
the reality,

questions.

is

perfect knowledge), each advance points toward new

For society, the imperfect knowledge manifests itself in

these unintended costs which provides the opening for further research
and advancement on the part of science, which is then adapted and so on.

This is the arms race; it is also referred to as a technological

imperative.

This should not be confused with determinism.

Rather, the

imperative is to progress along a certain path because of the initial
investment in that approach.

It is scientific incrementalism.
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The urge

to screen workers follows this pattern.

Confronted with the need to

respond to workplace hazards and a growing social interest In the

developing screening technology, the logic pointing toward extending its

application to a new area is compelling.

What better way to adapt to

the new environment than through man's essence.

The fact that the

relevant "science is truly in its infancy ," 24 is only
back.

a

temporary set-

Research continues in the area and the idea remains viable.
The logic of this argument should be familiar.

The eugenicists

argued that advances in medicine disrupted the evolutionary adaptive
process and necessitated human intervention to take nature's place.

Workplace screening is economic eugenics.
environment and now must ensure a good fit.

Mankind changed the
This could be achieved by

changing the environment, but that would mean giving up many advances
that most of society wants to keep.

For the present, direct

manipulation of the body (e.g., changing genetic vulnerability to
environmental insult) is unachievable.

That leaves identifying the

genetic characteristics and assigning people to the environment for

which they are most suited.
Does this fit with the screening for disease?

forms of carrier screening are eugenic goals.

Common to all

All seek to minimize the

damage that may result from "our genetic load.

In one case the damage

results from nature, prompted by human procreation, and in the other

through more forceful human intervention triggering an otherwise latent
condition.

Workplace screening was described as part of a search to

improve the fit between man and his environment.
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Is that

true for

disease screening as well?
is

Essentially, it is.

defined as no genetic disease.

In this case best

fit

Given the advances in medicine,

whatever side benefits may accrue to carrier status can be taken over by

medicine (e.g., someone with sickle cell trait is more resistent to

malaria than others).
off without it:

The implicit argument is that everyone is better

the child,

the parents, and the society.

What is normal

(no "disease") is what is good and what is good is what is desirable.
It

is, however,

the goal of normality rather than the evolutionary laden

eugenics that guides this practice.
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CHAPTER IV
THE BODY POLITIC

The eugenic legacy, although not dominant, is important.

It

kept alive an interest in shaping and controlling the nature of future

generations and focused concerns on deviations from a genetically normal
body (either physical or mental normality).

But what both case studies

present is the greater importance of science and technology in shaping
the events.

This occurred in several ways.

First, science provided a

more exact understanding of the eugenicist's concerns.

Genetic

knowledge illuminated the nature and root of the frailties (enabling a

eugenicist to discriminate meaningfully between

a

condition capable of

being passed on to offspring (and thus important to the eugenicist) and
one specific to the individual (theoretically of no eugenic importance))
and also provided tools of identification and action that made this
But this led to another influence of

knowledge of practical importance.

science where the application of science changed the issue.
two forms in this study.

This took

First, eugenics became buried in genetics.

This was part of the Osborn/Muller strategy .

1

only be de facto, no longer an explicit policy.

As a result eugenics can

This accounts for some

genetic screening programs' diseugenic consequences (i.e., permitting
the passing on of defective genes).

The genetic research and

application were defended in terms of science's social value:
paralleling the logic used to defend the application of physics,

196

tor

.

this reason, the wrongful birth court cases 2 could
extend the most

successful eugenic recommendation (genetic screening) while denying
the
eugenic dimension.

The consequence was that political controversies

were fought on noneugenic terms.

The resolutions to these conflicts,

too, were not eugenically based.

Slowly, then, the association with

science transformed the eugenic programs into ones dominated by the

politics of technology: applying the fruits of science and then coping
with the results.
This transformation is the change reflected in the movement from

eugenic sterilization to the politics of genetic screening and the

technocratic use of sterilization.

This became the political

battleground: the means to attain social goals and the reason for the
nature of the political reaction.

The means side of the equation is

reflected in the modest trend toward the use of sterilization as a tool
to maintain control over the mentally impaired as their legal status

changed.

It is also reflected in prenatal screening and the response to

the interest group pressure that brought about the carrier screening

programs.

The political reaction centered on the degree and permanence

of the intervention in the sterilization cases;

the status of abortion;

and concerns over stigmatization based upon the fact that genetic

screening provides such constitutive knowledge of an individual

biological being.

In general,

s

these would not be controversial to the

eugenicist, attesting to the extent eugenics has been removed from the
calculus
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This political science that developed contains several
elements.
Tirst is the eugenic background.

Second is the increased

responsibilities placed on the social system as a result of the use of
increased capabilities.

its

Third, the programs together provide an

institutional context within which politics occurs and which will shape
future decisions, in particular those over which new technologies to

employ.

Finally present is reductionist tendencies.

I

The hopes of Osborn and the modern eugenicists of a eugenic

revival or culture has not been demonstrated in the preceding two

chapters.

What is demonstrated is the urge to control and the search

for the most effective means of control.

Beginning with sterilization,

the most significant aspects were the state court cases extending

sterilization to the mentally impaired and the developments in the area
of reversible sterilization.

The former represents the growing

legitimacy of the use of sterilization to control, even in cases when

voluntary consent is not possible.

This last point is important because

voluntary consent has been a central issue and, as the federal court in
the Relf 5 case illustrated, a key obstacle to eugenic sterilization.

The Grady^ court went to great lengths to hide the fact of state imposed

Significantly, the strong

sterilization, but this charade failed.
dissent by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
se

,

5

did not oppose the policy, per

only the location of the decision, namely in the courts.

developments suggest rather than proclaim

198

a trend,

These

but the suggestion

seems plausible given the 1960's legislative interest in linking

sterilization to welfare and the abuse of sterilization within the
welfare system.
The anecdotal and statistical evidence pointing toward

sterilization abuse directed against those on welfare is serious yet
does not constitute the new economic eugenics Julius Paul envisioned.^

Rather, it was used for social (in this case largely economic) purposes.
The fact that sterilization was chosen illustrates two factors working

together, which in turn create a third.

First, in many cases the issue

was reproduction, and sterilization provided the easiest solution (the

"technical fix").

A second factor, relevant in the Relf and Grady

cases, was the eugenic legacy which provided precedent for using

sterilization in the case of mental defectives.

These two blended

together to create a third, "politics place[ing our] existence as a
living being in question.

In other words,

the increasingly

sophisticated technology joined with the eugenic focus on genes to
create a willingness to treat the body as an object of political

activity to the degree of shaping the development of future generations,
in this case by denying someone the ability to contribute to it.

This

argument does not imply that sterilization was inevitable, only that it
of
was available and a socially accepted technique (independent

contextual acceptance).
The line of court cases^ on sterilizing the mentally impaired

rejuvenation and
embodied the technocratic focus of sterilization's

served to ratify its status.

How else can one explain granting
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sterilization constitutional status and, even more absurdly, as part of
the privacy right?

For all its reasonableness as a policy compromise,

the Grady decision represents the legitimation of using biological means
to address

political questions.

The key is not the status granted

sterilization, but the fact that the court concluded that it must aid
Grady in exercising that right.

The court granted the political system

permission to exercise surveillance over and possibly act upon Grady's
biological life.

The sleight of hand contained in the "best interests"

position is that her interests and the state's converge.

Of all the

abuses or misuses of sterilization discussed, this is the worst because
it

is a lie.

In an attempt to make available for public policy a

technique, the courts resorted to subterfuge.
practice by denying its political nature.

It

accepted a political

This sleight of hand reveals

the difference between technocratic politics which denies politics and

eugenic politics which accepts politics.
In the area of sterilization, then, one finds two trends

converging.

First is the revitalized interest in sterilization as a

formal (Grady) or informal (welfare abuse) policy tool and second is the

growing acceptance of sterilization as

a

means of contraception.

Certainly the growing acceptance of the technique's routine use will reenforce its legitimacy as a policy tool.

What threatens to make this

trend a matter of concern is the improvements in reversible

sterilization.
control.

This offers the possibility of precise and effective

with fewer
If a reversible sterilization technology develops

could easily
problems than Depo provero, then the use of sterilization
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be extended on a routine basis to rapists or
welfare clients (especially

informally by the doctors).

Although each of these could be defended on

its own terms, by viewing sterilization as a technique
of power, the

different practices become linked.
body to achieve social goals.

They share the strategy of using the

In the case of both rape and the family

life of the mentally impaired, a biological dimension exists
to the

problem but not one that demands a biological approach to its solution.
The virtue of the body as the means to address these issues, however, is
that it is administratively neater and the predictable outcome is more

certain than social or even psychological remedies.
In sum, sterilization has, for the moment, become a part of

political issues and battles greater than eugenics.
in its ability to be a technical fix.

Its value is seen

While its crude edge has been

blunted, it remains a part of and illustrates those political battles

which are waged on and through the body.
What emerged from the study of sterilization was that eugenics
and the politics of technology work together.

The product of this

relationship is making the body the object of politics.

This

partnership becomes more evident in the material on genetic screening.
What develops is the outlines of a system through which an increasingly

exacting control over the body becomes possible.
The family planning function common to the three types of

screening raises an important issue: the extent to which the technique

s

ability to extend our capabilities also extends our choices and

responsibilities.

Prenatal screening enables us to know characteristics
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of our children early in their development,
which in turn offers more

choices than previously existed.
them new responsibilities.

These choices, however, bring with

On the one hand the doctors must now offer

the advantages of the techniques; on the other hand,
this information

enhances an ability to act on the revealed fetus.

The status of the

fetus becomes our active responsibility.

This form of screening exemplifies the processes that Osborn

hoped would materialize.
to

The patients undertook the screening in order

determine the status of the fetus.

not fit their desires.

Many would abort if the fetus did

While the parents act out of quality of life

concerns (including the inability to bear the extraordinary expenses
that an impaired infant requires) their actions also serve eugenic ends.

Eugenic goals "under a name other than eugenics.
is

not eugenic.

But this controversy

Social problems (the care and treatment of the mentally

and physically impaired; the quality of family life) are being addressed

medically.

The controversy is over the appropriateness of this strategy

and its current manifestation, abortion.

receives scant attention.

Concern over deleterious genes

In this case, the responsibilities carried

with the extended choice transform the issue into a debate over the
moral dimension of the form of action following from the technique's

application.

At present this is abortion, but generally it centers on

the enhanced ability provided by the technique to define and act on

quality of life concerns.

The issue itself is part of a strategy which

seeks to achieve social goals through the instrumental treatment of
life.

Eugenics is but a subset of this approach.
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While prenatal screening produces eugenic outcomes, neonatal

screening is diseugenic.

This results from its assistance in the

passing on of deleterious genes onto future generations.

Begun as a

routine public health program the consequences of its success, however,
placed upon the government an expanding role in genetic management.
This took three forms.

First, the success of the PKU program encouraged

the expansion of neonatal screening to other diseases.

Second, because

not all diseases have cures (e.g., sickle cell anemia), the program

extends to research as well as public health.
extend into the adult lives of those screened.

Finally, the programs
The infants successfully

treated for PKU, must be monitored and then counseled when they reach

reproductive age.

Most of the states have or are developing programs to

collect and maintain this information.

In sum, the responsibilities

extended relate to an enhanced ability to identify, record, and monitor
individuals' genetic status.
in practice.

This sounds more sinister than it has been

But what is important is the extent to which it increases

the state's focus on genetic matters and provides an institutional

capacity to act.
Carrier screening is the form of screening with the most

potential to aid in the eugenic approach to reproduction.

It can

identify the genetic quality of surrogate mothers or AID donors.
would certainly be employed in the Buck Rogers

world of cloning.

It

But

when it was put into a systematic program, it was in response to ethnic
interest group politics.

Since the capability existed to identify those

disease, the
who might produce a child suffering from an ethnic specific
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reasoning went, then there existed a public responsibility to use it.
As was the case for neonatal screening, this is not particularly

remarkable other than its break from strict eugenics.

These diseases

are genetically based and can be best addressed genetically.

Carrier

screening, however, has been extended beyond this level to the workplace
and the ability to address biologically other social concerns (e.g., the

link between smoking and disease) is rapidly developing.

This expansion

betrays an interest in the technique growing out of a willingness to

achieve social goals by acting upon the body.

developing in two ways.

In sum,

this technique is

First, following its eugenic heritage, it

provides a vehicle and partial administrative structure to promote

eugenic reproduction, although instituted for noneugenic reasons.

Next,

its technocratic dimension offers an ability to exercise exacting

control over individuals as they relate to various social concerns
(e.g., workplace insults, drinking, smoking, drugs).

Hastily developed programs that crept beyond their original
scope characterized neonatal screening as well.

PKU screening was

introduced before it had been proven effective and before the diet was
fully tested.

But the importance of that form of screening includes the

legitimacy it helped confer on neonatal screening, the role for public
health in that area, and its extension into maternal PKU programs.

In

other words, even though the screening is narrowly applicable in its
from
early stages, lessons learned from its use, consequences resulting

combine to
its successes, and scientific developments around it

transform the program.

Carrier screening also exemplifies this.
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Beginning as a means to identify blacks or Jews at risk,
early programs
evolved into part research, part public health programs.
is

The technique

now considered for use in the workplace to provide a more
detailed

portrait of job candidates and as a means to improve AID through

examining the donor

s

genetic make-up.

Introduced in one context it not

only transformed that but also expanded into new areas.

What holds them

all together is focusing attention at the level of genes.
The fact that a technical system was in place made it easier to
use the same approach to expand into new areas.

In fact,

this

exemplifies a central issue in the study of technology's political role.

According to one student of technological politics, political theorist
Langdon Winner, the lasting political importance of technology is not
its original adoption, but rather the context it enters and helps to

He stated this as follows:

create.

would not deny that there are any number of factors that go into
the original and continued employment of these technical ensembles.
My question is, however, In what technological context do such
systems themselves operate and what imperatives do they feel obliged
That one employs something at all far outweighs
to obey?
(and often obliterates) the matter of how one employs it.
I

...

....

Genetic screening provides an institutional setting within which the

genetic knowledge can be identified, transmitted to the public, and
used.

In this process,

the status of the body becomes important.

No

longer are we simply manipulating atoms or other inert objects; now the

object of our attention is living and within us: in fact in one sense it

defines us.

The body, the natural laboratory, is the subject of

scientific investigation in the same way that an atom is in physics.
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By

defining the body clinically and instrumentally in order to bring

it

under the powerful gaze of science, shaping or repairing people
to serve
a variety of interests becomes possible.

Of course, science's gaze produces many benefits.

individual

s

From the

perspective, living as a PKU mother is preferable to the

retardation that results from failing to treat her as an infant.
would suggest withdrawing into the Luddite's worldview.

No one

But the too

ready acceptance of these techniques may produce unintended problems.
One is the tendency to reduce issues to scientific or technical terms.

The danger inherent in genetic technologies involves explaining disease
or birth defects simply in scientific or medical terms which implies a

scientific or medical response.

Marc Lappe elaborates:

would not attempt to deny scientific or genetically verified
realities. ... It is the social institutions that we develop to
respond to those realities when they are verified that I'm concerned
with.
The rapid appropriation of a genetic model for which the
first solution might be sterilization of carriers may not be the
most moral way of approaching a problem of a carrier status for a
significant gene.^
I

Concerns regarding workplace screening stem partly from this factor.

Defining the risk of workplace insults in terms of the body's reaction
to chemicals reduces the issue to one of science,

or social exclusion makes sense.

then genetic therapy

If the companies had maintained the

issue at this level of understanding (which all claim they did not) this

would be an example of the genetic model at its purest.

While employers

have not yet reduced policy to the level of genes, the courts have.

The

wrongful birth cases have required the option of genetic testing in
order that all technical remedies are available.
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The Gleitman

12

court

s

reliance on a policy favoring life is a rejection of
the genetic model
but the legalizing of abortion and the subsequent
developments in tort

law guaranteeing the genetic option have enhanced the model's
stature.
Of course it is not accepted without qualification, but its
imperatives

are ascending.
The issue of eugenics cannot be dropped too easily.

Winner, in

fact, does provide grounds for dismissing a deterministic eugenics

argument but not eugenics entirely.

Genetic screening is of eugenic

origin and often works to promote eugenic ends.

But, in practice, it

has become a technological issue subsuming its eugenic dimension to that
of genetics.

The fact of deployment has been important in that the

institutional context transcended the eugenic dimension.
Once the technique is introduced to solve one problem, it

expands to deal with new ones.

The dangers this brings with it are of

losing sight of broader social issues and reducing the subject to a

technical issue and, once that is accomplished, falling prey to the

narrowing blinders of a technology.

Within the technical world of

prenatal screening, abortion should not be a problem.

Abortion's

But it carries over to the screening.

controversy is social.

The

problem occurs because of the context, health care, within which the
techniques are used.

It

is

presented as a part of public health (and

the doctors pressured into making it available) while the leading remedy
to an identified problem is a deeply politicized issue that some may

consider murder.

The two practices cannot be completely separated yet

within the world of health care, the politicized world of abortion makes

207

no sense.

This is the same trap waiting to be sprung in the
workplace.

Why should it be controversial to identify those whose
genes predispose

them to risk?

Is not

this to their advantage?

technical, the answer is yes.

If

the issue is simply

The technical focus blinds its

participants to those considerations outside of which the technique
is
programmed to handle.

At the same time, its power is also obvious and

its potential applications wide (e.g., Tay-Sachs, AID, workplace).

The

imperative that Winner questioned is to identify even more precisely
more characteristics of our genes that are relevant in the modern
post ) industrial world.

(

That is reductionism, and moral values exist at

which we may have to blink in order to expand the technique.

II

Although the application of scientific advances is rarely
denied, it is worth proceeding as if denial were possible.

The current

focus on regulation and the prudent introduction of new techniques is

responsible public policy and beneficial at the important level of the
individual, but it obscures broader consequences and misses the

contextual concern raised by Winner.
After minimizing the direct influence of eugenics on recent

events, it must be acknowledged that one of Muller's strategies is

rapidly developing.

He hoped to promote eugenic reproduction and

recognized that this would mean separating love and reproduction.

13

Although this is not the necessary result of a systematic and expanded
use of genetic screening, it is likely.
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Muller wanted to make the break

in order to plan birth, but today that is not the
sole motivation.

Instead it grows from the frustration of infertility as
well as from
those carrying deleterious genes, such as Tay-Sachs.

Changes along these lines are already apparent.

Surrogate

parenting has grown in acceptance and, as the Baby M case 14
confirmed,
the definition of a parent has changed.

her child at birth.

The natural mother was denied

Certainly "parent" is a socially constituted term

and it appears that as technology becomes more effective, pressure is

applied to redefine the term.

disconnected.
clinical.

In this case, love and reproduction were

Love and birth remained, but the act of reproduction was

If the fertility problem resides with the male, AID is a

possible remedy.

This too breaks the love-reproduction relationship,

but little else.

In both cases, genetic screening would make the

techniques more effective, in the sense of avoiding error.
Liberal societies usually encourage the application of

technologies when, as in these situations, they appear to respond to a
social need (where social need is defined as the sum of individual
needs).

But what distinguishes these techniques from others

power, automobiles

— is

— nuclear

that they act on and through the person.

By

opening up the body too completely to science, society risks promoting
an instrumental understanding of the human: treating the person as a

machine.

This is the technical context into which new techniques

refinements of old ones

appropriate.

— enter.

— or

In the case of PKU screening it is

But the controversies surrounding abortion, surrogate
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parenting, and non-voluntary sterilization indicate that it is not
always appropriate or acceptable.
At stake is society's conception of its children and the family.

The promotion of genetic technology rests on the desire to ensure the

best quality of life possible for children and their families.

motivation is not entirely unselfish.

This

Concern over expenses involved in

raising someone impaired, the psychological trauma felt by parents which

may interfere with their ability to be a good parent are all part of
this concern.

In fact,

they are the reasons the courts began to move

toward the wrongful birth position.

But the approach developing in

order to fulfill this responsibility urges that we do all that is

technically and humanly feasible to ensure the good life.

Careful

planning, which would include screening and maybe even the use of

donors, is a logical extension of this and offers a more precise vehicle
to

the desired end.

This is not a world without love, but it is one

willing to break the love-reproduction bond.

This perspective has been

accepted by many of the courts, usually in the name of quality of life

considerations.

It supports the Grady decision,

the acceptance of

wrongful birth cases, and the initial Baby M decision.

It is also

consistent with (although not derived from) Osborn's quality of life
concerns

.

^

But the instrumental view of life this view contains can extend

beyond its quality of life concerns.

Once instrumental manipulation is

the
accepted in order to minimize natural suffering or hardship,

practices gain social acceptance.

This is the importance of the
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technical context.

If

their use to eliminate natural handicaps is

legitimate, why not social ones, especiu.

j.y

those with significant

biological dimensions?
Present here is a difficult dilemma raised by these issues.

Unquestionably many of the screening programs help individuals.

Many

would live longer and happier lives if they knew what dangers their

lifestyle might increase.

But the step from naturally caused problems

to matters of lifestyle expands the aspects of life that are reduced to

technical issues.

Given the nature of these technologies, it also

focuses responsibility on the individual.

control.

It allows

for more exacting

This is a problematic approach for the conditions triggered by

lifestyle or social practices.

The clear health benefits run up against

the instrumental, technical perspective the practices spread in their

wake
The Catholic Church, in its Instruction on Bioethics,

1

recognized the extent to which the instrumental treatment of the person
was spreading throughout society.

In this document,

its analysis to reproductive issues.

the Church confined

Although it is not a useful policy

document, the Instruction does identify several important issues at
stake.

Briefly, it discusses issues of control, spirit, and standards.

The Church argues that the technological approach to reproduction shifts

control from God and the family to scientists and technology.

transforms a human issue into a technical one.

It

For example:

transfer] is brought
Homologous [in
- vitro fertilization and embryo
actions of third
through
couple
the
about outside the bodies of
determine the
activity
technical
parties whose competence and
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success of the procedure.
Such fertilization entrusts the life and
identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists
and
establishes the domination of technology over the origin and
destiny
of the human person.
Such a relationship of domination is in itself
contrary to the dignity and equality that must be common to parents
and children . L
The Church objects to two aspects of the process.

First, the

doctors must determine which embryos are strongest and should be
implanted.

The remainder are destroyed.

decisions to be made?

By what standards are these

What special competence does a doctor possess

that empowers him in this case?

According to the Instruction, "No

biologist or doctor can reasonably claim, by virtue of his scientific

competence, to be able to decide about people's origin and destiny."^
Second, it warns about the dehumanizing effect of these techniques.

The

instrumental treatment of the body means the instrumental treatment of
the person.

According to the Church:

Thus, in the body and through the body, one touches the person
himself in his concrete reality. To respect the dignity of man
consequently amounts to safeguarding this identity of the man
corpore et anima unus.^

Even after excepting the Church's position and accepting the legitimacy
of the reproductive technologies, this concern is real.

Science,

investigating the body, treats the person as an object of nature,
removing any soul (secularly or sectarianly understood).

The purpose of

science is to solve the mysteries of nature: in this case, demystifying
the human animal.

Thus, to accept the legitimacy of these techniques is

to confer on this endeavor the legitimacy of science.

accepting the strategy of addressing an issue through

In other words,
a technical

as
(e.g., screening) lends credence to understanding the problem
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means

technical, meaning amenable to science.

addressed, it should be.

If it can be technically

The loss of control found here is spiritual

(from the Church's perspective) or human (in the secular view).

Control carries with it another meaning.

The Church focused on

technical imperatives (and technologists) replacing either God's or
Man's ability to shape human destiny.

But increasing the scope of the

issues which can be addressed through an individual's body increases the

ability of those in power (public or private power) to adapt man to the
social environment.

This means that the social and economic

infrastructure does not need to be changed, rather people can be forced
to adapt

to it.

Again, this is the issue at stake in workplace

screening and any proposals to extend screening to identify those

susceptible to hazards resulting from lifestyle.

applicable to the reproductive technologies.

But it is also

At present the concern of

those promoting carrier screening or seeking prenatal screening are

genetically linked diseases.

It is not a great

leap, however, to shift

the concern to include other genetically identifiable problems.

One would be in adult life

control would occur at two stages.

screening to identify a person's susceptibilities to hazards.

Now

— carrier
Added to

this would be a reproductive strategy to promote the gene lines most

resistant to environmental insults.

This could be achieved through

fine-tuned reproduction using AID, surrogates, in vitro fertilization,
and embryo transfers.

Both donors and recipients' genetic

characteristics would be examined and matched.

Ideally, these decisions

norms.
would be made routinely with individuals responding to social
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These sorts of environmental developments could be attempted through
tax

incentives, different fee structures for health care packages,

or

public education programs identifying the problems, stating why they are

undesirable, and then offering the genetic services.
The purpose of speculation is not to raise fears but to try and

draw the contours of the developing technological context.

To

summarize, it is characterized by a technical understanding of the body
and its instrumental treatment.

While developing out of legitimate

public health considerations and

a

search for an improved quality of

life for both parents and children, its successful implementation

changes social norms and carries with it the need to establish

standards.

It focuses on the individual which risks shifting attention

away from social factors to the isolated individual.

Finally, against

the technical expertise of science, the individual is in a weakened

This

position to question the appropriateness of the strategy.

discussion does not resolve the dilemma, but raises it.

In a liberal

democracy, that is all one can ask.

Ill

The preceding section brought to the surface concerns over the

lingering and indirect implications of genetic techniques.

This

reflects the same concerns over the slippery slope between therapy and

breeding raised at the end of Chapter One.

Pushed to their extreme, the

concerns over the new techniques could lead to a neo-ludditism.
response is not justified by events to date.
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This

More importantly, it is an

impractical response given the American culture.

On the other hand, a

utilitarian or technocratic acceptance of technology misses
the

cautionary tales focusing on the extended capabilities and
responsibilities brought on by the techniques.

A technology introduced

as a solution to a present problem may extend to situations
unforseen

when it was first introduced.

To this extent, it helps shape events.

To the practically minded person who recognizes the truth in

each position, but is unwilling to withdraw in despair, it is necessary
to

find a path through the technical minefield.

To help chart the

course, it may help to focus on the decision-makers and how different

decision-makers bring a different bias to the issues.
Leaving the decision to use and when to use present and

developing techniques at the level of the individual involves two sets
of actors.

First is the doctor-patient tandem.

They blend together a

health perspective with the individuals' value judgments on issues
involving the sanctity and quality of life.

It

is at

this level that

religious values or secularly derived moral codes will be most telling.
The doctor may serve as a conduit through which the limits of technology

can be passed to the parents.

Certainly the doctor as a recognized and

respected expert will generally receive a privileged position in this

dialogue.

But the extent of this privilege will vary depending on the

parents' values.

Those whose world view presents all life, no matter

what its condition, as sacred provide strict limits on which technical

applications are acceptable.
child's quality of life

— and

Those who act out of concern over the
these decisions often resemble situational
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will necessarily work closely with the physician in order
to

determine the range of options, their consequences, and probability.
These different outlooks guarantee that, taken as a whole, decisions
made at this level will vary and in ways inconsistent with each other.
This, of course, parallels the experience with abortion.
The outcome of this process is a form of incrementalism.

Individual decisions accumulate into a pattern and the process of

accumulation may serve to perpetuate the decisions made.

In other

words, the repetition of a choice may lend it a form of contextual

legitimacy.

It

is

incremental because the legitimacy builds slowly from

actions which are motivated by events close at hand, including

precedents for the chosen action, but not by an overriding goal with a
clear strategy on how to achieve it.

This was seen in the slow but

steady acceptance of genetic screening.

It moved from a technique of

choice to the point where it was recognized by courts as a standard

element of health care.

The problem with this form of incremental

acceptance of the technique lies in the existence of the competing

world-views within which the techniques appropriateness is evaluated.
The legitimacy of the technique that precedent of use provided placed

genetic screening in the context of a health care technique that grows
out of quality of life concerns.

The process through which this ripened

sufficiently for the courts to accept

it did not

provide a forum where

the indirect consequences and opportunity costs could be examined.

This

would involve highlighting its link to abortion at the cost of sanctity
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of life values.

In sum,

the courts sanctified the quality of life

perspective
What gives the fact of incremental decision-making
importance is
the issue of the mobilization of bias . 21

H ow an issue or interest is

politically organized (that is, organized in

a

manner meaningful for

political action) determines the political definition of the issue.
This includes such considerations as: the relevant actors, the issues to

which

it

is

likened, the values at stake, and the range of likely

options and outcomes.

This is what is meant by bias.

Mobilization

enters in the choice of organization used to bring the issue to the

political agenda and the degree to which the issue is visible (in

Schattschneider's terminology, socialized).
Technological incrementalism places the political and social
issues at a low level of visibility, although the spectrum of issues

present may be wide.
(or parents

Decisions are made privately, between the patient

and doctor or semi-privately

review committees.

,

in conjunction with hospital

The substantive conclusions gain precedential

legitimacy as long as they are not challenged.

Legitimacy means here

that the participants can act with relative autonomy.

The scope and bias of action at this level is varied.

As was

stated, above, the scope varies between religious/moral constraints or

actions and a health care perspective.

examples from sterilization.

This can be illustrated by

The difficult sterilization question is

how to deal with those unable to consent voluntarily.

A restraining

force is a belief in the sanctity of the body and autonomy over
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reproductive decisions.

This was the unspoken quarrel between Justice

Douglas in Skinner 22 and Justice Holmes in Buck 23
.

On the other side,

sterilization provides a technically effective means to achieve
the
health goal of meaningful contraception.

Stating it thusly illustrates

how, even at the individual level, broader forces influence the

decision.

In particular, one finds religion, liberty of choice,

normality, and the lure of the technologically sweet.

A concern that

brought the issue to the attention of the courts was that parents would
respond to social pressures defining mental incompetents as

descriptively and normatively abnormal.

This influence may be

exaggerated when a safe and effective technology exists to limit the
damage, so to speak, to one generation.

A person may fear that the

failure to be sterilized (or parents failing to sterilize their

incompetent child) may result in personal or social retributions ranging
from disapproval to the withdrawl of social benefits (by either the

public or the private sector).

That these social pressures and concerns

over normality exist can be seen in the controversies surrounding

decisions to let mentally deficient couples keep children and

homosexuals be foster parents.
A second actor is the market.
the health care system.

In doing this, it determines the options known

and available to an individual.

access.

The market regulates access to

The market may intervene to prevent

Those who lack health care resources may be sufficiently

removed from the health care system so as to be denied knowledge about
the techniques;

financially denied access; or inadequately socialized to
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the values of preventive medicine.

If the health or moral value of

the

technique is considered significant, then the
government may intervene
to provide,

or even mandate, access.

This was unsuccessfully attempted

in the Baby Jane Doe controversy 24 and
successfully carried out in the

neonatal screening programs.
A second influence of the market focuses on the health
care

providers.

The individual

s

access to a technology, especially within a

system of expertise and technical knowledge as the health care system
is, may depend on the provider actually informing the individual of
the

technology's relevance and availability.

The patient may have the

finances, appreciate the role of preventive medicine, and be deeply

involved in the health care system (e.g., regular care) but unable to

partake of its fruits if uninformed.
birth cases.

This was the issue in the wrongful

The government's intervention here resulted from equity

concerns
The pattern of outcomes of private decisions raises a set of

concerns that raise the stakes of the process.
parental rights and responsibilities.

These issues involve

A common influence of technology

on society is to push existing tendencies further than individuals could
or would have pushed them before the introduction of the technique.

the case of the biological/genetic techniques discussed above, this

appears to be the nature of their influence.

One parental concern is

the responsibility toward the fetus, the abortion issue.

Prenatal

screening provides the parent with increased abilities to control the
nature of their offspring.

The parents can choose their children
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gender and can monitor (within limits) their physical
and mental

development.

This new ability confers onto the parents the

responsibility of making judgments concerning quality of their
children

life.

s

The wrongful birth cases can be understood as a

willingness to provide the parents with the opportunity to make
these
choices.

The long-term concern centers on whether this ability is

turned into an expected or optional parental responsibility.

Certainly, the wrongful birth cases have ensured that the

federalist value of diversity is being honored.

But, at this stage of

the debate, the principal follow-up technique, abortion, remains a

controversial remedy and the diversity of the wrongful birth law raises
the concern that the political system sanctions murder (too much access
to screening) or repression (too little access).

satisfied.

Neither side can be

The rigidity of the activists' positions on abortion hinders

attempts to find a coherent middle ground on prenatal screening.

The

prenatal screening techniques define abortion as therapeutic and have
increased the number of opportunities for choosing therapeutic abortion.
But defining abortion as simply therapeutic diminishes the stakes raised

by both sides of the abortion debate.

It is a moral Right or moral

Wrong; in either case the logic impels a single national policy.

The

desire to provide parents with more information, control, and

responsibility over their children's lives has the unintended effect of
challenging the rigidity of abortion positions.

If abortion is a Wrong,

prenatal screening loses legitimacy; if it is a Right, prenatal

screening becomes a subsidiary right.
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Stated this way, attempts to

incrementally introduce new techniques, and exploit
the flexibility of
federalism, becomes illegitimate.

The dilemma this causes was uncovered

by Kristin Luker s study which found the public most
sympathetic to

aborting deformed fetuses but found the right— to— life activists^

opposition strongest against this form of abortion 25
.

To complicate the issue further, the quality of life perspective

may result in the fetus developing rights against the parent.

The

wrongful birth cases imply that the mother should make decisions on
behalf of the fetus.

techniques?

What if she fails to avail herself of these

Wrongful life cases, which fall into this extended picture,

are against the doctor, but what is to prevent them from extending to
the parent who has access to the technologies and refuses to use them?

An intermediate issue is the fetus suing the mother for inadequate

prenatal care due to smoking, drinking, or drug addiction.
cases a parental nondecision becomes a decision.

extensions

— the

In both

The first of these

fetus suing the mother for failing to use the test

— is

a

logical extension of the wrongful birth position; the second extension
is more

Holding a mother accountable for

probable but not necessary.

damage due to drug addiction or even smoking, taken by itself, may be

defensible.

It extends, nonetheless,

obligations and responsibility.

the meaning of parental

Although the specifics of court

decisions may be discrete and applied narrowly, the trickle down impact
of an evolving understanding of parental responsibility may not.

The

decision-making forum cannot take into account how the new
responsibilities effect other issues (such as abortion) and the fact
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that the decisions are state based may have the effect of
widely

diverging standards.

In an issue such as this, the wrong, to those who

see it as such, is of such a moral nature that allowing it in some
cases

and not others means the system is implicated by the wrong because
it is

tolerated at all.
To summarize, decisions left to the individual will, on the

whole, promote the flexibility that individual choice implies; the

decision's low level of visibility may contain the consequences, in
particular moral consequences of the decision; and the incremental

decision-making may allow the society to slowly become educated on the
techniques and their implications while it limits the ability to turn
back.

On the other hand, because the decision must come from within the

individual it is subject to internalized social values, including

religious/moral codes, learned health care values and opportunities, and
concerns over normality.

Finally, the importance of many of these

values to individuals and the incompatibility of the full range of

decisions made means that pressure will be placed to raise the private

decision to a public issue.
involvement.

Most often this has resulted in judicial

Given the propensity to socialize the conflict, the next

set of questions deals with how much to socialize it and the desirable

scope and bias of the new conflict.

Throughout this study, the courts have come under close and
critical scrutiny in their attempts to regulate and balance these

concerns.

The criticisms have centered on the bias of their outcomes.

the
In order to generalize on the advantages and disadvantages of
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courts' role in regulating genetic technologies, it is necessary to

identify key institutional factors.
be

Once these are established, it will

possible to examine the scope and bias of judicial policy making in

this area.

Courts and legislatures diverge in their approach to governing.
The courts must work through reasoned and principled analysis while the

elected branches logroll or employ other techniques of bargaining.

difference reflects differing objectives.

This

Arguing this distinction,

Dworkin wrote:
Arguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an
individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to
establish a collective goal. Principles are propositions that
describe rights; policies are propositions that describe
goals. ... A political right is an individuated political
aim. ... A goal is a nonindividuated political aim, that is, a
state of affairs whose specification does not in this way call for
any particular opportunity or resource or liberty for particular
individuals
The bias of the court, therefore, rests in its focus on individuals and
in the language of rights.

In the two case studies, the courts were natural institutions

for those who employed them.

The wrongful birth cases reflected

individuals seeking access to a technique.
perceived broad social goals at stake.
needed redress.

Few of the participants

The individuals felt wronged and

Grady and Relf also addressed individual concerns: they

sought protection against applications of technology by authorities.
the whole,
this context, it is not surprising that the courts have, on

sought to ensure choice in the use of technology.

In some cases this

limiting it.
has meant expanding its availability, in others,
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Although it was not the intention of the litigants to set
social
policy, establishing policy could not be avoided.

provides a good beginning point.

The Relf case

Inevitably this court entered into

social policy when it defined the mentally impaired out of the voluntary

consent category.

Working without a legislative definition of consent,

the court established the meaning of an accepted constitutional right

(the right to procreate) in a narrowly construed context.

Although the

finding had broad social policy implications, the court refused to
resolve them or look beyond the scope of established governmental

regulations.

By raising the constitutional issue, however, the court

made subsequent attempts to resolve the policy consequences difficult.
This follows Schattschneider's theory that enlarging a conflict

changes what the conflict is about.

In the cases reviewed, the changes

centered around making explicit and public the value and moral issues in
dispute: in the case of genetic screening, certifying the issue as one
of public health and medical practices;

in the sterilization cases, the

courts recognized that issues of power and coercion were at stake.
Finally, the courts placed the issues into the language of rights.

Although significant variations exist among the courts, the incremental
movement is toward greater judicial activism in extending access to
technology and to do so within the context of rights sets precedent (and
therefore defines the bias) in the same way that individual incremental

decision-making does.

The courts, however, do so in a more public and

authoritative manner.

One of the characteristics of incremental change

is

to
that although it moves forward in small steps, it is difficult
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reverse direction, except incrementally.

Here is seen Schattschneider's

insight: once the substance of the conflict
is changed, the next change
is

not likely to return to the status quo ante
but rather to a new

conflict, albeit the offspring of the first two.
Taken as a whole, the Relf court acted responsibly.

It

focused

on the facts before it and evaluated the consequences
of governmental

practices on an individual.
well.

At

This is what courts should do and can do

this point, Dworkin's distinction becomes central.

objectives imply different institutional roles.

Different

The complexity of

society, however, means that these roles and goals will overlap.

At

what point does the presence of the other institution's objectives

diminish an institutions responsibilities to pursue its own?

Stated

differently, did the fact that social policy was involved mean that the
Relf court overextended itself?

J.

Craig Youngblood and Parker Folse,

also concerned with identifying boundaries, raised this issue as

follows

Courts govern, and they produce social policy; yet their
institutional nature is such that they do not always produce sound
social policy, at least as judged from the social scientist's
perspective. Their attention to the individual rather than to
social conditions generally and their emphasis on principle, even
when principle is inadequate to capture the complexity of a social
The
organization, are not conducive to effective policymaking.
dilemma, however, is only apparent. A society that wishes its
government to do more than simply make policy that wishes its
government also to accept claims that interfere with the making of
policy must become comfortable with institutions like the American
j udiciary
.

—

—

225

.

.

The bias of Re If was to Limit the scope of a technology's
application

without denying the technology in general and by limiting, but not

excluding, the role of elected officials.

Whether or not this decision falls within the acceptable limits
of the judicial role depends on how one answers the general question of

the role of the court.

It is not self-evident that a reasonable man

must necessarily find informed consent under these circumstances

unreasonable.

A federal court in North Carolina, for example, found it

reasonable. 28

Most courts, however, have begun to follow the activist

course set out in Relf and in doing so illustrate the scope and bias of
an activist court.

The scope in Relf was broad but the substance of the

scope resulted from the bias restricting its focus to an individual
case.

Although it made policy, it worked from the narrower base of its

legal context, in this case the constitution, rather than centering on
the substance of the policy.

This scope and bias may leave the court as a poor choice to be
the institution of first resort in the area of technological

application.

This is illustrated by the debate between the Grady and

Eberhardy courts.

The Grady court was unwilling to accept the strong

position on consent taken in Relf

.

Although the court did not argue

this directly, it appeared to be motivated by the desire to make

sterilization a viable policy option.
of procreative rights,

it

While working within the language

sought to keep the option open.

Once

compelled to
rejecting this as involuntary sterilization, the court felt

constrain the opportunities for abuse.
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This was not necessary.

The

court could have ruled that sterilization was permissible but that

inadequate guidelines existed and then returned the issue to the
legislature.

This was the Eberhardy resolution.

By rejecting this,

the

court established policy guidelines without reviewing either the past
and current practices or the practice and needs of caring for the

mentally impaired.

These are not considerations central to the

determination of rights but are at the core of establishing social
goals.

Their neglect is also part of the bias of rights oriented and

individual centered institutions promulgating broad social policy.
was the thesis of Youngblood and Folse's argument.

This

Given this position,

was it necessary to carry the argument as far as the Grady court did to

resolve the issue of rights?

If

society must accept institutions like

the American judiciary, the judiciary must make a good faith effort to

stay within its domain.

The Relf case illustrates a protection of

rights with a minimal intrusion into social policy.
to

Grady only needed

establish the issue of rights and could have left the implementation

of its ruling to the legislature.

Eberhardy recognized this as a

justiciable issue but desired to wait for legislative guidelines as to
the policy goals.

Once these are established, the court could examine

the rules and evaluate their impact on rights.

The Grady approach

prematurely raises the rights issue and constrains the policy making

institutions from subsequently dealing with these questions.

The

difference between the scope and bias found in the Eberhardy and Grady
institution
approaches is the difference between using the courts as the
of first or second resort.
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Several political consequences follow from an activist court.
By granting the status of right to individual technologies, the question
of what general principle is behind that right remains.

Did the outcome

in Grady really mean that a woman has the right to the most effective

contraception?

If

so,

this could severely limit the legislatures'

ability to regulate reversible sterilization.

This issue resembles the

influence of the abortion right on the courts' willingness to accept the

wrongful birth position.

In each case, a right's scope grows as new

capabilities extend the opportunities to apply it.
situations are not equivalent.
these rights?

Is it

But all the

What general principle resides behind

the privacy of the body?

The sanctity of the body?

The courts need to draw out the arguments more fully and explicitly in

order to provide the policy-making institutions with guidance.

If the

right's scope grows too large, the political system will be handicapped
in its attempts to regulate new technologies.

At issue here is whether

courts should be evaluating techniques or principles.

Another consideration of the activist court, especially one

establishing

a

positive right, is that it further socializes the issue

by committing the state to a certain position.

This was true of Grady

and certainly was true of the wrongful birth cases.

Again, the use of

the courts as the institution of first resort biased the policy issue.

Prenatal screening is one of several technologies whose purpose is to

allow potential parents to choose their children.
zero-sum

— to

beget or abort

— or

it may,

This choice may be

in the future, allow for

remedial work that may change the child's nature (fetal therapy).
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The

question becomes: to what extent society wishes these to be unregulated

opportunities or rights.

By linking prenatal screening to the abortion

right and imposing the burden on doctors of offering it as routine

health care (enforced through malpractice tort law) the courts have
limited a legislature's ability to control this issue.

It has also

placed the state's institutions in the role of ensuring the option of

eugenic abortion.

Again, this is a consequence of approaching the issue

as one of individual rights

rather than public policy.

The trend by

courts to link access to technologies and individual rights has limited
the ability to treat the issue of regulating the body

future bodies

— as

a coherent

policy issue.

— both

current and

For this reason, the

decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court to return the surrogate
parenting issue to the legislature is welcome.

More surprising,

however, was their urging the legislature to look at reproductive

technologies as a whole.

Although the opinion reflects a bias toward

allowing access to technology, it also reflects

a

recognition that these

are interrelated and problematic issues of public policy, not principled

and individuated questions of rights.
In doing this, they recognize the limits of the courts to

resolve the pressures placed on the political system by these

techniques.

No longer can abortion and abortion guided by prenatal

screening be seen as equivalent.
is an issue of breeding goals.

The first has many motives; the second
But a cogent and complete analysis of

scope is
these connections cannot be undertaken by an institution whose

who must wait
limited by the questions brought to it by the litigants;
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tor issues to come; and who lack the institutional capabilities
and

representational mandate to bring together, debate, evaluate, and
conciliate the varied interests and values raised by modern technology.
Once again the argument points toward the legislative nature
of
these issues.

In fact, even if many of the institutional obstacles
to

the courts could be overcome, these remain legislative matters.

This

follows from a lesson the text has sought to teach: in subtle ways,

technology legislates.

outlook in

a

It legislates through directing our actions and

certain manner (in this case, the genetic model and

reductionism) and it provides both tools and justifications to extend
the technique to issues beyond those initially addressed (e.g., genetic

screening for lifestyle conditions).

The bias of technology itself

raises issues of general public policy.

Rights are involved but the

problem with the judicial outcomes is that they have treated access to
technology as a right in and of itself.
term, "rights reductionism."

a

This is, for lack of a better

Rights become specific technologies

(abortion, sterilization) rather than substantive or procedural issues
of politics (free speech, due process).

As is true for technological

reductionism, this confuses means and ends.

By making the technology

itself a right, the courts also institutionalize the public policy

embodied in the technology.

This concern adds to the problems of

judicial governing in this area.
Aside from the limitations of the courts as technology policy-

makers, the legislature as an institution has several virtues.
least is that it should be more democratically responsive.

230

Not the

It is

designed to offer the most complex and complete representation of the
various interests and perspectives within the country.

As it has

developed its system of committees and support organizations, such as
the Office of Technology Asse

.ment,

it offers the possibility of

integrating democratic representation with technical knowledge.
ideally, results in responsible governance.

This,

Compared to the courts,

this should allow for a greater representation of all relevant interests

and capabilities to place issues into broader policy contexts.

Therefore, genetic screening could be considered in conjunction with

surrogate parenting and AID programs all of which reflect similar
desires to control reproduction for quality of life concerns and

implicate important social relationships (love-reproduction) and social

institutions (parenting).
Unfortunately, the experience of legislatures uncovered, above,
is not

promising.

What emerged reaffirmed Theodore Lowi's gloomy theory

of interest group liberalism.

30

Lowi argued that the

institutionalization of positive government transformed the role of
interest groups from a necessary, but worrisome, aspect of balanced

government, to an integral part of government.
important part in American political theory.

Groups have played an

Madison, in his defense of

the Constitution, sought multiple and diverse groups to create balanced

politics.

Representatives would act as a filter capable of transforming

narrow social interests into broader political ends,

to refine and

a chosen
enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of

true interest of
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
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their country ." 31

implicit in this scheme is distancing the group from

the institutions of government.

This contrasts sharply with the modern role of interest groups.

Madison's filtering mechanism no longer filters.

Rather than the

government acting as a means to enlarge private interests, the groups
now shape and help define the actions of the government.

The place of

group politics has shifted from interests organized in the society to

groups serving in the government; it has moved from pluralism in the

society to pluralism in the government.

The consequences for

contemporary governing are diffusion of authority and conflict
resolution through bargaining.

Lowi described this as follows:

Typical American politicians displace and defer and delegate
conflict where possible; they face conflict squarely only when they
Interest-group liberalism offered a justification for keeping
must.
major combatants apart and for delegating their conflict as far down
It provided a theoretical basis for giving to
the line as possible.
each according to his claim, the price for which is a reduction of
In other words, it
concern for what others are claiming.
transformed access and logrolling from necessary evil to greater
good 32
.

Working from this perspective, the legislative process, raised as the
proper response to the courts, may not be adequate to its assigned task.
The previous three chapters presented legislatures which chopped
the technological issues into instrumental aspects of continuing issues.

Early use of sterilization was adopted to meet the eugenicists' fear of
immigrants; genetic screening served the needs of public health

advocates and ethnic politics.

But in no case were technologies treated

debate
as active forces drawing links to issues outside of the immediate

through links forged by the capabilities offered by the technique.
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Specifically, the legislatures missed the slide from therapy to
breeding.

In the case of the early sterilization laws and the Sickle

Cell Anemia screening programs, this resulted in bad politics and bad

policy.

In genetic screening in general, it has dimmed awareness of the

qualitative difference between public health screening for genetic
diseases and screening for susceptability to conditions triggered by
lifestyle.

The rationale for drawing individuals into the latter

screening programs must be different from the public health programs due
to the greater social dimension of the information sought.

Interest group liberalism claims that governing is dominated by
two forces.

First is interest groups serving as representatives of the

public and second is functional expertise.

Together they mobilize a

bias which is narrow and technical.

Reviewing the substance of the case

studies, both forces were dominant.

The early screening laws responded

to the apparent expertise of

the eugenic community which had leading

geneticists in prominent positions, lending credibility to their claims.
The role of expertise was again apparent in the immigration legislation
of

1924 and in Harry Laughlin's advisory position to the House Committee

on Immigration and Naturalization.

The genetic screening legislation

more clearly reflects the functional approach to legislation.

The

principal actors were interest groups and public health experts who
sought to demonstrate the public utility of new technologies and then

institutionalize their use.

The advisory network developed so as to

exclude the quality of life/sanctity of life debate.

This is a

into the
contentious cleavage in American politics and not one that fits
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functional arrangement of committees or into the administrative

structures.

By reducing the issues to technical matters, the

politicians were able to skirt what most consider a no-win debate.
It

seems reasonable to conclude that reliance on legislatures
to

resolve issues surrounding the social adoption of new technologies will
have certain predictable features.

First, the legislatures will not

address the genetic issue on its own merits as

policy issue.

if

it were a

discrete

Instead the issue will be placed into another context.

Although this is not an absurd approach, it misses the extent to which
the broad issues surrounding breeding can be addressed.

The issue will

then be delegated to an agency which will re-enforce the narrowing

circle of issues and interests addressed.

In sura,

the legislative

process treats genetic technologies as therapeutic techniques.

In the

fashion of interest group liberalism, the more controversial and

problematic issues of how far society should allow refashioning the
human essence and issues of normality's social pressures are neglected.
Compared to the courts, the legislatures have succeeded in

opening the issues up to democratic scrutiny, but due to their current
processes and procedures, they have limited the scope.

The visibility

and socialization of the issues are expanded but the scope and bias are

generally confined to public health or the use of public health for
ethnic politics.

The shame of this resides in the fact that the failure

to question the technologies' appropriateness has given them the stamp

of approval by the state.

This, no less than treating them as rights,
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limits the ability to control their expansion into new areas, whether
they be the issues of wrongful birth or workplace screening.
The limitations of this narrow focus can be probed by returning
to the issue of modern eugenics raised at the end of Chapter One.

The

issue of eugenics has haunted this work: frequently lurking beneath the

surface but rarely allowing the scrutiny of light.

Its ubiquity is

inevitable given that the two areas chosen both grew out of the eugenics

Eugenic's suspended animation results, in part, from the

movement.

success of Osborn and those who sought to minimize the intrusiveness of

eugenics.

By reducing it to an add-on,

rather than an issue in its own

right, its presence remains but its shape is obscured.

In order to

tease out the underlying forces at work, Chapter One concluded by

contrasting eugenics and genetic engineering.

By returning to the

issues upon which they were compared, it is possible to see the

dimensions missed by the scope and bias of the legislature (although the
courts come closer to addressing them) and to review the two areas

examined in this work.
Eugenics and engineering were distinguished by their reliance on

therapeutic or breeding goals; on an individual or societal focus; and
on average or idealized man.

Each of these, as well as the non-

eugenic/eugenic issue, should be made into
the left end would be the least eugenic.

a continuum.

For each pair,

Seen as a whole, the case

studies do not move far down the line toward eugenics.

They do,

became
however, provide the groundwork necessary if that movement

desirable
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Recent experience with both sterilization and genetic
screening
has been motivated largely by therapeutic concerns at the
individual

level.

Contraceptive sterilization was done for matters of lifestyle,

although in the case of Lee Ann Grady societal motives intruded.
were, however, custodial issues and not issues of breeding.

They

The welfare

abuses offered coercive societal motives but, again, they were not

breeding concerns and were ultimately deemed illegitimate.
Issues of genetic normality remained but in a muted form.

In

sharp contrast to the earlier sterilization campaign, the focus on

Grady's deviation from normality centered on her ability to exercise

judgment, not a concern over the future of the race.

The societal issue

underlying the Grady controversy was the fate of any offspring she might
produce: would they be brought up well?

Deviations from average

capabilities (maybe due to genetic abnormalities) was the standard
against which the need for sterilization was measured.

sterilization in order to compensate for
naturalistic bias with eugenics.

The use of

a lack of capabilities shares a

Each works on the assumption that the

root of the problem is biological and that a biological remedy is

therefore appropriate.

Genetic screening, too, falls at the therapeutic end of the
spectrum, but closer to breeding than does sterilization.

Movement

toward the eugenic end of the spectrum is also present on the issues of

individual/societal interests and on the average/normality range.

This

movement results, in large part, from the influence of carrier and
prenatal screening.

The more precise and powerful the technique, the
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greater the ability to achieve an idealized norm which moves
screening
further down the continuum toward eugenics.

Moving to the non-

eugenic/eugenic continuum, one finds that genetic screening moves
closer
to

eugenics by reaching, at times, a de facto eugenics.

This is not the

intention of the programs but is an unintended by-product.

Screening

reaches closer to this than does sterilization because all three

continuums work together.

Idealized norms play a greater role; societal

interests motivate many of the programs, even as they are voluntary and
serve individual interests; and therapeutic programs, in particular

carrier and prenatal, produce breeding consequences.

Each re-enforces

the other in terms of de facto eugenics.

When the legislatures treat screening or sterilization as

techniques designed to aid existing goals, they miss the movement along
these continuums.

They also miss the power exercised over nature, and,

in particular, the increased activity aimed at defining and achieving an

idealized biology.

While many of these programs legitimately are public

health, failure to identify these underlying themes misses an

opportunity to explore them in preparation of future genetic advances.
Eugenics may or may not be appropriate policy (Chapter One suggests

it

may not), but it should not become policy without careful debate and
scrutiny.
Even if eugenics is rejected as an explanatory framework for
these policies, the issue of power remains.

Rather than power through

eugenics, the vehicle may be technological faith.

This shares with

eugenics a naturalistic bias and the accompanying faith in the power of
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science.

The reason for continuing research in this area is to
gain

power over genes: to work toward an ideal genetic condition.

Business

has sought to gain power over the body in order to ensure a healthier

workforce (workplace screening).

The state has sought power in order to

improve the public health to lower medical costs and improve the

citizens' quality of life.

Finally, the individual desires power in

order to ensure a healthy family and/or life.
Two issues stand out in the discussion over power.

First,

technological advances have provided sophisticated and effective tools
to achieve these goals.

Furthermore, access is relatively

decentralized, enabling a wide range of interested parties the

opportunity to employ them.

Second, the naturalistic bias re-enforces

the notion that these tools are the appropriate approach to take; that

they provide meaningful information.

Legislative and administrative

approaches to technology have blinked at these concerns, instead

institutionalizing the incremental decision-making that takes place at
the individual level.
In sum, the discussion has proceeded full circle.

The

individuals have sought out technical solutions to their problems, the
courts have obliged and so too have legislatures.

Defined by the

individual as public health measures, the government has

institutionalized the model.

Joined with this is the scientific model

of controlling and manipulating nature.

Missing from the package is

a

and
critical eye turned toward the cumulative effect of these techniques

their use.
the social and political dimensions to the goals underlying
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The technologies provide power, the ability to control.
to

It

is necessary

recognize that issues which previously were "an act of God" or

"nature's roll of the dice" are now ours to decide.

Consequently, it is

necessary to demystify the technology and focus on the goals underlying
its use.

This, however, cannot be done through the language of rights

or the language of policy spoken through logrolling.

While the specific applications of the technologies today may be

benign social policy, they leave in place the institutional framework
for an easy slide into more powerful techniques.

This institutional

framework consists of a belief that a genetic strategy (naturalistic
bias) is a reasonable, fair, and meaningful approach to these issues;
the socialization of the public into accepting public health officials'

desire to identify and act upon one's genetic characteristics and the

appropriateness of our acting individually to shape our genetic future;
the courts legitimation of the technologies; and the legislatively

mandated legal and administrative structure from which the programs
could expand.

Inertia is a powerful force.

Once these arrangements

are in place, it is easier to approach problems through available means

than to search for alternative understandings of a problem and the

probability that new institutional arrangements will be necessary.
These institutional arrangements did not develop out of any plan (unless
one accepts the victory of the eugenic hypothesis, which this research
has not confirmed).

However, a politics dominated by interest groups

linkages
and logrolling is not well equipped to reflect carefully on the

between new political issues and new technologies.
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IV

The events presented were not masterminded by deviant
scientists
in the tradition of either Dr.

Strangelove or Dr. Frankenstein.

were there conspirators motivated by eugenics.
small step related to the previous stage.

sterilization.

Nor

Each movement was a

Castration progressed into

Sterilization's social application moved from the crude

use by the eugenicists to more refined applications under the Grady

rule.

Genetic screening, too, has worked in steps.

Carrier screening,

originally hastily applied to pander to interest groups, now is where it
belongs: a voluntary health program, coupled with research components.

Neonatal screening has slowly expanded to include more diseases and now
takes a natural step toward genetic registries in order to continue to
treat those afflicted.

routine health care.

Prenatal screening has slowly worked into

Technological incrementalism.

This incremental movement will, in all probability, continue on

This will mean extending the concerns addressed

its present course.

through the body.

Because genes are so controlling, they are a prime

vehicle and this means the practices will, on occasion, fit the

eugenicists' agenda.

But there is no evidence to suggest that the role

of eugenics will be any greater than the de facto eugenics presented,

above.

One extension that is likely is an increasingly systematic

extension of genetic screening to other genetic techniques, such as

AID.^

This means increasingly planned and rationalized birth.
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Future research on the applications of biological
knowledge

needs to examine the applications in light of these questions.

The

abuses of the early sterilization programs as well as the weaknesses
of

genetic screening endeavors were addressed, in part, because they
were
public programs.

To what extent are the priorities of which diseases or

problems are addressed the result of a social need or profit motive?
Can privacy be maintained?

Will coercion become a problem?

The

changing nature of the research and development system indicates that
the traditional public policy framework, where the policies are

explicitly government policies, is inadequate.

Yet, policies on

screening and pressures toward rationalized reproduction will persist.
What will be harder to find is who or what is or can be in control.

Another concern is privacy.
of confidentiality.

If

The principal concern here is one

the scope of managing the body expands, those

who carry out the programs will gain significant information about the

individual.

It

is

imperative that this be kept confidential.

Privacy cuts in a different direction.

As more public policy

focuses on the body, to what extent can the individual maintain

autonomy?

As the possibilities of AID or surrogate parenting become

understood or even encouraged, will this subtly limit an individual

ability to control his/her germ line?
on the status of the body.

s

The concern over autonomy centers

This needs to be examined.

The

Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.

This has been interpreted to exclude, as unreasonable,

surgery to remove a bullet near the heart but includes the drawing of
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blood. 35

The state police powers have been extended to include

vaccination and sterilization 36
.

the body,

As science and policy's focus
moves to

its legal status needs to be clarified.

its prudent

This may necessitate

remystification.

Finally, the difficult problem of democratic decision-making
on

technical issues needs to be addressed.

Should the society address

workplace insults or lifestyle side effects through screening even
is

the most effective and efficient means?

if

it

Should the costs and

benefits of screening be measured by its genetic consequences or by
political considerations developed by the public?

These are complex

problems, but given the fact that they address the fundamental make-up
of individuals they must be democratically resolved.

But the record

found, above, indicates that the system has been unwilling to examine

directly these questions.

They are, afterall, questions akin to an

individual examining his soul.

They ask, and the technology demands,

that we examine our biological and human essence.

contentiousness of these issues,

it

is not

Given the

surprising that the one

institution, the courts, that occasionally, but incompletely, addressed
these issues was the least democratic.

Democratic participation and the

bias of technology, however, produce competing pressures.

The

techniques narrow the focus to the individual while the pressures of
37
democratic decision-making are to expand the conflict.

But the

important role played by social standards of normality and the power of
the techniques to change ourselves and our self-image necessitates that
the expanded conflict be engaged.
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V

Any conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion must

recognize that this work served as a cautionary tale more than policy

analysis aimed at prescription.

How one takes the moral depends, in

part, on what is brought to the tale.

Freedom of choice expressed

through the privacy law, the screening malpractice cases, and the
support for the technical fix has been a value the political system
sought to enhance.

Balanced against this were concerns over

normalization, the instrumental treatment of life, and eugenics.

It is

ironic that so much power to improve the quality of an individual's life
has been made available and used under the rubric of liberty but that

each extension added to the growing instrumental treatment and

understanding of the individual.
A recent example of this is abortion.

The nationalization of

abortion was, to its supporters, a great strike for liberty.

Now,

OO

abortion may be applied to micromanage multiple births.

°

in this case

fetuses, chosen at random, will be aborted in order to enhance the

remaining fetus' chances for normal development.

The technique moves

from providing the woman freedom to control her body in a gross sense to

fine-tuning birth.

Although the technique remains the same, its

extended application highlights its instrumental logic and extends the
universe available to our instrumental manipulation.
The criticism leveled against the courts and legislatures in the

case studies was their failure to take this ironic twist into account.
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But the problems uncovered cannot be blamed simply upon institutions

failing to live up to their promise; the problem is also one of

perspective.

For this reason, recommending institutional reform or a

new institutional mix (e.g., a greater role for the Department of Health
and Human Services) will not solve the problems.

Before institutional tinkering can work, the influence of

science on our values must be recognized and considered.

The power of

science to change perceptions was stated well by Joseph Haberer:
To be sure, "in most scientific study, questions of good and evil,
or right and wrong, play at most a minor and secondary part."
Yet
questions on the moral and ethical responsibility of science, cannot
Scientific
be relegated to another realm, called politics.
knowledge per se is neither moral nor immoral. Nonetheless, this
knowledge does not remain neutral but makes important contributions
technologically, and, more crucially, because
to human existence
its theories change man's image of himself and later his

—

cosmology.

Abortion, AID, screening, and sterilization have all developed in such a
way as to challenge our traditional biological or social norms.

developed in

a

Each

narrow framework, abortion and AID as extraordinary and

exceptional practices, sterilization as

a private practice,

and

screening, generally speaking, as part of the public health function of
the state.

Now abortion will be used to manage pregnancies, AID has

made surrogate parenting possible, screening may allow for precise
in
control over the workplace or lifestyles, and sterilization floats

and out of eugenic and welfare politics.

sophisticated in substance or application.

Each has become more

They have entered new

human life
institutional arrangements making more human control over

possible.

and strive to
In sum, the biological sciences have made
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continue to make possible man's ability to change not only his
image of

himself but also himself.

The movement is relentlessly in the direction

of removing the randomness of chance.

The political system's response to this must recognize science
as the sine qua non of contemporary society.

Practically, this will

mean recognizing that the laissez-faire model of science is politically

unacceptable.

Science and the fruits of science, like their industrial

predecessor, must be regulated in the public interest.

Of course,

prudence dictates that this movement be done with care so that science
as an institution does not suffer unduly.

In order to do this, it is

necessary for the political system to view technology and science as
more than just a neutral tool to achieve previously agreed upon ends.
The transformation of abortion just noted or the application of genetic

screening to lifestyle concerns or the use of AID in surrogate parenting

illustrate that a tool is capable of creating new ends.
When the political system addresses new technologies it must

review their immediate purposes but also remain cognizant of the values
they touch.

The Congress has begun this process by creating committees

whose jurisdiction includes science, as well as creating support

institutions to help analyze the social impact of technology.

The

executive, too, has advisors designated to treat science on its own
terms.

The trend applies to the courts as well.

As was noted, above,

new
the recent Baby M case classified surrogate parenting with other

reproductive techniques, suggesting that the legislature examine their
cumulative impact.

These actions are among many institutional
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recognititions that politics as usual is not adequate.

But the most

important issue remaining is viewing science as an independent
variable.

Creating a commission on biotechnology composed of representatives
from
the policy-making branches, students of science and politics,
and those

from other callings may help raise the visibility of the educational
side of the issue.

There is no guarantee that this will produce

miraculous transformations, but its virtue, however, is that education
and vision are the preconditions for successfully dealing with science

and society and commissions have been successful at introducing issues

into public discourse.

Relying on the market to regulate these technologies is

difficult.

Unlike traditional economic products, the currency of

technological politics is information which is harder for a market to
regulate than widgets.

Furthermore, the market takes short-term costs

into account but the "costs" of science are often in the future.

Working the long-term factors into the short-term will depend upon
informed consumers aware of the issues at stake.
In a political system experienced in incremental decision-

making, working out ends and exploring the interrelationship between
means and ends is difficult.

But the need to do this is at the core of

a responsible politics of science.

The courts have recognized this in

some cases but they are not capable of this practice.

These are

legislative concerns and the central task of American politics will be
to convince the voters that

logroll.

their representatives must govern, not

with the
In this system, the responsibility ultimately resides
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voters since they, through the ballot, express their opinion on the

direction and soundness of the political system.

Parochial legislation

in the area of science reflects the individualistic and possessive view

the public has of technology.
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(
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1974).
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15.
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12.

Gleitman v. Cosgrove

13.
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14.
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1967).
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16.

Congregation For the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction
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For Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity
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Translated by Vatican (Boston: Daughters of St. Pauli
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17.

Instruction

,
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17.

18.
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,
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19.
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,
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20.
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21.
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34.
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